Ordinary Muslims are disillusioned with the selective form of Shariah imple- mented by politicians. However, the idea of Shariah, as depicted by imams, is still popular among them.14 This does not mean that radicals like Boko Haram, who fight for an undiluted form of divine law, can count on widespread support. Most Muslims in the North do not want to live under a Taliban-like regime, alt- hough they find it difficult to formulate a counter-model when distancing them- selves from the militants. Ideas about Shariah are diverse and often vague. Ad- herents of the Tijaniyya brotherhood, the dominant Muslim grouping in the North-East, tended to be lax in matters of Islamic Law and came under attack from more zealous Muslims who entered the scene in the 1970s: preachers with a
13
Some governors made it clear that they dislike Shariah. In Kano, Rabiu Kwankwaso announced that no cleric could tell him what to do, “no matter how long his beard is” (Anon.), “Paralysed by Fear”,
The Economist (print edition, 10 January 2004, 32). Yet he was forced to pass comprehensive Shariah
laws and set up a Shariah vigilante. Moreover, he was voted out of office after just one term.
14
Crisis Group, Northern Nigeria, 21, 38; (Anon.), “Most Nigerians reject Boko Haram”, Daily Trust (print edition), 21 February 2012, 10.
certificate in Islamic studies (acquired in Saudi Arabia or at some university in Nigeria), who toured the countryside in order to impose, with the followers they gained, their purist version of a righteous life, often inspired by Salafist ideas or by Shia publications from Iran. Against these foreign doctrines, adherents of Ti- janiyya tried to defend what little personal freedom they still had. However, their rejection of undue religious interference does not mean that they were fighting for tolerance and equal rights. Like other Muslims in the North, they want a soci- ety dominated by Islam, where infidels and women know their place.
The other major organisation, the Salafist Izala (“Society for the Eradication of (un-Islamic) Innovations and the Establishment of the Sunnah”), comes closer to Boko Haram in that it emphasises the necessity of scrupulously following God’s commandments as revealed in the Quran and the Sunnah. Yet a literal in- terpretation of the holy texts, as suggested by Izala, does not necessarily lead to a strategy of violence: instead of attacking the state apparatus, as Boko Haram suggests, it is better to take it over. By engaging with the state, Muslims have a chance to Islamise it, pushing for reforms that will gradually expand the official, state-enforced Shariah legislation. If they are to enhance their political influence, Muslims have to acquire Western-style education; without school certificates they cannot apply for senior positions in the state bureaucracy. This reformist apology of appropriating secular education and accepting jobs in an un-Islamic government appeals to those who have found employment, especially if they are young and better educated. But it is less attractive to the millions of jobless youths. Most of them just attended Quranic schools, where they learnt little else but to copy and memorise suwar (sing.: surah) written and pronounced in a lan- guage they did not understand (Arabic). Products of an almajiri education used to stick to the teachings of the two main Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa), the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya, yet they are also drawn to the message of Boko Haram: that West- ern schools, by spreading alien, materialist values, have corrupted society and must be banned.
When comparing the statements of religious organisations, it becomes clear that there is no major ideological difference between moderates and radicals. I will illustrate this, at the end of this contribution, by looking at three topics which have been at the centre of controversies generated by Boko Haram: the rejection of Western education; the declaration that some fellow Muslims are infidels who may be killed with impunity; and the attacks on Christians. In reconstructing some features of these debates, I will quote from newspaper articles and other materials available on the Internet, and I will draw on my own observations in 2011 and 2012 when I spent a few months in some remote locations in Yobe (and
Borno) State.15 In these rural towns and villages, questions of religious doctrine were widely discussed, among both local government employees and illiterate farmers. However, theological disputes are just one aspect of the present crisis. They reflect social divisions between old and young, between illiterate and West- ern-educated Nigerians. In addition, they are shaped by political interests and intrigues. Thus, I will first discuss the political setting within which groups like Tijaniyya, Izala, and Boko Haram operate. Then I will look at the social compo- sition of their members, their relationship with the political class, and the bitter antagonisms among these groups: not just between Boko Haram and the religious establishment but also between Izala and Tijaniyya.
Given these deep divisions, it is unlikely that Muslims in northern Nigeria will direct the rigour of God’s law against their oppressors. Clerics may decry a de- praved and godless ruling class, but the faithful will not muster the common strength to confront those who are mainly responsible for the social and econom- ic decline. Another reason why the project of a religious renewal of society will fail is the absence of credible leaders, as many imams have an ambivalent rela- tionship towards the political establishment. Even Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, was close to the corrupt authorities in Borno State, sometimes working with them and sometimes confronting them. Although he was preaching jihad, his political patrons still bailed him out in January 2009 when he was detained in Abuja. On his return to Maiduguri, where he received a triumphant welcome, the streets at the reception venue were lined with exotic cars.16 There is a further rea- son why religion will fail to domesticate the political elite: despite popular re- sentment of the rapacious elites, there is considerable complicity with them. Poli- ticians and citizens work hand in hand to defraud the state, and they both take a very selective interest in Shariah. They observe their ritual obligations and main- tain some Islamic decorum but have few qualms violating the holy injunctions against adultery and other vices.