Acoples rápidos

In chapter one I tried to expose James's theory of radical empiricism along with the subsequent development o f his thought from reluctant psychophysical dualism to metaphysical monism of neutral entities. It was argued that James accepted part of the Cartesian explanation of mind in order to dispose of the sterile notion of consciousness as an epiphenomenon as described by the automaton theorists. James a physiologist and a psychologist was impressed by the function of nervous system, and his analysis of the theory o f the sensory and the motor activity of the nervous system led James to regard "sensation" as physiological process. As he said:

"|T |he function o f the nervous system is to bring each part into harmonious co-operation with every other. The afferent nerves, when excited by some physical irritant,... conveys the excitement to the nervous centres. The commotion set up by the centres does not stop there, but discharges itself,... through the efferent nerves into muscles and glands, exciting movements of the limbs and viscera, or acts of secretion,.... These acts of response have usually the common character of being of service." \The Principles o f Psychology, vol. 1, p. 12],

He was convinced that consciousness is not a spiritual activity but is really a "feeling of bodily activities" Such biological interpretation lead him to explain consciousness in terms of "cephalic movements".

James later had a different interpretation for the notion of consciousness. He asked: "Does consciousness exist?" His candid reply was "no". What exists is a sort of activity which functions in a peculiar way and hence is called consciousness. There is no such thing as "I", a permanent subject of discourse as Descartes and his followers believed. What is left behind is a "mere echo", the "faint rumor" of the disappearing "soul" which we call consciousness. Now consciousness simply stands for a function

Critique o f James. 9 1

and that function is "knowing". James thought that Cartesian notion of consciousness "vanished" from his philosophy once and for all. John Dewey, in his remarkable essay "The Vanishing Subject in The Psychology of James" (pp. 589-599), said that the biological interpretation o f consciousness by James clearly shows that "the "subject" o f dualistic epistemology disappears and its place is taken by an empirical and behavioural self.” [p. 596]. Dewey interpreted James's theory as a form of behaviourism because James relied on the physiological interpretation of brain and central nervous system. My argument is that James's reliance on physiological theory is simply analogical. I will shortly discuss this.

James's metaphysical aspiration led him outline on several occasions how, in his opinion, his position differed from dualism; however on close inspection, fa r from convincing one that his position is not dualistic, these statements make it more apparent that, covertly, it is.

There is a sort of dualism present in Jam es's philosophy. A.O. Lovejoy, in his The Revolt Against D ualism, argued:

While we may "take" an individual thing or event in two relations or context, we do not thereby make it possible for it at once to have and not have the same relation to a given other term, or to cause and not cause the same effect. The final outcome of James's reasoning on the matter is thus a complete relapse into the dualism from which he set out to escape.3

The above passage indicates that by dualism Lovejoy meant Cartesian dualism. Since an event B cannot be the cause of both C (a physical event) and M (a mental event), for instance, at the same time, therefore C and M must have separate causes. This suggested that since this cannot be explained James has lapsed into a dualism which explains that there are two different substances to explain mind and matter, similar to that o f Descartes.

1 differ to agree with Lovejoy. For James dualism is that of a relation. For instance, a man, P, has at some particular time, a certain relation to his neighbour X. He also, at that time has a relation to his student Y. Both the relations are simultaneous. The dualism James lapses into is of this sort. Here we can say that P, constituted out of series of experiences has a relation with both X and Y, similar to two straight lines both intersecting at a point. According to James P has a relation to X which is a part

Critique of James. 9 2

o f a sequence. Similarly it is part of a sequence of Y. James did not deny that this sort o f dualism is preserved in his theory. Dualism "is an affair of relations ... and can always be particularised and defined". ["Does "consciousness" Exist?"J. This is reflected in the following example:

To her offspring a tigress is tender, but cruel to every other living thing - both cruel and tender, therefore, at once. ["The Place of Affectional Facts", p. 70].

My reaction is that the sort of dualism James spoke is a kind o f covert dualism. I have argued this in section 1.2.3. In short if a neutral entity used in construction needs a complex structure composed o f elements or qualities and internal relations as a part then it has inner duplicity. We should then consider the construction the construction o f the mental or physical entity as Covert. If the covert elements are themselves mental or physical then we have Covert Dualism. Covert dualist implicitly introduce both physical and mental elements within the neutral entities. These elements form the inherent structure of the individual neutral entity. They are so arranged that the subject object distinction follow implicitly without any interference of external causes. In my analysis of James’s theory of neutral monism I will argue this point and show that he is a covert dualist and not as Lovejoy argued a Cartesian dualist.

I have already claimed that James, in his formative period of neutral monism was a covert dualist. In his theory of "phenomenism” he implicitly introduced the dualism by suggesting internal elements within a single experience. The theory of radical empiricism is the mature version of phenomenism. Though he emphasised the "pristine" character of experiences, his attentive analysis showed that in fact they have parts. The following passage demonstrates this:

Experience, from the very first, presents us with concreted objects, vaguely continuous with the rest of the world which envelops them in space and time, and potentially divisible into inward elements and parts. |The Principles, vol. 1, p. 487].

Although his mature theory was triumphant on Cartesian dualism, he failed to stick the strict programme of neutral monism. Instead James collapsed to his earlier version called "phenomenism". There he admitted that the "experience" has internal elements. He made no gloss, rather admitted that experiences has "selective" power and "tendencies" which leads them from one experience to another in their fulfilled end, no matter whatever their "knowing office" (here James hinted on the term "consciousness" as a separate entity) may be. Moreover on several occasion James

Critique of James. 9 3

stated that relations are part of pure experience. This suggest that apart from externally relating different experiences internally the elements of each experience are organized and structured.

There is no doubt that James succeeded in closing the gap between mind and matter, which Descartes and his followers left asunder. Descartes believed that two different substances are the constituent of mind and matter. Mind has two distinct activities to perform. Apart from the thinking process there is a permanent subject called ’ 1" which is the actual knower. Such interpretation is responsible for epistemological dualism where a distinction is made between the knower and the known, between the subject and the object. James denounced such distinctions which make the relation of knowing the most "mysterious" thing in the world. He believed that experience, as an empirically given, can explain both mind and matter. The mystery o f cognitive process is dissolved in the stream of conscious flow. One can feel ones feelings flowing inward and outward and can be aware o f them immediately without any mediator, such as an "Ego".

James could not defend his ambitious theory. In his over enthusiastic analysis of experience, he brought in dualism in rather disguised form. This is why 1 called his theory covertly dualistic. This will become more clear as 1 set my reasons as to how James’s theory lapses into dualism.

In this chapter I will analyse his theory o f pure experience in general. This will lead me to point out especially as to why James theory collapses into dualism. For the purpose of my discussion 1 have isolated eight points. The discussion o f them will reveal how James fell into the trap of dualism. The points of my discussions are as follows:

3.2.1. Experiences are not neutral as James claimed.

3.2.2. James failed to give proper reasons for why experiences at their initial stage are pure.

3.2.3. James brought in neourophysiological imagery to explain the continuity of experience.

3.2.4. His theory o f relations only partly answered Hume.

3.2.5. Extrinsic analysis of an unwarranted experience—, mental and physical, is not applied to sequences but to points,

3.2.6. The functional explanation of experiences remain inadequate 3.2.7. Experiences are heterogeneous and not homogeneous as James claimed.

Critique of James. 9 4

3.2.8. Experiences have intrinsic elements. His theory of knowledge by acquaintance further, inadvertently, supports this.

3.2.1. The Concept “Neutral*: Two Approaches.