The approaches considered in the previous sections take as a theoretical point of departure a rational evaluation of the consequences of action. Rationality, however, is bound by constraints of time, knowledge, and cognitive capacity (Simon,1972). Acknowledging this distinction dual process theories describe two modes of thinking: automatic and controlled (Evans, 2003). Designating these modes intuitive and deliberative, Kahneman (2003, p. 699) notes the anthropomorphic simplification of this relationship indicating that, rather than describing a hierarchy, it refers to a hypothesis about what would happen if the operations of controlled thought were disrupted. The intuitive mode is characterised by the spontaneous manifestation of thoughts. The ease of manifestation is related to accessibility —the amount of effort required for particular mental representations to emerge. Kahneman (2003, p. 700) describes this accessibility as a continuum, with automatic, habitual operations occurring at one end and slower, effortful operations at the other. In a given situation, however, what becomes accessible is dependent on the properties of the eliciting stimuli, with motivationally relevant and emotionally arousing stimuli exogenously attracting attention and subsequent consideration for action. The RAA, in particular, ascribes behaviour to deliberative processes. Such processes are slow and, as a result of the need for WM, limited in their capacity to process si-
multaneous demands (Evans, 2003). In contrast, intuitive processes are automatic and rapid, employing previous experiences (Evans, 2003), habits (Wood and Neal, 2007), or heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974) to guide actions. These intuitive behavioural drivers direct behaviour in predictable ways. For instance, a habit is a re- peated pattern of behaviour that occurs in response to environmental or psychological cues (Wood and Neal,2007, p. 843). Automatically triggered behavioural patterns draw on the notion of automatic, exogenous attentional orienting. In this instance, intuitive behaviour occurs independent of cognitive control (Evans and Stanovich,2013, p. 236) — control is “outsourced” to environmental cues (Wood and Neal,2007, p. 853). For habits, through previous experiences, cues create a relationship between a trigger, behaviour, and a reward (Wood and Neal, 2007). Once a habit has formed the reward does not drive behaviour. Rather, the habit has become automatic. Cues can trigger behaviour irrespective of whether the related reward is received or not.
Habit, as a psychological construct, has historically been linked with behaviourism (Wood and Neal, 2007). The first wave of this perspective began to fall into decline follow- ing two critiques disparaging the reduction of complex human behaviour to a series of stimulus-response relationships (Chomsky, 1959; Mowrer, 1963). These criticisms coin- cided with the burgeoning school of Cognitive Psychology. As described in Section 2.2, such an approach rejects the environmental restrictions of behaviourism. Rather, be- haviour is ascribed to internal processes contingent on the operation of various executive functions. Wood and Neal (2007, p. 844) note that, beginning at the turn of the 20th century, a social-cognitive-behaviourist synthesis has emerged, incorporating key elements of behaviourism within a framework considering action to emerge on the basis of goals. Specifically, the causal role of the environment has been incorporated into models of cog- nitive control. From this perspective,Wood and Neal (2007) outline a theory of habitual behaviour, integrating the stimulus-response mechanism present in behaviourism, with cognitive theories of goal-directed behaviour. In this theory goals are required for the learning and performance of habitual behaviour, but not for their initiation. Rather, habitual behaviour is triggered by cues that have covaried with previous performance instances. This theory is outlined by means of three principles, each describing different aspects of the relationship between goals, contexts, and behavioural responses.
The first principle outlines the contextual triggering of habitual responses. Wood and Neal (2007) describe how the automaticity of habitual behaviour is developed through repeated patterns of covariation between contexts, cues, and responses in one of two ways. In direct cuing, habits are formed on the basis of associations between stimuli
and responses or, in motivated cuing, habits are formed through motivation related to previous experiences of rewards in the associated context. Evidence supporting the role of contextual cues for habitual responses has been found in both laboratory and nat- uralistic studies (e.g. Wood et al., 2005; Neal and Wood, 2007). The second principle concerns the absence of goal mediation in the context-response relationship. Wood and Neal (2007) account for goal-directed behaviour in describing habits as the ‘residue’ of repeated instances of goal-directed action. Therefore, in their model, goals are necessary for the development of habitual behaviour, but not required for subsequent initiation of behaviour. Support for this principle has been found in both behavioural and neuro- physiological studies (e.g.Sheeran et al.,2005;Moors and De Houwer,2006). The third principle describes the interface between habits and goals. As enduring behavioural pat- terns, habits are not affected by current goals or intentions. Rather, the interface between habits and goals is constrained in such a way that, if necessary, they can drive each other. Goals direct the formation of habits but, as Wood and Neal(2007) describe, habits can be used to make assumptions about goals. Consequently, they interface such that, in cer- tain situations, behaviour is habitual, while in others the habitual action is inhibited in favour of a different goal-directed response. Evidence supporting this principle has been observed in experience sampling, observational, and experimental studies (e.g.Ouellette and Wood,1998;Wilkinson and Shanks,2004).
2.4.5 Conclusions
While each of these approaches presume to propose a complete model of behaviour, if considered together, a more comprehensive understanding of the factors underlying be- haviour can be produced. In considering the RAA, the importance of behaviour-specific attitudes, beliefs and intentions was noted. While this theory accounts for factors under- lying behavioural intentions, other than social norms, it does not consider environmental factors which may have an influence on such intentions. The SCT, in contrast, emphasises the reciprocal interactions between individuals, their environments, and behaviour. The FBM emphasises the necessary requirements for an action —motivation, simplicity and a trigger. Finally, through considering intuitive, habitual behaviour the role of goals in the acquisition, but not necessarily the initiation of habitual behaviour was noted. While differences do exist, many constructs specified in one theory relate to those described in another. For instance, perceived behavioural control, within the RAA, corresponds with abilities in the FBM, or the notion of self-efficacy within the SCT.
Following this examination it is concluded that behaviour, media multitasking for in- stance, is acquired, enacted, and initiated through a complex mix of internal factors —goals, motivations, abilities, triggers, perceptions, and outcome expectancies— and external factors —triggers, cues, social contexts, and norms. Of particular relevance is the importance of goals for both deliberative and intuitive behaviour. Whether such intentions are formed through attitudes, beliefs, modelling or other motivations, they imply that behaviour is purposeful. Bandura(1991) asserts that actions are pro-actively directed in accordance with desires to attain specific outcomes. To consider the nature of media multitasking, given the importance of goals and environmental and social cues in the initiation of behaviour, it is necessary to understand the intentions brought to such engagements as well as the situational factors present. In particular, given the af- fordances of media, a comprehensive understanding of the ensuing enactment of these affordances requires considering the needs people desire media to fulfil and how fulfilment of such needs produces particular patterns of behaviour.
In the context of this dissertation this section served two purposes. First, the considera- tion of factors influencing behaviour is intended to guide the examination of media multi- tasking behaviour. Second, the establishment of a theoretical framework for behaviour is necessary for producing a behavioural intervention (Michie et al.,2011). While the first can be addressed through the narrative discussion presented thus far, the second requires the development of a pragmatic model capable of guiding the analysis and development of behavioural interventions. Michie et al.(2011) describe a model of behaviour suitable for this purpose, COM-B. In this model, depicted in Figure2.5, the interaction between capability (C), opportunity (O), and motivation (M) produces behaviour (B), which it- self reciprocally influences these components. Michie et al.(2011, p. 6) define capability as the “psychological and physical capacity to engage in the activity concerned”. Op- portunity refers to all factors external to the individual that either prompt or enable an action. The authors distinguish between physical and social opportunities. Finally, they define motivation as the “brain processes that energise and direct behaviour” (p. 6). This construct includes both intentional, as well as habitual and emotionally directed motiva- tions. Given the conceptualisations for these constructs, it is evident that the COM-B model incorporates, at an abstract level, the key positions of the four approaches con- sidered previously. In abstracting these processes this model is intended to be useful for the consideration and development of behavioural interventions.
Capability
Motivation
Opportunity
Behaviour
Figure 2.5: The COM-B model of behaviour