Aer Lingus reluctantly became the first flag carrier outside Britain to order the Carvair. Aviation Traders was very pleased with the order and considered it a positive sign for potential sales. The decision to purchase was made under the direction of the Irish government and the influence of the Irish tourist authority, Bord Failte.
During the summer of 1960–61 BKS Air Transport operated car-ferry service between Liv- erpool and Dublin using the Bristol freighter. BKS was co-founded by T. D. “Mike” Keegan, who became the owner of British Air Ferries in 1971. Operating up to ten flights per day in each direction BKS transported 1628 automobiles during the summer of 1961. There were no drive- on sea ferries operating across the Irish Sea during this period. This was slightly more than six and a half percent of the traffic in the market prompting the opinion the car-ferry operation had great potential for growth.
Aer Lingus in an effort to expand into new markets reviewed four potential aircraft for car-ferry work and for possible replacement of the DC-3 cargo aircraft. The choices were the Bristol freighter, which was already in car-ferry service, the Armstrong Whitworth AW650 Argosy, the planned AW670, and the Carvair. It was concluded that the Bristol was not suited because of high maintenance and low capacity. The AW650 was too expensive and the AW670 project was eventually cancelled. The carrier was quite interested in the AW670 and worked closely with the manufacturer on reviewing its potential. It soon became obvious that it was not cost effective for car-ferry work and the Carvair was the only suitable aircraft. Aer Lingus officials concluded that even the Carvair would not be profitable in dedicated car-ferry service and considered a mixed role of cars, horses and cargo. It was decided that the economical DC- 3s, already in service, were quite sufficient in the cargo role until at least 1966. After further review it was clear that the Carvair would not be profitable and would require government sub- sidy.
BKS Air Transport withdrew the Liverpool-Dublin service at the end of the 1961 season because of financial problems. Southend based Channel Airways already an operator of car- ferry Bristol freighters applied to take over the Liverpool-Dublin service. With this change in circumstances Bord Failte became concerned with the lack of car-ferry service and the prospect of Channel Airways expanding into the Irish market. The Irish government concluded that Bord Failte was correct and directed Aer Lingus to provide car-ferry service even if not profitable.
On 31 August 1962 Aer Lingus placed the first order for two Carvairs and support equip- ment (including eight “Hylo” Mark II loaders) at a cost of £700,000 ($1,960,700). The carrier also took an option on a third Carvair to be exercised at an unspecified date. They were sched- uled to begin service in the spring of 1963 to capitalize on the tourist season. The purchase of all Carvairs included one “Hylo” loader. Aer Lingus positioned the pair acquired with the first two aircraft at Dublin and ordered five additional loaders to be positioned at Cork, Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol, and Cherbourg. The option for a third Carvair added the ninth loader, which was positioned at Bristol’s alternate city of Cardiff.
Irish specifications required the Carvair fuel systems to be uniform on all ships. Aviation Traders was acutely aware of fuel system problems since they were not the same on the any of the DC-4 conversion candidates to date. Engineers at ATEL were already involved in standard- izing the Carvair fuel system but in order to meet the Aer Lingus requirement the fuel selec- tors were permanently set on tank to engine. Aer Lingus also specified the Carvairs be equipped with Collins Flight Director 101, which was used on the Viscount fleet. The FD 101 ran off the battery through a separate inverter.
To capitalize on all markets and to attempt to make the Carvair profitable Aer Lingus became the first carrier to order the “Rolamat” floor system. The system was installed along with the raised ceiling option during the winter of 1963–64. This system allowed the aircraft to
be quickly loaded with palletized cargo, horses, or automobiles. The “Rolamat” system was designed in such a way that the auto tires fit between the roller tracks when in car-ferry serv- ice.
It is also the first carrier to order the four-car 34-passenger cabin to be used on the Dublin — Cherbourg route or special bookings. The 34-seat cabin was also used on a passenger —freighter service to Liverpool (pallet cargo only). Normal car-ferry service was operated in 22-passen- ger, five-car or 34-passenger four-car configuration. The passenger cabin decor was very sim- ilar to BUAF and consisted of deep-blue carpets with light blue with gold Lurex seats. The lower cabin wall was coral Vynide with white on the upper walls and ceiling. The window curtains were light beige color. An extra emergency exit was installed on the right side of the fuselage in the forward cabin.
The cargo bay sliding door, which is directly across from the passenger entry door, was secured in the open position for the 34-seat four-car configuration. A sliding curtain was installed over the opening and a small door was installed on the forward bulkhead to allow access to the cargo bay. After takeoff the flight attendant was required to enter the cargo bay and inspect the cars for fuel leaks. Upon completion the flight attendant was required to call the captain and state, “Freight hold free from fumes.” At that time the “No Smoking” signs were turned off. When horses were transported a groom also rode in the cargo bay forward of the cabin. The groom carried a stun gun in the event a horse became unmanageable and placed the aircraft in danger. The captain had the authority to order the groom to destroy the horse in such an occurrence.
Aer Lingus officials considered every option for maximum utilization of the Carvair even convincing Silver City Managing Director W.C. (Bill) Franklin to take a position with the Irish carrier when the Carvair was delivered. He remained with Aer Lingus as the Cargo and Ferry Manager for many years.
The first Carvair was delivered 14 March 1963 followed by the second on 29 April. Both aircraft were immediately put into crew training service under the direction of Captain J.J.
In addition to the two loaders received with the first two Carvairs, Aer Lingus ordered five more “Hylo” loaders to be positioned at Cork, Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol and Cherbourg (courtesy Aviation Traders Ltd./Guy Craven).
Sullivan, who became and held the position of Training Captain during the entire Carvair tenure. He later became the Training Captain on the Aer Lingus 747 fleet often pointing out the ATL-98 cockpit similarity.
Aer Lingus crews soon learned that flying the Carvair was most definitely a two handed affair. The non-flying pilot was asked to set the power, especially during approach. In cruise the captain usually flew because the “Autopilot” control unit was on his side. It was little more than a stabilization device run by vacuum gyroscopes and hydraulic servos under the cockpit. In cruise he would set 650 BHP and accept the airspeed, which was dictated by the current weight of the aircraft.7
Use of carburetor heat automatically reduced the boost because of lower air density. The pilot had to add more boost to compensate, which changed the inlet temperature again. These delicate adjustments were made until the temperature stabilized at 20˚C. If you popped out of a cloud into warmer air you had to instantly reduce the carburetor heat to avoid detonation and reduce boost at the same time to avoid over-boosting the engines (eight levers to play with).8 As the aircraft was rounded out for landing the Captain would call for a “Slow Bleed” to reduce power. If it was done to quickly you arrived with a bump. It could be counter acted with a heave on the elevator to stop the sink, which was difficult because of the weight of the con- trols and reduced airflow over the elevators. Too slow and you flew to the ground very gently. Too fast landed you long requiring hard braking with no anti-skid increasing stopping distance on a rapidly shortening runway.9
The biggest problem not foreseen by Aer Lingus officials, was reliability. The flight crews although well qualified were never really comfortable with the Carvair. The braking system was very effective but required careful handling to avoid tire damage since the brakes were not fit- ted with anti-skid. The crews had considerable more experience with the eight Viscounts and seven F-27 aircraft operated by Aer Lingus and preferred the Rolls-Royce Dart turboprop, which was more forgiving and easier to manage. It was acknowledged that the Carvair takeoff and climb performance was very good but experienced considerable engine failures because of what was perceived as the more temperamental R-2000 radials. The responsibility for the problems was generally laid upon the crews. The argument has been made that the American made Pratt & Whitney engines were considerably more complex.
The practice of cutting power on approach and letting the prop turn the engine causes lubri- cation problems and valve backlash resulting in a high rate of engine failure. The crews were instructed to insure the manifold boost pressure in inches was not to drop below the engine rpm (i.e. if engine rpm is 2000 the minimum boost is 20 inches). It was also decided to reduce T/O Boost from 50 inches to 48, which lessened stresses on the engines producing a noticeable result. It was noted that at the end of the maximum allowable time for T/O boost all engine parameters, cylinder head and oil temperature, were at maximum allowable. Overheating caused the oil pressure to drop making damage inevitable. After a period of learning adjustment engine failures were somewhat reduced but still remained at an unacceptable level.
The Carvair is a larger aircraft than the crews were generally experienced in operating and it was thought to require a softer touch. It was theorized that these factors combined with crit- ical airflow considerations because of the large nose reduced reliability. In reality the engines could not be stressed as much as the Dart engines on other aircraft. In addition the aircraft were operated on short segments not intended for the long range aircraft and fields with marginal takeoff with a full load. Bristol was one such field that tested the resolve of the Carvair crew. Captain J.J. Sullivan noted such an incident at Bristol when the aircraft approached V1; the F/O called engine fire. Captain Murphy responded “Give me more boost” and continued a takeoff and climb on three engines immediately returning to the field, having completed a fire drill and feathering procedure. The incident ended without damage or injury but demonstrated the point that there was no margin for error.10
Aer Lingus pilots were not comfortable with the Carvair in these marginal situations and company officials were never really pleased with the Carvair service. The company always viewed the operation as a marginal government stop- gap measure to help Irish tourism until the arrival of Irish Sea car-ferries.
Early on some of the mechanical problems were traced to the magnetos because of the Carvair being operated in the high mois- ture atmosphere of Ireland. The moisture caused arch- ing and misfiring damaging the engine cylinders. The most effective approach to resolve the problem was the use of a red sealer on the magneto covers to prevent the moisture from enter- ing.11Aer Lingus continued to deal with the engine fail- ures while the flight crews
became very apprehensive about the problem and preferred the Viscount. Engine failures became so common that one Captain experienced 12 failures in 12 months. Captain Joe Dible wrote in the front of his log. “A Gentleman’s aeroplane, which does not require one to worry unduly unless one has a thing about engines!”12
Eventually it was learned that faulty engine overhaul practices by a contractor was the cul- prit. During the majority of the five years the Carvair was with Aer Lingus, replacement engines were supplied by Scottish Aviation. In mid 1965, near the end of the Irish Carvair operation, engine replacements were supplied by Air France overhaul. At this point the problems were greatly reduced and reliability improved to the point that engine failures were rare. The crews were exonerated and the culprit was identified as unreliable practices by contract maintenance. Reliability improved so much that EI-AMP operated for an entire month without inci- dent. The performance became so good that the flight crews became concerned and some feared a failure may be on the next flight. Crews often stated, “It has to break sometime.”
Aer Lingus took over the BKS car ferry terminal at Dublin. The two aircraft were sched- uled initially for 7 flights per week beginning 08 May, increasing to 13 flights per week during the peak period form Dublin-Liverpool. Three services per week were scheduled Dublin-Bris- tol beginning 11 May increasing to six during peak months. Cork-Bristol began 12 May with two per week later increasing to four. The forth car ferry route from Dublin to Cherbourg was originally announced as once weekly on Thursday from 20 June to 12 September. Advanced bookings were so strong it was increased to twice per week. The Dublin-Bristol-Cork was set up as circle trip utilizing the aircraft for more than eight hours per day. Several combinations
A fresh overhauled Pratt & Whitney R-2000 awaiting installation of the QEC kit. At a cost of $20,000 each in 1963 the high rate of failures was considered unacceptable (author’s photograph).
were used to attempt to maximize utilization and yield. The cross channel flights transported only passengers with cars in the five-car 22-passenger set up. The Dublin-Cherbourg flights oper- ated in the three-car 34-passenger set up accepting passenger without cars.
The rates were set up with varying rates for size of car and day of the week travel. Accom- panying passengers were charged the normal airfare.
Dublin — Liverpool Cars up to 11 ft. in length £10.0s (Mid Week) £9.0s Cars up to 15 ft. in length £22.0s
(Mid Week) £19.10s Dublin — Bristol Cars up to 11 ft. in length £11.10s (Mid Week) £10.10s Cars up to 15 ft. in length £28.0s
(Mid Week) £26.0s Cork — Bristol Cars up to 11 ft. in length £12.10s
(Mid Week) £10.10s Cars up to 15 ft. in length £29.0s
(Mid Week) £27.0s Dublin — Cherbourg Cars up to 11 ft. in length £17.10s
Cars up to 13 ft. in length £26.0s Cars over 13 ft./under 15.5 £42.0s
Initial pre-season bookings for 2,160 cars were met with optimism. This was almost half of the capacity on the cross channel routes. In addition slightly more than half of the reserva- tions of 4000 cars Aer Lingus estimated would be transported during the first season were already sold. Officials were quite pleased that by the end of the season 4,324 cars and 12,532 passengers were transported. This was better than planned traffic and the not yet corrected reliability prob- lems prompted the airline to exercise the third Carvair option in November 1963. Considera- tion of a fourth Carvair was discussed with ATEL. It was believed a third aircraft would better the Aer Lingus position for the 1964 season. It would also improve schedule reliability in the event the mechanical failures could not be reduced.
Aer Lingus Carvairs were delivered in a 34-passenger four-car configuration with the stan- dard ceiling in the cargo hold. The first two ships began service in an all cargo role supplement- ing the DC-3s. They operated on overnight mail service from Manchester to Dublin and cargo flights to France, which was more profitable because of the longer flight segment. The program was successful enough that two of the DC-3s were surplused and sold. The two Carvairs were returned to Southend during the winter of 1963–64 for maintenance and modifications. In a further attempt to transport more cargo and increase market share the “Rolamat” floor system was installed and the ceiling was raised in the cargo compartment behind the cockpit hump. The modification gave a cathedral effect to the forward section of the cargo hold. This was done in an effort to obtain horse charters, which BKS Air Transport had dominated. Aer Lingus offi- cials believed they could expand into a new market and increase revenue.
After the delivery of the third Carvair the remaining DC-3 cargo aircraft were sold and the car-ferry frequency was increased. The three ships were employed on car-ferry service between Dublin, Liverpool and Bristol and many bloodstock charters to Cambridge. During the 1964 season 5101 cars were transported, however aircraft reliability still remained a prob- lem. The three aircraft were used for all cargo service during the winter of 1964–65.
As the cheaper drive on Irish sea-ferry operators increased market share, Aer Lingus was unable to compete and began to scale back the Carvair car-ferry service. The fleet was upgraded with Viscounts, which were much more reliable, and a freighter version was planned to begin service in 1966. The Carvairs were scheduled to operate through the 1966 season with the can- cellation of the Dublin-Liverpool service. The traffic was further reduced due with the increased
to allow Aer Lingus to discontinue the car-ferry service in September at the end of the 1966 season.
The Carvairs operated in all cargo work through October 1966 then the cargo operation was contracted to Aer Turas DC-4s and Bristols until the Vis- count cargo aircraft could be delivered. Aer Lingus never considered the Carvair successful even though it was instru- mental in developing the Irish tour industry and palletized cargo transport.
Top: The low ceiling is evident on this cargo
version without the “Rolamat” floor sys- tem. The twin overhead channels for the elevator and rudder control cables are vis- ible as they run to the rear of the aircraft (courtesy Ruth May). Bottom: The raised ceiling option originally ordered by Aer Lingus for transporting horses and later seen on this Ansett Carvair is obvious. The rudder and elevator cable runs are in a sin- gle channel following the contour of the hump and cargo hold. The “Rolamat” floor expedites the loading of palletized cargo (author’s photograph).
The three aircraft transported more than 16,000 cars, 41,000 passengers, 700 horses, and 21,500 tons of cargo. The transport of 700 horses was not considered a success because BKS Air Trans- port dominated the market. It does demonstrate the efforts of Aer Lingus to maximize utiliza- tion in order to show a profit with the Carvair. The carrier originally planned to purchase a fourth Carvair but because of perceived dependability problems, changing market conditions, and fleet upgrades it was never ordered.