Análisis de los resultados del pre experimento.

Comparative studies of lobbying in different political systems demonstrate that the particular characteristics of institutions with which groups interact affect both lobbying strategies and influence (Mahoney 2008; Joachim & Locher 2009c). However, these studies say little about how lobbying and influence vary within the EU depending on the institutional framework in which groups try to influence policymaking. The focus of prevailing research on lobbying on issues that belong to the former first (Community) pillar does not allow for this kind of analysis.

We know from the literature that the Commission and the European Parliament are the most lobbied EU institutions due to their relative openness to interest groups, whereas the Council remains more closed to outside interests (Coen & Richardson 2009; Greenwood 2007; Joachim & Locher 2009a).

Unsurprisingly, the Commission is the most popular research focus for scholars studying lobbying in the EU (see Bunea & Baumgartner 2014), with the emerging studies focusing on the European Parliament reflecting the gradual empowerment of this

institution by the subsequent treaties.

Given the Commission’s right of legislative initiative, this institution has always been a target for interest groups. Its organisational ideology has pushed the Commission to develop an EU level interest group system (Mazey & Richardson 2006: 279). The Commission’s symbiotic relationship with interest groups is driven by its need for technical information and advice and the support of cross-national advocacy coalitions for the introduction of the Commission’s proposals (ibidem: 280). As Mazey and Richardson point out, by demonstrating openness to societal interests the Commission enhances its own legitimacy. Given the Commission’s role as a legal guardian, early involvement of interest groups is also instrumental for smooth implementation of the Commission’s proposals once they become legislative acts (Tanasescu 2009: 56). Moreover, consultations with interest groups is a legal obligation for the Commission stated in the Protocol No. 7 to the Amsterdam Treaty and, recently, the Lisbon Treaty. The latter stresses that “the Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent” (quoted in Tanasescu 2009: 58). The Commission has gradually institutionalized its consultative practices outlining the main principles and norms in a number of documents (e.g. White Paper on European Governance of 2001, General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission of 2002). The Commission and European Parliament took steps to increase the transparency of lobbying in the EU by establishing a joint Transparency Register in 2011, in which voluntary registration of interest representatives is incentivised by a promise of greater inclusion in consultation schemes and 12 months accreditation for a 1-day access pass to the EP (Greenwood & Dreger 2013: 142). Moreover, organised groups can submit

proposals for legislation to the European Commission in the sphere of its competences via the European Citizens Initiative – “the world’s first transnational participatory mechanism” (Bouza Garcia & Greenwood 2014: 247) .

The Commission shapes EU-level interest representation by funding the activities of certain groups (favouring diffuse interests, organised at the EU level and promoting European identity, democracy and civic engagement, see Mahoney & Beckstrand 2011) and by institutionalizing consultation practices (see Tanasescu 2009) and extensively relying on committee governance (Bouwen 2009). This goes in line with the neofunctionalist prediction that supranational institutions and transnational interest groups will ally to promote further integration.

With a gradual expansion of its budgetary and legislative powers since the early 1990s, the European Parliament (EP) has become a popular target for lobbyists (Kohler-Koch 1997; Lehmann 2009). As directly elected representatives, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are more open to these groups that “either represent a broad constituency such as trade unions, social movements, or political parties, or those that can provide them with an aggregate view on the most efficient ways to deal with the problems and economic consequences” (Lehmann 2009: 58). Interest groups play an important role in transmitting and translating “often complex and technical information into accessible data for busy elected representatives” (Earnshaw & Judge 2002: 63). The EP appears as both a national and European route of interest representation as MEPs have contacts with national interest groups from their countries and European level groups (Wessels 1999; Bouwen 2004b). The EP is the only institution attentive to outside strategies that are more often deployed by civil society organisations (Eising 2007a).

The alignment of parties and interest groups in the EP reflects a left-right cleavage familiar at the national level. Business tends to side with Christian democrats, conservatives and liberals, whereas NGOs are strongly aligned with Social democrats, the left parties and the Greens (Beyers et al. 2015). Still, groups lobby non-natural allies if they hold influential positions: if they are members of the largest political groups, members of policy relevant committees and active legislators (Marshall 2015). Interest groups also lobby EP Secretariat officials as another pathway to influence rapporteurs (Marshall 2012) and influential committee members during the open amendments phase (Marshall 2010).

The lobbying of MEPs may not be a goal in itself but a way to reach other institutions, the Commission and the Council (Kohler-Koch 1997). This can be especially the case for EU foreign policy in which interest organisations and the EP form a “coalition of the weak”, as Kohler-Koch puts it.

The Council of the EU and European Council are considered the “least accessible” institutions, though “not inaccessible” (Hayes-Renshaw 2009) and less lobbied (Greenwood 2007). First, the Council’s role is crucial at the later stages of the legislation-making process when there is less possibility to shape the EU acquis (see Klüver 2013). Second, the Council primarily deals with ‘high-politics’ issues that involve inter-state bargaining, thus making it extremely difficult to influence decision- making processes. It is also clear that interest representation in the Council’s machinery remains largely unresearched (Greenwood 2007: 28).

The difficulty in approaching the Council is due to several features that distinguish this institution from the other two. Despite the efforts to improve transparency, the atmosphere of secrecy remains deeply embedded in the Council’s work (Hayes-

Renshaw 2009: 73; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 2006: 67). The Lisbon Treaty requires the Council to “meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act” (TEU Art. 16(8)). This constitutes a change compared to the pre-Lisbon situation where only the discussion of the legislation under co-decision was subjected to public meeting, whereas Council’s transparency in this regard was regulated through its Rules of Procedure which could be amended by simple majority voting (Peers 2008). Since the Lisbon Treaty “[t]he opening to the public of Council meetings relating to the ‘Legislative deliberations’ part of its agenda shall be made through public transmission by audiovisual means, notably in an overflow room and through broadcasting in all official languages of the institutions of the European Union using video-streaming” (Council 2009, Art. 7(2)).

However, this transparency provision does not extend to non-legislative acts, which constitute the majority of EU foreign policy decisions (e.g. CFSP decisions, Council declarations). The Council’s Rules of Procedure merely envisage that the results of votes related to external action and the CFSP shall be made public by a unanimous Council or the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) decision taken at the request of one of their members, which in practice may appear as difficult to achieve as an adoption of the decision itself. In general, the Council decided that its deliberations “shall be covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, except in so far as the Council decides otherwise” (ibidem, Art. 6 (1). There is no such a thing as a transparency register regulating access to the Council or institutionalised consultation practices.

This body is governed by many informal rules for the sake of efficiency and consensus building; and, for example, when voting does not take place it is more difficult for

lobbyists to know the parties’ positions and the extent to which promises given to interest groups have been kept (Hayes-Renshaw 2009: 75). The Council is a multi- layered institution that includes not only ministers from twenty eight members states that gather in different configurations, but a network of preparatory bodies such as committees and working groups also consisting of national representatives of all member states. As Hayes-Renshaw points out, even for a resource-rich interest organization it is costly to monitor “the detailed work of hundreds of actors and multiple layers” (ibidem: 74). Frequent rotation and the fact that many national representatives in the Council and its bodies are not based in Brussels is another obstacle to the building of the long-term personal relationships necessary for effective lobbying (ibidem: 75). Finally, EU level groups find it difficult to gain access to the Council because, essentially, it is a part of a national route of interest representation (Greenwood 2007: 27). Indeed, empirical studies of business lobbying show that national business associations and important national firms have better access to the Council than EU- wide associations (Bouwen 2004a: 357).

These obstacles do not mean that interest groups do not approach the Council and its bureaucracy. There are various ways in which the Council can be accessed: there are some practices of giving access to the Council to selected groups (e.g. dinners with environmental NGOs within the margins of Environmental Council’s meetings, Tripartite Social Summit preceding the European Council meetings dedicated to the Lisbon agenda); through the national governments, including permanent representations in Brussels; through the Council’s presidency which play an important role in setting the Council’s agenda; through the Secretariat bureaucracy that assists the Council work; and through the Council’s preparatory bodies in which real work takes place (Hayes-

Renshaw 2009).

The Court of Justice of the European Union (EUCJ) is seen as “a highly successful venue in which to seek policy change and many organized interest have long cultivated strategies for targeting it, albeit with varied success” (McCown 2009: 89). While there are hardly any studies concerning choices of combination of lobbying or/and litigation strategies by interest groups in the EU, it is hypothesized that litigation strategies are likely to be pursued by narrowly focused and well resource-endowed interest groups in a situation when the EU fails to produce legislation (Bouwen & McCown 2007). Litigation may empower individuals and groups who are often disadvantaged in their own systems (Cichowski 2007: 6). On the one hand, judicial rulings “may create new rights for individuals or groups that can enable direct access or be utilized by movement activists to make subsequent claims through litigation”; on the other, the EUCJ decisions “may change the rules and procedures in a way that makes the policy process a more open to a particular group” (Cichowski 2007: 11). The EUCJ in its turn benefits from litigation as the clarification and construction of new EU rules is instrumental in strengthening the Court’s position in EU rulemaking (Cichowski 2007). Organised interests use the EUCJ preliminary reference mechanism to challenge national legislation and practices with which they do not agree (McCown 2009: 93). Litigation strategies are often reinforced by lobbying efforts in which groups provide technical expertise to rule-makers, frame policy issues and raise the awareness among new potential litigants (McCown 2009; Cichowski 2007; Bouwen & McCown 2007).