Análisis de frecuencias según las dimensiones de la variable independiente

things do not always appear to be so as a result of sense perception.

1 009b 1 0 Which sort among these are true or false is not clear; for the ones are no more true than the others, but just like them. For this reason, in fact, Democritus says that either nothing is true or at any rate things ^are obscure to us.

But in general, because of assuming that knowledge is sense per­

ception, and that this in turn is a process of being altered, people say that the appearance that comes from sensing is necessarily true; for it is from these reasons that both Empedocles and Democritus, as well as, so to speak, each of the others has become vulnerable to opinions of this sort. For Empedocles says that those who change their condition change their knowledge, "for wisdom grows for humans according to 1 009b 20 what is present." And in other verses he says,

However much change comes into their natures, just that much Does it always happen to them to think changed thoughts.

And Parmenides declares himself in the same way:

For as at any time is the composition of the much-twisted limbs, Thus is intellect present to humans; for it is the very same thing That thinks, the nature of the limbs both in all humans and in Each one, since its thought is what is more in its mixture .

. And a blunt remark of Anaxagoras to some of his friends is also remembered, that beings would be for them however they conceive them. And people also say that Homer seemed to have this opinion, 1 009b 30 because he made Hector,15 when he was knocked out by a blow, lie

"thinking changed thoughts," as though even those who are delirious are thinking, just not the same things. So it is clear that, if both are processes of thinking, the beings too are at the same time so and not so. And it is in this respect that what follows is most harsh: for if those who most of all have seen the truth that is accessible-and these are those who seek it most and love it most-if

they

have such opinions and declare these things about truth, how will this not be enough to make those who are trying to philosophize lose heart? For seeking the 1 01 Oa truth would be a wild goose chase.

Now the cause of their opinion is that they were inquiring into the truth about beings, but they assumed that the only beings were perceptible things; but among these the nature of the indeterminate

1 5 Actually Epeius (Iliad XXIII, 689).

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is heavily present, and the sort of being that we described. For this reason, while they speak reasonably, they do not speak the truth (for it fits better to say it this way than the way Epicharmus spoke of Xenophanes16). And further,

it

was because of seeing all nature around us in motion, while about what is changing nothing is true, or at least does not admit of being true about what is wholly changing in every way. For out of this conception the most extreme opinion of those mentioned burst into bloom, that of the people who announce that they are Heracleiteans,l7 and of the sort that Cratylus held, who at last believed that it was necessary to say nothing but only moved his finger, and who censured Heracleitus for saying that it is not possible to step into the same river twice, since

he

believed it is not possible even to step into it once.

Now we too will say in response to this argument that there is some reason for them to believe that what is changing, when it is changing, does not have being. It is, however, something disputable, since a thing that is losing something has some of what it is losing, and a thing must already be something of what it is becoming. And in general, if something is being destroyed, there will be present something that

is,

and if something is coming into being, there must be something out of which it is coming into being and something by which it is generated, and this cannot go on to infinity. But passing over those things, let us say these: that to change in quantity is not the same as to change what sort of thing something is, so letting something not stay constant with respect to size, we still recognize everything on account of its form. What's more, those who conceive things this way deserve to be censured because, having seen that things are in this condition with a lesser number even of the perceptible things themselves, they declared that it is the same way for the whole heaven; for the place around us in the sensible world is the only one that is constantly in a state of passing away and coming to be, but this is, so to speak, not even a piece of the whole, so that it would have been more just if they had acquitted these

1 6 Apparently, that he spoke truly but unreasonably.

1 7 See 1 005b 24-26 and note. Heracleitus was most famous for such paradoxes as

"everything is in flux" and the one about the river that is quoted below, to which those who adopted his name were attracted. In fact, however, the central idea in his writings is that of the logos which brings stability out of the midst of flux, a thought very close to Aristotle's own idea of being-at -work.

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things on account of those instead of condemning those on account of these. And further, it is obvious that we shall also say to them the same things that were said earlier; for that there is some motionless nature must be shown to them and they must be convinced of it. And in fact it follows for those who say everything is and is not at the same time that they should say that everything is at rest rather than in motion; for there is not anything into which anything can change, since everything belongs to everything.

But as far as truth is concerned, that not every appearance is true is because, in the first place, even if the perception, at least of the proper object of each of the senses,18 is not false, still appearance is not the same thing as perception. Then too, it is worth wondering at if they are at an impasse about this: whether magnitudes are of the amount or colors of the sort that they appear to be to those far away or those up close, or whether they are the way they appear to the healthy or to the sick, and whether things are heavier that seem so the weak or to the strong, and whether those things are true that seem so to those who are asleep or those who are awake. That they do not really believe it is obvious; at any rate, no one, even if he thinks he is in Athens one night when he is in Libya, goes to the Athenian town hall. And about the future too, as Plato says,19 surely the opinion of the doctor and that of an ignorant person are not alike authoritative about, say, who is or is not going to get well. Further, among the senses themselves, the perceptions of an alien or a proper attribute are not alike authoritative, nor are those by a similar sense and the proper sense itself, 20 but about color, sight is authoritative, not taste, and about flavor, taste is, not

1 8 See On the Soul 41 8a 8-1 7. This view is a reversal of Democritus's famous saying that all immediately perceived qualities, such as sweet, are only conventions.

Modern thinkers such as Galileo, Descartes, and Locke dismiss them again as merely

"subjective," sometimes calling them secondary qualities. In the twentieth century, Husserl and others again reassert the primacy of sensory experience.

1 9 Theaetetus, 1 77C-1 79B. This passage is far-reaching, establishing the good as neither relative nor subjective. Aristotle too, in the Nicomachean Ethics (1 1 34b 24-35), says that there is a natural justice, easily distinguished from customs about right and wrong.

20 Examples of the two preceding clauses might be these: a lemon looks both bitter and yellow, and both smells and tastes bitter. The second judgement of the eye, and the second judgement of the bitterness, are the ones we give more credence to.

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sight, each of which at the same time about the same thing never says that it is simultaneously so and not so. But not even at a different time does one of the senses disagree about the

attribute,

but only about that to which the attribute belongs. I mean, for example, that the same wine might seem at one time to be sweet and at another time not to be, if either it or one's body had changed; but the sweetness itself, such as it is whenever it might be present, never changes, and one is always right about it, and what is going to be sweet is necessarily of such a kind. And yet all these arguments abolish this, and just as they make thinghood be nothing, so too do they make nothing be necessary; for what is necessary cannot be otherwise and otherwise again, so that if anything is so by necessity, it will not be both so and not so.

And in general, if all there is is what is perceptible, nothing would be if there were not beings with souls, since there would be no sense perception. Now that there would be neither sense objects nor sense perceptions is perhaps true (for these are experiences of the perceiver), but it is impossible that there not be the underlying things which bring about sense perception, even without the perception. For the perception itself is surely not

of

itself, but there is also something else besides the perception, which must be prior to the perception; for what causes motion is prior by nature to what is moved, and even if these things are meant relatively to one another, this is nonetheless so.21

Chapter 6

There are some of those who are convinced of these things, as well as some who merely repeat these arguments, who raise an impasse: they inquire who it is who judges which person is healthy, and generally who judges each thing correctly. But such perplexities are like being in doubt whether we are now asleep or awake, and all such impasses amount to the same thing. For these people insist that there be a justification of everything; for they ask for a starting point, and want to get hold of it by demonstration, when the fact that they are not convinced of their own doubts is obvious in their actions. Instead, the very thing we are saying is the condition they are in, for they are

21 In general, relative terms name things that depend on each other and come into being together (such as double and half, master and slave, etc.), but knowledge and perception· are exceptions, being relative to the knowable and perceivable which are not relative to them. See Categories 7b 1 5-8a 1 2.

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In document Auditoría financiera y su relación con la toma de decisiones gerenciales de la empresa Científica Andina S.A.C., Lima, 2022. (página 50-65)