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Whether it is (meaningfully) possible to draw a line between Subjectivist and Objectivist ontologies has been discussed and criticised at length (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Deetz, 1996; King et al., 1994). It has been claimed that there is either no fundamental difference, bar “in style” (King et al., 1994, p. 5), that the differentiation is misleading and counterproductive (Deetz, 1996) or that the apparent chasm can be breached at another conceptual level (Gioia & Pitre, 1990). Nevertheless, the ontological opposites of Objectivism and Subjectivism do (at least formally) exist and inform much of our understanding of philosophical standpoints (Hatch, 2012). 3.4.1.1 Objectivism

While Galileo Galilei can certainly be called “father of modern science” (Whitehouse, 2009, p. 219), the scientific method traces back to Francis Bacon at the end of the sixteenth century (Russell, 1959). Further developed during the philosophical period of Enlightenment and heavily influenced by philosophers from the seventeenth and early eighteenth century,

the objectivist ontology is based around the belief that the reality exists without our knowledge of it (Hatch, 2012).

It is seen as a concrete structure which is independent of our perceptions (Holden & Lynch, 2004). Many of the basic assumptions are rooted in the natural sciences (or Naturwissenschaften) like physics and chemistry with the natural, physical world being the concrete, tangible structure and source of knowledge (Giddens, 1993; Kant, 1787; Morgan & Smircich, 1980). The scientist’s task, therefore, is to understand the reality and “uncover” the knowledge by providing correct description of this reality (Warnke, 1987). As a consequence, the epistemological stance often accompanying this ontology is positivist.

In their most orthodox position, positivists believe that the world can be ‘unequivocally described in a series of elementary propositions’ (Hindess, 1973). The Management and organisational research has historically been heavily influenced by

objectivist thinking. For instance, Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) found that almost 97% of published management studies in the late 1980’s where following a positivist epistemology. The picture has since changed, notably IS journals publishing more interpretative research papers (Nandhakumar & Montealegre, 2003). The objectivist worldview and the positivist stance have many compelling arguments for adoption. First, assuming that there is a correct way of understanding reality, the scientist pursues a “tangible” objective: positivistic science often seeks to provide a precise factual description of phenomena (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Second, influenced by the notion of “real science”, positivist research is assumed to be high in external validity thus making the theory and findings more widely applicable. Third, many of the positivist methods utilise well established and recognised quantitative techniques whereby theories and explanations can be measured, quantified and presented in an abstract and universally understandable language of science (Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Rorty et al., 1980). Such language system is considered to be superior to the “real” language of the subjects, and so to provide a less ambiguous, universal version of rational knowledge (Deetz, 1996).

3.4.1.2 Subjectivism

The philosophical position of subjectivism could be described as a polar opposite to positivism (Holden & Lynch, 2004; Morgan & Smircich, 1980).

Reality is considered to be socially constructed or even to be just a mere projection of human imagination.

As a result, the epistemological stance focuses more on understanding the processes and means by which reality is created. No absolute universal “truth” is sought and the role of a scientist is not to provide a “mirror” of the reality, as Rorty et al. (1980) point out, but instead to continue the conversation. The epistemology of subjectivism focuses on situated practical and idiosyncratic description of socially and linguistically constructed structures and practices (Deetz, 1996; Klein & Myers, 1999; Myers & Avison, 1997). In Deetz’s (1996) taxonomy, the Subjectivist dimension corresponds to the “Local/Emergent”-dimension, which highlights the researchers’ openness to emergent knowledge, new interpretations and meanings. Although qualitative research is not firmly based on an underlying epistemological position and can be applied by positivist, interpretative and critical researchers alike, subjectivist ontology often

employs qualitative methods (Myers & Avison, 1997). These methods were developed to study complex dynamic cultural and social phenomena that are time and context bound (Myers & Avison, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). King et al. (1994) argue that the qualitative and quantitative researchers “derive from the same underlying logic of inference” (ibid, p 4). However, the interplay of qualitative methods and the subjectivist worldview of constructed, situated reality allows the researcher to abandon the positivist statistical logic for making inferences. A few observations, one specific case, a single historical occurrence can have a profound impact on theory without being statistically significant. Subjectivist research allows the researcher to focus on the “telling” case and to uncover hidden causal relationships and explanations which would be overlooked through generalisation (McKeown, 1999). Since the early 1980’s the research in organisation theory approaches a more balanced view, moving slowly away from the dominance of empiricism based on quantitative methods (Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Pozzebon, 2004). Specifically, in the field of Information Systems, subjectivist research has enjoyed considerable attention with notable journals dedicating special issues to interpretative and critical research (Miranda et al., 2015; Myers & Klein, 2011; Nandhakumar & Montealegre, 2003). There are several arguments for adopting a subjectivist- interpretivist position.

First, the position is better suited to clarify theoretical relationships and causal mechanisms, i.e. addressing the how and why questions (McKeown, 1999). Second, without the need for statistical significance, specific (often unique or outlier) cases can be used to generate insights and theories for example in ethnographies or “critical case studies” (discussed later in this chapter) (King et al., 1994; McKeown, 1999; Yin, 2009). Finally, focus on the meaning of a lived social phenomena rather than its measurement allows the researcher to generate comprehensive descriptions of a new or developing phenomenon (Holden & Lynch, 2004; King et al., 1994; Miranda, Young, & Yetgin, 2016; Wiesche et al., 2017).

Considering the objectivist and subjectivist views to be two poles of an ontological and epistemological continuum, it needs to be acknowledged that there are a plethora of competing and complementing stances in between these polar positions (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Even more so, some researchers argue for mixed-methods approaches which combine methods and epistemologies from positivist and

subjectivist “extremes” and so breach the chasm between them (Haverkamp, Morrow, & Ponterotto, 2005). It is questionable whether or not the objective-subjective divide still holds as a dimension for separation of paradigms. The actual use of “objective” and “subjective”-labels has been criticised as “boring” and “misleading” (Deetz, 1996). Gioia and Pitre (1990) argue that the lines between the paradigms are blurred and there exist “transition zones” that allow for linkages between apparently different viewpoints to be established. The researcher can, therefore, move “up” to a meta-level and assess the subject from different perspectives and so “constitute a multidimensional presentation of the topic area” (Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 586). The presumed conflict is in reality not as irreconcilable as it might appear, the discourses “pose problems for each other and steal insights across the lines” (Deetz, 1996, p. 199), it is an interplay, rather than a conflict.