Análisis y verificación de las listas de chequeo específicas

THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION.

1. the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built only on October 6, 1981, several years after the property had been registered on May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed ESLABAN V DE ONORIO

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and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use.

2. the rule is that where private property is needed for conversion to some public use, the first thing that the government should do is to offer to buy it. If the owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on the price and the other conditions of the sale, a voluntary transaction can then be concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its power of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just compensation, to acquire private property in order to devote it to public use.

3. it is the market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor."

4. just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

5. In the Ansaldo case, there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of

taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.

6. It is now provided that ― SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. ― If the objections to and the defense against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.

7. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable.

8. Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."

9. In this case, the proper valuation for the property in question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the commission (composed of the provincial treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by the trial court to make an assessment of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per hectare basis.¹⁴

1. Central Luzon Drug Corporation opened 3 drugstores as a franchise under the business name,

―Mercury Drug‖. In conformity to the mandate of RA 7432, it granted a 20% discount on the sale of medicine to senior citizens. Pursuant to Rev Reg 2-94, which states that the discount given to senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for value-added tax and other percentage tax purposes, the corporation deducted 219,778 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995.

2. For said taxable period, the corporation reported a net loss of 20,963 in its corporate income tax return.

As a consequence, the corporation did not pay income tax for 1995.

3. It then claimed the amount of 219,778 should be applied as a tax credit, it filed a claim for refund in the amount of 150,193. This amount represents the tax credit allegedly due to the corporation under RA 7432.

4. CTA: even if the law treats the discounts granted to senior citizens as a tax credit, it cannot apply when there is no tax liability or the amount of the tax credit is greater than the tax due. In the latter case, the tax credit will only be to the extent of the tax liability.

Likewise, no refund can be granted because there was no tax which was erroneously or illegally collected.

5. CA: the 20% discount given to senior citizens which is treated as a tax credit is considered just compensation and, as such, may be carried over to the next taxable period if there is no current tax liability.

ISSUE: Whether the 20% sales discount may be claimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from gross sales

1. RA 7432 provides, ―the grant of twenty percent discount from all establishments relative ... purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit.

2. The above provision explicitly employed the word

"tax credit." Nothing in the provision suggests for it to mean a "deduction" from gross sales.

3. Thus, the 20% discount required by the Act to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned.

4. Accordingly, when the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount -- when claimed – shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability.

5. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally assessed and collected. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax liability is not a precondition before a taxable entity can benefit from the tax credit. The credit may be availed of upon payment of the tax due, if any.

Where there is no tax liability or where a private establishment reports a net loss for the period, the CIR V CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION JUNE 26,

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tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the next taxable year.

6. It must also be stressed that unlike in Sec. 229 of the Tax Code wherein the remedy of refund is available to the taxpayer, Sec. 4 of the law speaks only of a tax credit, not a refund.

7. The tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned.

1. Marcos issued PD1107 establishing the Philippine Root Crops Research and Training Center in the Visayas State College of Agriculture (VISCA). It had the power to expropriate lands situated within the barrios, thus VISCA filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners to:

a. Establish experimental fields

b. Construct buildings laboratories and housing facilities for the personnel of the Root Crops Center; and

c. integrate and conduct country-wide researches on root crops.

2. Respondent VISCA deposited the amount of P74,050.00 with the Philippine National Bank

representing the assessed value of the lands for taxation purposes as determined under PD No. 76.

3. VISCA prayed in its complaint that a writ of possession be issued since P.D. No. 42 allows the entity expropriating the land to take possession thereof upon deposit with the PNB of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the subject properties.

4. Petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. They alleged that (1) the lands sought to be expropriated were not within the area specified under PD No.

1107; (2) the amount of P74,050.00 did not constitute just compensation; (3) P.D. No. 794 providing that the just compensation shall not be in excess of the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the provincial assessor, which is lower, was unconstitutional; (4) P.D. No. 1107 was also unconstitutional for impairing the freedom of contract and violating the equal protection clause;

and (5) there was no public necessity for the acquisition by VISCA of petitioners' lands.

5. 1298 tenants filed a motion to intervene alleging that they were tenant-tillers and occupants of the lands involved in the expropriation proceedings, their tenure of work as tenants being secured and protected by law, they cannot be removed from their landholdings through eminent domain. TC granted the intervenors‘ motion to which VISCA filed its reply.

It denied that they were tenants and that their reliance to the decree was misplaced since the proscription therein against the ejectment or removal of tenants is applicable as regards landowners, PANES V VISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE

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landholders and agricultural lessors and not as regards the State or those acting for and in its behalf.

6. TC denied motion for the issuance of a writ of possession because expropriation was not one of the causes provided for in the agrarian laws. PD 42 was only applicable to untenanted private properties and that there is doubt as to whether the lands to be expropriated were indeed within the area indicated by PD 1107 to be proper for expropriation.

7. CA: dismissed the expropriation case as it was tainted with GAD when it denied immediate possession of the properties. The authority of the petitioner to take immediate possession of the subject properties appear clear and explicit. The contention of the petitioners that PD 42 applies only to untenanted lands is not convincing for there is nothing in PD 42 that indicates this.

8. Petitioners filed for petition of review and likewise assailed the constitutionality of PD 1107 on the grounds that it impairs the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Constitution; it violates the equal protection of law and the tenurial security guaranteed by the Constitution and it runs counter to the agrarian laws.

ISSUE: W/N VISCA is entitled to a writ of possession NO

1. The finding of the CA insofar as it found that VISCA has the right to a writ of possession upon compliance with the requirements of P.D. No. 1533 in relation to P.D. Nos. 1107 and 42, i.e., payment of an amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation for the property which is, under P.D. 42, the amount

equivalent to the assessed value of the subject property for purposes of taxation, has been rendered ineffectual by the ruling in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay

2. P.D. No. 1533 determines the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

Thus, the determination of just compensation, by virtue of the enactment of P.D. No. 1533, was converted from being a judicial prerogative to an executive decision. Because the executive determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings renders the courts inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to them for final determination, SC declared P.D. No.

1533 to be unconstitutional and void.

3. In the instant case, VISCA deposited an amount with the PNB representing the assessed value of the lands for taxation purposes as determined under P.D. No. 76. On the basis of this deposit, VISCA prayed in its complaint that a writ of possession be issued, the same being sanctioned under P.D. No.

42 which allows the entity expropriating the land to take possession thereof upon deposit with the PNB of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the subject properties for purposes of taxation.

4. In the light of the declared unconstitutionality of P.D.

No. 76, P.D. No. 1533 and P.D. No. 42 insofar as they sanction executive determination of just compensation in expropriation cases, it is imperative that any right to the immediate possession of the

subject property, accruing to VISCA, must be firmly grounded on a valid compliance with Section 2 of Rule 67 – that there must be a deposit with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the subject property as provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.

1. Belen leased a small portion of land (100sqm) from Manotok Services situated in Tondo, Manila. Belen built his house there. Juliano occupied part of the land; he bought a house standing there and moved in without Belen‘s knowledge. Upon learning about Juliano, they came up with an agreement that Juliano could continue staying on the land temporarily and would pay ½ of the rental to Manotok Realty. However, the houses were burned.

Belen acceded to Juliano‘s continued stay on the condition that it should only be for 1 ½ years. When Juliano failed to leave the presmies, Belen brought suit in the MTC.

2. MTC: ordered Juliano to vacate the property. He appealed to the RTC. RTC reversed the judgment.

3. RTC: PD No. 1670 has expropriated real property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog, Tondo, Manila formerly owned by the Manotok Realty, Inc. Juliano is a prospective beneficiary of the Bliss Project being undertaken by the National Housing Authority at the site in question. Therefore, when the complaint in this case was filed on September 13, 1982, Manotok

Realty Services, Inc. was no longer the owner of the premises in question and as correctly contended by Juliano, the relation between Juliano and Belen were also deemed terminated.

4. Belen appealed to the CA which was resolved against him.

5. The Appellate Court took account of Presidential Decree No. 1670 as the decisive factor in determining the "pivotal and decisive issue — whether Manotok Realty, Inc., Belen‘s lessor, has retained ownership of the lot in question, the expropriating law invoked by Juliano (PD 1670)‖.

6. The decision declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the owner of the land, including the lot leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the possession, administration, control and disposition of the NHA; its only right being to claim the just compensation thereof; that as a result, Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in question also ipso facto ended, as well as the sublease between Belen and Juliano, since a sublease can never extend beyond the duration of the sublessor's lease of the sublessor. Belen appealed by certiorari to the SC

ISSUE: W/N Manotok Realty was still the owner of the land considering it didn‘t receive money as payment for the subject property yet

HELD: yes

1. PD 1670 is unconstitutional for being violative of the owners‘ right to due process of law. The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the BELEN V CA

MARCH 11,1991

propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to provide for a hearing, the Government should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so.

2. But it did not deem it necessary because the enactment of the questioned decrees which rendered, by their very passage, any questions with regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot and academic. In effect, the properties under the decrees were "automatically expropriated."

3. This becomes more evident when the NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to support its request.

4. The Court observed that contrary to Rule 67 and established precedents, the decrees provided for the determination of just compensation at a time earlier than that "of the actual taking of the government or at the time of the judgment by the court, whichever came first."

5. Apart from this, the fixing of the value of the property was left by the decrees to the City Assessor.

6. In P.D. No. 76, P.D. No. 464, P.D. No. 794, and P.D.

No. 1533, the basis for determining just compensation was fixed at the market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

Here, there is no mention of any market value declared by the owner. Sections 6 of the two decrees peg just compensation at the market value determined by the City Assessor.

7. PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also be deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of the property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof.

1. ACIL Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Dvao del Norte which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Certificates were cancelled and new ones issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.

2. The lands were valued by Land Bank however, in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings which ACIL corporation filed with DAR, a lower Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner was stated and that based on this statement, Land Bank valued the land uniformly.

3. ACIL rejected the government‘s offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same crops were valued at the higher price per hectare.

4. ACIL then filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. It prayed that DAR be ordered to pay 24, 717.40 instead of the 15, 311 which was stated on the statement ACIL filed with DAR.

5. RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that ACIL should have appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board. ACIL moved for reconsideration but its motion REPUBLIC (DAR) V CA

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was denied thus it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that a petition for just compensation under RA 6657 falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. CA granted his petition. It remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

6. In turn, DAR filed this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N in cases involving claims for just compensation under RA 6657 an appeal from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to RTC

HELD: N

1. §50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,"

except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. However,

§57 provides: The Special Agrarian Courts shall

§57 provides: The Special Agrarian Courts shall