OBJETIVO: Sustentar posiciones frente a los problemas que afectan los derechos humanos en todas sus dimensiones haciendo uso de los instrumentos dados desde el Derecho Internacional Humanitario, la Constitución, leyes, y demás entidades que asisten estos conflictos para orientar a quien tenga dificultades y a su vez mejore la
PROYECTOS SITUACION
P: Analiza y argumenta la
That a change in government policy was on the way had been apparent from both Barwick's and Menzies' January statements. This was confirmed by a "leak" to the Melbourne Herald by Sir Garfield Barwick. On 23 January 1962, a report appeared in the Herald that the government was considering a major change in policy:
Feeling in Canberra is that the Government can no longer
seriously maintain its earlier support for Holland's sovereignty and is becoming reconciled to sharing a common frontier with Indonesia in New Guinea. It wants negotiations between Holland and Indonesia to end the present risk of armed collision...
Australia should recognise the inevitable, and that the long term interest of Australia requires friendly relations with Indonesia
...There is no longer much confidence in the Australian Government that any principle of self-determination for the Papuans of West New Guinea can be practically maintained in the
1 C.N., V o l . 33, 12.1.62, p. 42. 2
face of events as they are now shaping...It /the government/7 hopes to convert to this view those considerable segments of Australian opinion which have been instinctively opposed to concessions to Indonesia.
Bruce Grant's later account of what happened throws some light on the "leak":
...the Melbourne 'Herald' declined to accept a confidential briefing on West Irian by the then Minister for External Affairs (Sir Garfield Barwick) in the terms in which it had been given to selected newspaper editors and writers. The Minister's intention was to alert the newspapers to prepare -
to condition, if you like - the public to accept a transfer of West Irian to Indonesia. The 'Herald' chose to use this
information to inform the public that the Australian Government had changed policy on West Irian. 1
The Melbourne Herald's report caused a furore in the press, and Barwick, when questioned, called the reports "unofficial" and
"speculative"; he did not comment on their truth. The Sydney Morning Herald saw the report as confirming what it had feared in the earlier statements:
Understandably the Government, conscious that its present policy bears little relation to the firm and unequivocal attitude stated by the then Minister for External Affairs 12 years ago, is eager not to offend too deeply the feelings of the considerable body of Australians who have watched its retreat. (27.1.62)
Douglas Wilkie in the Advertiser felt that it was about time the govern ment came round to a realistic policy. The Melbourne Herald renewed its concern with self-determination - "it seems that we have chosen not to speak out for a principle where so many others thought it expedient to be silent" (24.1.62). The Courier Mail welcomed the reports and looked to co-operation with the Indonesians in New Guinea. The Age denied that the government was considering a change of policy - "What has been
changing is the Government's assessment of the trend of the West New Guinea dispute, as inevitably it had to as the trend itself inclined in Indonesia's favour. This is not a new policy" (29.1.62) . Clearly one's view of what constituted a change of policy depended on what one believed the original policy to be. Yet the Age went on that while a majority of Cabinet believed that Australia would have to resign itself to Indonesia's getting West New Guinea "there is no need to simulate a public enthusiasm
for this prospect" (29.1.62) . 1
Bruce Grant, "Foreign Affairs and the Australian Press", the Roy Milne Lecture, 1969.
As the year progressed and negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesians traversed their difficult path, it was clear that the
Australian government was attempting to prepare the public for what the Sydney Morning Herald saw as the failure of its previous policies. Most press reaction was one of resignation to the inevitable coupled with
frequent heart-searchings on past policies and lost opportunities and fears for the future. The Sydney Morning Herald swung to and fro from resignat
ion to attack. Menzies' statement of 11 February (S.M.H. 12.2.62) in which
he reiterated that it would be "crazy and irresponsible" for Australia to resist the Indonesians unless she was supported by the great powers, was characterized by the Sydney Morning Herald as "the language of appeasement
/and7 of pusillanimity. Is Australia to let her national interests be
decided by the Great Powers? Is she to stay her hand for fear of offending
the nations of Asia? To both these questions the Prime Minister answers
Yes" (12.2.62).
The positions of the Australian press were maintained with
little change until an agreement between the Dutch and Indonesians was
finally initialled on 15 August 1962. The agreement provided for the Dutch
to hand over to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in October,
which would in turn hand over to the Indonesians in May 1963. Provision
was also made in the agreement for an "act of choice" by Papuans no later
than 1969. The Age1s reaction was in line with its February 1959 views:
Without itself using force Australia has never been in a position to dictate terms of settlement to either side...We have rightly resisted the temptation to oppose at all costs an Indonesian presence in New Guinea. We can view the prospective extension of Indonesian authority to our border
with caution but without alarm. (2.8.62)
The West Australian, the Melbourne Herald and the Advertiser (23.8.62) were all disturbed about the way the settlement had been reached
and criticized Indonesia's use of military pressure. They were also
concerned about the future of the West Papuans and criticized the United Nations on both these grounds for failing to take any strong action. Relief that a settlement had been reached was however the dominant note.
The most bitter reaction came from the Sydney Morning Herald: the United
Nations and the United States were attacked for surrendering to aggression, but the Australian government received chief blame for sponsoring "the
ignominious policy of retreat and evasion and appeasement...Asia, and Indonesia, not least, will have drawn only one conclusion from Australia's
timidity - that Australia is not prepared to stand up alone for its national interests" (S.M.H. 17.8.62).
By May 1963, when the Indonesians took over in West New Guinea, the majority of the Australian press resigned itself to unenthusiastic
statements of coexistence with Indonesia in New Guinea. The Sydney Morning
Herald remained unhappy about the takeover and called on the government to
resist any Indonesian attempt not to hold the proposed act of self-
determination. It also called for the government to increase the defences
of both East New Guinea and the mainland, for "who can say that Indonesia, be it ever so virtuous now, will not under some future Government - a Communist Government conceivably - be tempted by the prize we are?"
(1.5.63) .
This description of press opinion since February 1959 on the
West New Guinea issue has shown how durable some perceptions of and
attitudes to Indonesia were. The change in the Courier Mail’s position
dating from 1959, and the later softening of the Age and Melbourne
Herald's opposition to Indonesian control, were probably to be explained by a recognition of Australia's inability to affect the outcome of the dispute and an awareness that the dispute was damaging to Australian-
Indonesian relations. But the continuing opposition of the Sydney Morning
Herald, West Australian and Advertiser remained intense and not susceptible
to changes in the international situation. In spite of the later emphasis
on self-determination as a motive for Australian policy, it was clear, even in 1963, that the security fears of 1950 remained paramount for these papers.
There was considerable interplay between the press and
government on this issue. Many papers, and in particular the Sydney Morning Herald, were very critical of government policy and pressed for
stronger opposition to Indonesia. The government used the press for
"leaks", and was able to quiet press criticism at least on one particular
occasion in late February 1959. Press opinion and public opinion were
generally agreed on this issue and it may be inferred that the generally negative treatment of Indonesia in the Australian press reinforced such
perceptions of Indonesia in the community. The role of the Sydney Morning
Herald on this issue was a particularly important one. In late 1961 and
A.L.P., on the West New Guinea issue, and appeared to have informal 2
links with R.S.L. spokesmen. It appeared to be the most influential paper within the community on this issue, but the extent to which it
3