Aplicación de paneles solares en el Perú

According to several political analysts and observers, the Darfur Crisis is a reflection of domestic political conflicts between internal Sudanese actors seeking power (Kalu 2010, p. 12). A large segment of interested tribal and political anthropologists argue that the underlying causes of conflicts and tribal wars that frequently break out in Darfur are political conflicts based on an increased tendency toward tribalism. The desire to obtain constitutional positions and the keenness of some intellectuals in Darfur to achieve their personal political aspirations and ambitions have fed tribal conflicts, and politicians have failed to attract people on the basis of party loyalty.

Instead, they rely on tribal affiliations to run the political race for gaining constitutional positions as the only available option (El-Tigani 2005, pp. 72-74).

This has led to the fuelling of tribal conflicts and the shrinking of the role of the state and its institutions in extending its prestige and providing the necessary protection to its citizens. Thus, tribal affiliation has become the standard of political competition, rather than competence, programme or thought, which has contributed to the instability and the weaknesses of Darfur’s tribal structure (Idris 2006, p. 49). One of the most important movements of partisan polarisation that occurred in Sudan, in the period 1986 – 1989 during the Sadiq al-Mahdi's rule is the framework of competition between the Umma Party (UP), led by Sadiq al-Mahdi. This focuses its activities on attracting Arab tribes stationed in the western Sudanese region, and the Democratic Unionist Party (led by Mohammed Merghani) who sought to win the loyalty of African tribes in the region (Mans 2004, p. 291). This competition polarised the loyalties of the tribes and different social groups – especially in times of elections – in exchange for political positions in the government if successful. This has deepened the differences between the political and social components in the region. It has also contributed to the increase of tribal strife in the absence of opportunities for real development to address the economic problems afflicting the region (Al-Nahas 2005).

114

As a consequence, tribes and civil departments evolved from social entities to political entities competing for power. Therefore, the conflicts in Darfur have turned from professional and productivity conflicts into ethnic and political conflicts. The tribe has become a major focus in the process of distribution of constitutional and executive positions. This, in turn, has encouraged aspirants to conduct political work in Darfur to affiliate more solidly with their tribes and ethnicities in order to gain positions through tribal and ethnic affiliations. Thus, the role of civil society organisations has been reduced. Instead, the tribal factor that is inconsistent with the developed civil societies has been activated (Beheiri 2010, p. 51). The tribe is a social entity which supports its members in difficult times, as well as defending and recovering their rights, even if it leads to tribal hostilities. This led to the inability of the state and its institutions to provide the necessary protection for its citizens. The tribe has become a sanctuary, in place of the police or judiciary, and thus, an appropriate environment to worsen the bilateral problems between tribes which led to the deterioration of state control and the transformation of tensions into armed conflicts (Mans 2004, p. 292).

However, many specialists in GoS political affairs believe that the differences and internal divisions that occurred in the National Islamic Front (NIF), the ruling party in 1999,¹⁷ have had a significant impact on the course of the worsening political situation in Darfur, due to the influence of al-Turabi on rebel groups. Most of the leaders in the ruling party, as well as some tribal leaders, were already a part of the Islamic movement and its spiritual leader Hassan al-Turabi (al-Turabi 14/01/2013).

The New Islamic party, named the Popular Congress, was formed and led by al-Turabi (de Waal 2005c, p. 18). Al-al-Turabi has been accused by the authorities in Khartoum, and many observers, of fermenting the crisis and inciting groups to rebel against the GoS (Hoile 2006, p. 18).

Furthermore, the split within the ranks of the NIF, which occurred in 1999, contributed to the deteriorating political situation and the outbreak of armed hostilities in Darfur against the GoS. Several political leaders of the NIF come from Darfur. Some leaders of the political opposition to the current regime are also from

17 The disputation over the issue of multiple references decision-making in the state led to the split of the ruling party into two parties: the National Congress Party headed by Omar al-Bashir, and the Popular Congress Party led by Hassan al-Turabi.

115

this region and their influence there is clear (Diraige 18/03/ 2013). Therefore, the political-military dimension is evident in the Darfur problem (Shnan 2005, p. 300).

In support of this Mahmood Mamdani (2010, p. 198) argues that the split of Daoud Bolad (which occurred in 1990) was an important juncture in the region's conflicts.

That split highlighted the division between settled and nomadic factions within Darfur that had important national and political implications. It was due to Bolad's awareness of the racial discrimination that the Sudanese elite made against him (Flint and de Waal 2008, p. 21).

Bolad believed that the Islamic National Salvation government was tilting too much in favour of nomadic Arab tribes. Likewise, El-Affendi (2009, p. 12) argues that the Daoud Bolad split was due to disputes that erupted within the NIF within the Darfur sector where Yahya (Bolad’s former student leader) was chosen as president of that sector in the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, Bolad was ruled out after the takeover of the military wing of the NIF, led by al-Turabi, on 30 June 1989 after financial, political and regulatory disputes which incited Bolad to rebel against the existing power at the time. This prompted a leading Fur member of the NIF, headed by Hassan al-Turabi, to defect from the movement with large numbers of the Fur and Zaghawa joining the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Sudan led by John Garang (al-Turabi 14/01/2013).

This act can also be represented as one of the root causes of the crisis. They received logistical and military training to demand that Khartoum grant the Darfur region its share of power, wealth and development. However, negotiations in Naivasha to resolve the problem of the south may have also played an important role in fuelling the crisis in Darfur. Another factor that further exacerbated the western rebellion was the SLA/JEM exploitation of the Naivasha Peace Accord¹⁸, which occurred at the same time to end the war in South Sudan and which was brokered by the international community (Tar 2006, p. 408). It was the appropriate time for each party to put more pressure on the GoS. In this context, a report issued on 24 August 2004 by the International Crisis Group demonstrates that:

18 This was the agreement that ended more than twenty years of war between the GoS and the SPLA/SPLM in the southern Sudan.

116

“The Darfur situation poses an ever greater threat to the nearly finalised peace agreement to end the larger and older civil war between the government and the insurgent Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)” (Deadline 2004, p. 23).

“As long as Darfur festers, the chance remains for political forces in Khartoum opposed to the concessions that have been made in that negotiation to turn government policy back toward war” (Deadline 2004, p.23).

On the other hand, some scholars argue that this transformation from an agenda of demands to a political agenda is not the result of a natural evolution but rather reflects a political issue with specific features worth struggling for. Furthermore, there are those who see the Darfur Crisis as being driven, or instigated, by actors outside the region, specifically the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which aims to weaken the position of the government negotiator in Naivasha.

C – Political Marginalisation of the Region

“The crisis is political and State-made. It results from the misadministration, abuse of authority, and economic greed of the governing elite, committed against the powerless Africans of Darfur” (El-Tigani 2004, p. 3).

A large part of the existing literature relating to the conflict in Darfur contends that what brought Darfur to humanitarian disaster in 2003 was mainly political marginalisation. According to this literature the key factors that created instability in Sudan, and particularly in Darfur, were the neglect and marginalisation practised by successive central governments since its independence in 1956. Scarcity of resources and uneven development policies and strategies have caused Darfur to become the most neglected region (Kalu 2010, p. 12). A prevailing idea is that the northerners have dominated power in Sudan since its independence in 1956. All significant positions, such as presidential and sovereign ministries, have never been given to anybody from Darfur (Abdulkarim 2005). Many scholars believe that the GoS has failed to achieve justice in the distribution of power. Political exclusion towards large parts of Sudan’s political components has been practised, so that they cannot fully participate political processes (Miller 2007).