Aportaciones recientes en el campo de la creatividad

Prior to the commencement of the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (Cummings, Dyball & Pang, 2009), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) released IFRIC 3 (Emission rights) in December 2004 (Deloitte, 2010). The purpose of IFRIC 3 was to provide guidance on accounting for a cap and trade emission rights scheme (EFRAG, 2005). IFRIC 3 made the following recommendations:

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x Carbon emission allowances are intangible assets irrespective of whether they have been purchased

or provided free of cost by the government.

x Subsequent to initial recognition, carbon emission allowances should be accounted for in accordance

with IAS 38 (Intangible assets standard).

x When a participant produces emissions, provisions for emissions-related liabilities should be recorded

at market value in accordance with IAS 37 (Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets standard).

Furthermore, IFRIC 3 recommended that where allowances are issued by governments for less than the fair value, the difference between the fair value and the amount paid, if any, is a government grant. Such a grant should be immediately recognised as deferred income in the balance sheet and thereafter as income on a systematic basis. IFRIC 3 also recommended that changes in the value of revalued allowances (i.e. intangible assets) be recognised in equity, and movements on the provision for emissions be recognised in the income statement (PwC, 2007; KPMG, 2008).

In June 2005, six months after its issuance, IFRIC 3 was withdrawn by the IASB. This decision was made primarily because the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) recommended that IFRIC 3 should not be endorsed for use in the European Union (Deloitte, 2010). Although the EFRAG agreed with the recommendations of IFRIC 3 (EFRAG, 2005), they pointed out that applying IFRIC 3 will not always reflect economic reality and provide relevant information. They also argued that the accounting requirements of IFRIC 3 will result in both measurement and reporting mismatches (EFRAG, 2005;

Mackenzie, 2009). In particular, they pointed out a mismatch between the valuation of assets and the

valuation of liabilities, which would lead to income volatility.

During its April 2009 meeting, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) discussed its joint project with the IASB on Emission Trading Schemes (KPMG, 2005). The purpose of the project was not to develop a new IFRS, rather, it was to address the carbon financial accounting issues arising due to ETSs by revising either IAS 38 (Intangible Assets) or IAS 39 (Financial instruments) and IAS 20 (Accounting for Government grants) (Deloitte, 2016). In November 2010, it was decided to defer the joint project. However, in December 2012, the project was again formally reactivated by IASB as an IASB project only, and it was re-scoped in February 2015 with the project name changed to “Pollutant Pricing Mechanisms”. Additionally, the scope of the project was broadened to include any other schemes apart from emission trading schemes

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that may be using emission allowances to address emission related pollution (Deloitte, 2016). Also, an FASB Exposure Draft was expected in the second quarter of 2010 and a final standard was to be issued in 2011. To date, neither has been issued.

3.3.2 PricewaterhouseCoopers

Two of PwC’s publications on the debate on climate change and emissions attend to accounting for carbon emission allowances (PwC, 2007; PwC 2008). The 2007 publication reports the results of a Europe-wide survey of PwC in conjunction with the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA). It provides PwC’s view on acceptable approaches for accounting for carbon emission allowances in the EU ETS. The survey investigated the accounting approaches applied by major organisations significantly affected by the EU ETS. The survey focused on accounting for the EU ETS but also covered accounting for Certified

Emission Reductions (CERs).3 _{The results of the majority of respondents’ answers to the survey are}

presented in the footnotes to Table 3-1. The 2008 publication relates to the New Zealand ETS. This publication sets out the key design features of the NZ ETS and examines some of the implications and obligations for both businesses and households. The main area of debate discussed in this publication is how to account for emissions liability.

PwC presented two accounting approaches companies could use to account for carbon emission allowances under the EU ETS (PwC, 2007). These are the full market value approach and the cost of settlement approach. Their recommendations as to which financial statement elements to recognise are the same under both approaches. In essence, it appears that PwC’s view on how to account for carbon emission allowances in an ETS is similar to the recommendations of IFRIC 3.

3.3.3 KPMG

KPMG has provided guidance on accounting for carbon emission allowances. Its most prominent document

in this area is, Accounting for carbon – the impact of carbon trading on financial statements (KPMG, 2008).

The following is a summary of the key accounting recommendations in this document:

x Recognise carbon emission allowances as intangible assets when received for free and when

purchased.

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x Recognise a government grant of carbon emission allowances when allowances are received for free.

x Measure the carbon emission allowances received as a government grant at a nominal value i.e. cost

(which may be nil), or at fair value (based on market price).

x Recognise the grant as deferred income and release to the income statement on a systematic basis

over the compliance period to which it relates.

x Recognise purchased allowances at cost less impairment if applicable.

x Measure at cost or revaluation. When revalued, recognise the movement in value directly in equity.

x Do not amortise carbon emission allowances.

x Recognise a liability when emissions occur as an expense in the income statement, measured at the

best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the obligation.

x Only commodity brokers/traders should revalue allowances when recognised as inventory. The

difference between fair value less costs to sell should be recognised in the income statement. Similar to PwC, it appears that KPMG has adopted the recommendations of IFRIC 3 in their approach. 3.3.4. Ernst & Young

Ernst & Young (2008) undertook a survey on the carbon emission allowance practices of US firms that apply US GAAP and are participants of emission programs like EPA, RGGI, etc. Their findings indicated diversity in the carbon financial accounting practices of the 29 US firms, with most firms adopting either an intangible asset model or an inventory model. Under the intangible asset model, the firms prefer to account for free and purchased carbon emission allowances at cost. Additionally, the carbon emission allowances were not amortised. Under the inventory model, the firms’ prefer to measure the emission allowances at weighted average cost, with the free emission allowances recorded at cost, and purchased emission allowances recorded at purchase price. Additionally, the weighted average cost of used emission allowances are charged to the cost of sales and the carbon emission allowances are subject to impairment. Also, under this model, the emission allowances are classified as inventory, with the relevant cash inflow/ outflow classified as operating activities in the statement of cash flows. As per the inventory model, the emission allowances held for sale are accounted for at fair value at each reporting date. The findings of the study also reveal that under both models, the firms do not record obligations to deliver carbon emission allowances until the actual level for a given period exceeds the amount of the emission allowances held on the balance sheet date. Also, under both models, the gain is recognised in the period in which the emission allowances are sold.

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