FACTS:
Private respondent Jeremias Cabiles (Cabiles) was hired by petitioner Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. (Intel Phil) in April 16, 1997. Throgh the years, Cabiles was promoted several times and was also assigned to Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu. He later applied for a position in Intel Hong Kong (Intel HK). In December of 2006, Cabiles received an offer by Intel HK for the position of Finance Manager. Before accepting such offer, Cabiles inquired with Intel Phil through an email as to the consequences of him accepting the offer, specifically on his retirement benefits from Intel Phil. Intel Phil, through Penny Gabronino, replied to Cabiles that he is not yet eligible for the retirement plan as he has not reached the minimum 10 years of service with them (just over 9 years of service) and such counting of the period will be suspended if he does indeed transfer to Intel HK but will be continued if he decides to work for Intel Phil again in the future. Despite such, Cabiles signed the job offer on January 31, 2007.
On March 8, 2007, Intel Phil issued his “Intel Final Pay Separation Voucher” to which he accepted and executed a Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of Intel Phil. On September8, 2007, after 7 months of employment in Intel HK, he resigned. About 2 years after, or on August 18, 2009, he filed a Complaint for non-payment of retirement benefits against Intel Phil before the NLRC RAB-IV.
The LA ordered Intel Phil to pay the retirement pay to Cabiles holding that he did not sever his employment with Intel Phil when he moved to Intel HK, similar to when he was assigned at Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu. The NLRC affirmed the LA decision. The CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC.
ISSUE:
WON the transfer of Cabiles to Intel HK was tantamount to resignation from Intel Phil. RULING:
The petition is granted and the decision of the CA is reversed and set aside and Cabiles is ordered to restitute to petitioner whatever amount he has received.
Resignation is the formal relinquishment of an office, the overt act of which is coupled with an intent to renounce. This intent could be inferred from the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation.
In this case, Cabiles, while still on a temporary assignment in Intel Chengdu, was offered by Intel HK the job of a Finance Manager. The words he used in his inquiry email — local hire, close, clearance — denote nothing but his firm resolve to voluntarily disassociate himself from Intel Phil. and take on new responsibilities with Intel HK. Despite a non-favorable reply as to his retirement concerns, Cabiles still accepted the offer of Intel HK. His acceptance of the offer meant letting go of the retirement benefits he now claims as he was informed through email correspondence that his 9.5 years of service with Intel Phil. would not be rounded off in his favor.
The continuity, existence or termination of an employer-employee relationship in a typical secondment contract or any employment contract for that matter is measured by the following yardsticks:
1 The selection and engagement of the employee; 2 The payment of wages;
3 The power of dismissal; and
4 The employer's power to control the employee's conduct.
with Intel HK on February 1, 2007. Intel HK became the new employer. It provided Cabiles his compensation. Cabiles then became subject to Hong Kong labor laws, and necessarily, the rights appurtenant thereto, including the right of Intel HK to fire him on available grounds. Lastly, Intel HK had control and supervision over him as its new Finance Manager. Evidently, Intel Phil. no longer had any control over him.
Although in various instances, his move to Hong Kong was referred to as an "assignment," it bears stressing that it was categorized as a "permanent transfer." In
Sta. Maria v. Lopez, the Court held that "no permanent transfer can take place
unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position." Undoubtedly, Cabiles' decision to move to Hong Kong required the abandonment of his permanent position with Intel Phil. in order for him to assume a position in an entirely different company. Clearly, the "transfer" was more than just an assignment. It constituted a severance of Cabiles' relationship with Intel Phil., for the assumption of a position with a different employer, rank, compensation and benefits.
3. Sutherland & Global Services Phils Inc., vs. Labrador, GR No. 193107, March 24, 2014 FACTS:
In August 2006, Sutherland hired Labrador as one of its call center agents with the main responsibility of answering carious queries and complaints through phoned-in calls. In his two years of working at Sutherland, Labrador committed several infractions. But it was only on June 17, 2008 that Labrador was finally charged with violation for transgressing the "Non-Compliance Sale Attribute" policy clause stated in the Employee Handbook. Labrador created a second account for a customer which charged the same customer twice by using the credit card number given supposedly only for verification purposes.
Under Sutherland's Employee Handbook, Labrador's action is classified as an act of dishonesty or fraud. On May 24, 2008, Sutherland sent Labrador a Notice to Explain in writing why he should not be held administratively liable. On May 28, 2008, an administrative hearing was conducted that took into consideration Labrador's past infractions. After investigation, a recommendation was issued finding Labrador guilty of violating the Employee Handbook due to gross or habitual neglect of duty.
On June 17, 2008, Labrador submitted his resignation letter. On October 27, 2008, Labrador filed a complaint for constructive/illegal dismissal before the NLRC.
On February 27, 2009, the LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The LA found just cause to terminate Labrador's employment, and that his resignation letter had been voluntarily executed. The NLRC reversed the LA's ruling on May 21, 2009.
The CA affirmed the NLRC’s finding of illegal dismissal. It ruled that Sutherland's decision to terminate Labrador's services was the proximate cause of his resignation; the resignation letter was submitted solely for the purpose of avoiding any derogatory record that would adversely affect his future employment. In effect, he cannot be deemed to have voluntarily resigned because he was forced to relinquish his position in order to avoid the inevitable termination of employment.
ISSUE:
WON Labrador’s resignation was a valid termination of his employment. RULING:
The appeal is granted and the decision of the CA is reversed and set aside and the complaint for illegal dismissal is dismissed.
In the evidence leading to Labrador's dismissal — evidence that Labrador had acknowledged to have received, thus binding him to its terms — no dispute exists that Labrador committed several infractions. In fact, the final infraction that brought on his termination was actually a repetition of the first offense.
The first offense (committed on September 24, 2007) already gave rise to a "Last Written Warning" with the statement that it was a serious offense, constituting neglect of duty for deviating from the program/department's standard operating procedures. Under this clear warning, a second similar offense would necessarily lead to his dismissal; otherwise the purpose of a "Last Written Warning" would have been negated.
The failure to faithfully comply with the company rules and regulations is considered to be a just cause in terminating one's employment, depending on the nature, severity and circumstances of non-compliance. "An employer 'has the right to regulate, according to its discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, including work assignment, working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.'"
It was within Sutherland's prerogative to terminate Labrador's employment when he committed a serious infraction and, despite a previous warning, repeated it. To Sutherland's credit, it duly complied with the procedural requirement in dismissing an employee; it clearly observed both substantive and procedural due process. Its action was based on a just and authorized cause, and the dismissal was effected after due notice and hearing. But before Sutherland could finally pronounce its verdict, Labrador submitted his resignation letter, impelled no doubt, as Sutherland alleged, by the need to protect his reputation and his future employment chances. The issue of whether the resignation letter was voluntarily executed is now moot. Even if Labrador had not submitted his resignation letter, Sutherland could still not be held liable for constructive dismissal given the existing just cause to terminate Labrador's employment.
4. Chiang Kai Shek College et al., vs. Torres, GR No. 189456, April 2, 2014