impermissibly take advantage of their public position to avoid punishment for traffic violations.
Q: What is the reason for this rule?
A: The prohibition will discourage, if not stop
judges from making business speculations in some business ventures, the secrets of which they learned by reason of their position as judges.
Q: Judge Lilagam was charged with improper conduct for allowing his wife to have access to court records. In his answer, the judge admitted that he requested his wife who was previously a legal researcher, to go over the records and pinpoint problem areas and to suggest measures to rectify the same and to improve the system of case monitoring. Is the judge guilty of improper conduct?
A: Yes. Records of cases are necessarily
confidential, and to preserve their integrity and confidentiality, access thereto ought to be limited only to the judge, the parties or their counsel and the appropriate court personnel in charged of the custody of said records. Here, since Mrs. Lilagam is not a court employee specifically in charge of the custody of said records, the judge’s act of allowing her to have access thereto is improper as such would convey the impression that she isthe one who can influence the judge’s official function. (Gordon v. Lilagam, A.M. No. RTJ-00-
1564, July 26, 2001)
Q: At the pre-trial of a civil case for collection, one of the parties mentioned that he expected to settle his obligation as he was investing in some stocks of a realty corporation that were sure to soar in the market because of some confidential information he obtained from his brother-in-law, a top rank officer of the corporation. Upon hearing the information the judge lost no time in buying the stocks in the realty corporation and as predicted made a lot of money. Is the judge guilty of unethical conduct? A: Yes. Sec. 9, Canon 4 of NJCJprovides that “no
information acquired in a judicial capacity shall be used or disclosed by a judge in any financial dealing or for any other purpose not related to judicial activities.” The judge in this case has violated the foregoing rule, and acted unethically.
(1995 Bar Question)
Q: May a violation of this rule constitute criminal offense?
A: Yes. The act may constitute the following
criminal offenses: Under Sec. ([k) of R.A. 3019, and under Art. 229 and 230 of the RPC, to wit:
1. Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date. (3[k] of R.A.
3019) Sec. 9, Canon 4, NCJC: Confidential
information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties.
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O M A S2. Revelation of secrets by an officer – Any public officer who shall reveal any secret known to him by reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies of papers of which he may have charge and which should not be published, shall suffer imprisonment. (Art.
229, RPC)
3. Public officer revealing secrets of private
individual – Any public officer to whom
the secrets of any private individual shall become known by reason of his office who shall reveal such secrets, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor and a fine. (Art.
230, RPC)
Note: This section allows the judge to participate in legal academia and public discourse on legal matters with the proviso that there shall be no interference in the performance of the judge’s primary functions with respect to his or her jurisdiction. In dealing with the media however, the Philippine Judicial Academy suggests that a judge or court should avoid acrimonious debate with reporters and the public, for a knee jerk reaction from the court or judge may only provoke negative follow-up reports and articles. This section’s tolerance of judicially-related activities is limited by Sec. 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits judges from being “designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions”.
Q: May a judge be a member of the Provincial Committee on Justice?
A: No. Such membership would violate the
constitutional provision on the discharge by members of the judiciary of administrative
functions in quasi-judicial or administrative agencies. This does not mean, however, that judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to the Provincial/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent judges, they form part of the structure of government. Even as non-members, Judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties. (In Re: Designation of Judge
Rodolfo U. Manzano, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, Oct. 5, 1988)
Note: Under Sec. 10(c), Section 10, Canon 4, a judge may engage in private business without the written permission of the Supreme Court. (Borre v. Moya,
A.M. No. 1765-CFI, Oct. 17, 1980)
Q: What is the basis of the prohibition?
A: This prohibition is based on the inherent
incompatibility of the rights, duties and functions of the office of an attorney with the powers, duties and functions of a judge.
Note: Sec. 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court prohibits judges from engaging in the practice of law or giving professional advice to clients.
Philippine courts not only prohibit judges from overtly representing clients as counsel of record, but also from acting more subtly in a way more befitting an advocate than a judge.
Note: While municipal judges can administer oaths or execute certificates on matters related to their official functions, they cannot notarize private documents. Judges assigned to municipalities and circuits may act as notaries provided all notarial fees charged be to the government’s account and a certification attesting to the lack of lawyers on notary in the municipality or circuit be made. (SC
Circular 1-90)
Note: The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid the evil of possible use of the power and influence of his office to affect the outcome of the litigation where he is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons of public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges are expected to conduct themselves in such a manner as to preclude any suspicion that they are representing the interests of party litigant (Dia- Sec. 10, Canon 4, NCJC: Subject to the proper
performance of judicial duties, judges may: 1. Write, lecture, teach and participate in
activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matter;
2. Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
3. Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.
Sec. 11, Canon 4, NCJC: Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.
Anonuevo v. Bercacio, A.M. No. 177-MTJ, November 27, 1975)
Q: Respondent Judge Lelina was
administratively charged for violation of Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Rule 5.07, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He was then preventively suspended by the Court on account of an earlier administrative complaint filed charging him with harassment in connection with the criminal complaint for Rape and the complaint for Abduction with Rape and Slight Illegal Detention. He then filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the criminal case praying for a resolution in his favor. Subsequently he appealed to the Court to grant him the permission to practice law during the remainder of his preventive suspension or, if such cannot be granted, to consider him resigned from the judiciary. It turned out that before he filed the above-said Manifestation, Appeal and Omnibus Motion, Judge Lelina engaged in the private practice of law. Did the judge commit any unethical act?
A: Yes. Since Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and Section 11, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary does not make any distinction in prohibiting judges from engaging in the private practice of law while holding judicial office, no distinction should be made in its application. In the present case, Judge Lelina having been merely suspended and not dismissed from the service, he was still bound under the prohibition. (Binalay v. Lelina Jr,
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2132, July 31, 2009)
Q: In an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late Juan Mayaman, the heirs requested Judge Maawain, a family friend, to go over the document prepared by a new lawyer before they signed it. Judge Maawain agreed and even acted as an instrumental witness. Did Judge Maawain engage in the unauthorized practice of law? Why?
A: No. In the case of de Castro v. Capulong, 118 SCRA 5 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a
judge who merely acted as a witness to a document and who explained to the party waiving his rights of redemption over mortgaged properties the consequences thereof, does not engage himself in the practice of law. This appears to be more applicable to the case of Judge Maawain. He did not give professional advice in anticipation of litigation. He was just asked to review a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate. He signed merely as an instrumental
witness and not as a legal counsel. Besides, his act was an isolated act. (2002 Bar Question)
Note: This rule recognizes the difference between membership in associations of judges and membership in associations of other legal professionals. While attendance at lavish events hosted by lawyers might create an appearance of impropriety, participation in judges-only organizations does not.
Q: What is the general rule with regard to prohibition against accepting gifts, bequests, or loans?
A: The general rule is that found in Sections 13
and 14.
Note: Section 13 should be read in conjunction with Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public officials and Employee) which provides that, public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of money value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.
Respondent Judge Ganay clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. His acts of receiving lawbooks worth fifty thousand pesos, cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians of the late Rev. Sec. 12, Canon 4, NCJC: Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations representing the interests of judges.
Sec. 13, Canon 4, NCJC: Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
Sec. 14, Canon 4, NCJC: Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done, to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.
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O M A SFr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court, constitute impropriety which the Court cannot allow. Respondent Judge Ganay’s act of issuing Orders directing the manager of the PNB, La Union Branch to draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras creates the impression of impropriety and subjects the court to suspicion of irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings. (Heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Jose Aspiras v.
Judge Ganay, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055, Dec. 17, 2009) Note: Section 14 should be read in relation to Section 7(d) of RA No. 6713 which prohibits public officials from soliciting or accepting gifts from any person in the course of their official duties.
Q: What is the reason for this rule?
A: This section is intended to assure that what the
judge cannot do directly (soliciting gifts), may not be done indirectly through the use of employees or staff members.
Q: X was charged with grave threat before the sala of Judge Elias Lelina. During the pendency of the case, X offered a business partnership to the daughter of Judge Lelina who then accepted the same. Should the judge be disciplined?
A: Yes. Judges should not allow members of their
family to accept gifts nor favor in relation to anything done, to be done, or omitted to be done by the judge in connection with the performance of his official duties. Here, the judge’s act of allowing his daughter to accept the business offer of X despite knowledge of the possible intention of the latter who has pending case in his sala is improper. (Dulay v. Lelina Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1516, July 14, 2005)
Q: What is the exception to Sections 13 and 14 of Canon 4 of the NCJC?
A: Canon 4, Section 15 of NCJC.
Note: Judges are allowed to accept token gifts, awards, or benefits when given as a consequence of a special occasion.
Q: What gifts and grants from foreign countries are allowed?
A:
1. The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;
2. The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment; or
3. The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely outside the Philippines (such as allowances, transportation, food and lodging) of more than nominal value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interest of the Philippines, and permitted by the head office, branch or agency to which the judge belongs. (Sec. 7[d], R.A. 6713)
Q: When is a judge considered guilty of indirect bribery? Of direct bribery?
A: Acceptance of gifts given by reason of the
office of the judge is indirect bribery (Art. 211,
Revised Penal Code) and when he agrees to
perform an act constituting a crime in connection with the performance of his official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present receive by such officer, he is guilty of direct bribery (Art. 210, Revised Penal Code).
Note:
GR: Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), the judge is liable criminally for directly or indirectly receiving gifts, presents or other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another under conditions provided in Section 2, pars. b and c of the law.
XPN: Unsolicited gifts or presents of small value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local custom or usage (Section 14, RA 3019)
Note: Donations given to a judge or to his wife, descendants or ascendants by reason of his office are void (Art. 739, Civil Code). Ownership does not pass to the donee. Money or property donated is recoverably by the donor, his heirs or creditors. Note: Under Section 16 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution “No loan, guarantee or other form of
financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted directly or indirectly by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial Sec. 15, Canon 4, NCJC: Subject to law and
to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made, provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of official duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.
institution to xxx members of the Supreme Court xxx during their tenure.
It is a serious misconduct for a judge to receive money from a litigant in the form of loans which he never intended to pay back. Even if the judge intends to pay, it is an act of impropriety to take a loan from a party litigant. The judge could not be wholly free from bias in deciding a case where his lender is a party. A judge should always strive to be free from suspicion and all forms of improprieties.
(Ompoc v. Judge Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-86-11 September 27, 1989
Note: To ensure equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial office. As the guardians of justice, courts must adhere to the principle of equality. People expect the courts to be unaffected by differences in social status, degree of education and even physical abilities.
Note: A judge must be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the judicial system, by being aware of the diversity in society. With that awareness, a judge should not yield to first impression, reach hasty conclusions or prejudge matters. (Castillo v. Judge Juan, 62 SCRA 124)
Q: What is the reason for this rule?
A: To render substantial justice and maintain
public confidence in the judicial system, judges are expected to be aware of the diversity in society that results from an increased worldwide exchange of people and ideas.
Note: Judges should be mindful of the various international instruments and treaties ratified by the Philippines, which affirm the equality of all human beings and establish a norm of non-discrimination without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Judges should not yield to first impression, reach hasty conclusions or prejudge matters. They have a duty to ensure that the minority status of a party plays no part in their decisions.
Note: Magistrates of law must comport themselves at all times in such a manner that their conduct, can withstand the highest level of public scrutiny. Judges should avoid private remarks, hasty conclusions, or distasteful jokes that may give even erroneous impressions of prejudice and lead the public to believe that cases before them are being prejudged.
Note: As arbiters of the law, judges should be conscientious, studious, courteous, patient and punctual in the discharge of their judicial duties, recognizing that time of litigants, witnesses and counsel is of value.
Judges should act with decorum toward jurors, parties, court staff, spectators, and alike.
Q: Judge Tormis made a comment in a certain case to the effect that the same should be dismissed as the act complained of was already decriminalized by a special law. Thereafter, Judge Navarro, who previously handled the case before he was appointed as a judge, barged into the office of Judge Tormis telling to the staff that their judge does not know her law. Judge Tormis then retaliated by saying that to her, the office of Judge Navarro does not exist. Are the judges guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge? A: Yes. Judges, being dispensers of justice should
not act in a way that would cast suspicion in order to preserve faith in the administration of justice. They should so behave to avoid poor public