Balanza de Langmuir

The widespread resentment in the Sikh community in India and abroad over Operation Blue Star led to an aggravation of Khalistani terrorism. More people started supporting the Khalistanis. The situation became worse in the wake of the atrocities committed on the Sikh community after the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the failure of the Government to prevent it. There were serious allegations that some leaders of the Congress (I) had instigated the atrocities. The ISI took full advantage of the resentment to further fuel the anger in the Sikh community to serve Pakistan’s own purpose. It set up more training camps for the Khalistanis in its territory and started imparting to them training in the fabrication and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), through timers and remote control. Before Operation Blue Star, the ISI’s training was mainly confined to the use of hand-held weapons. It started supplying high-grade explosives, detonators and chemical timers. Many of these came from the stocks given by the CIA for use by the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet troops. The ISI advised them to float non-governmental organizations in West Europe to agitate on the alleged violation of the human rights of the Sikhs during and after Operation Blue Star and after Indira Gandhi’s assassination. It funded them. It stressed upon them the importance of attacking economic targets. It wanted them to damage the agricultural economy of Punjab. It brought them into contact with fundamentalist organizations such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) of Pakistan and asked them to co- operate with the extremist elements in Jammu & Kashmir. It provided sanctuaries to terrorists and others, who had escaped from the Golden Temple and crossed over into Pakistan. The Zia-ul-Haq regime rejected repeated complaints of the Government of India regarding the ISI’s assistance to Khalistani terrorism.

Protection of Rajiv Gandhi and the members of his family from the wrath of the terrorists received the urgent attention of the Government of India. Till Indira Gandhi’s assassination, India did not have a dedicated service or force for the protection of the Prime Minister----similar to the US Secret Service, which is responsible for the protection of the US President. The IB performed the role of the co-ordinator of security arrangements for the Prime Minister. Unsatisfactory co-ordination and ineffective supervision had contributed to her assassination. It was, therefore, decided to set up a dedicated force called the Special Protection Group (SPG) for the protection of the Prime Minister. It was taken out of the control of the IB, which became one of the input feeder agencies for the protection of the PM instead of the principal agency as it was before Indira Gandhi’s assassination. Dr. S.Subramanian, a highly distinguished officer of the IPS from Andhra Pradesh, who had served for some years as Assistant Director in charge of the PM’s security in the IB in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was appointed the first Director of the SPG. He organized the SPG with great competence and won the trust of Rajiv Gandhi and his family. He was a no-nonsense type of officer, who was thorough in his supervision. He commanded the respect and the implicit obedience of his officers. He was professional to his finger tips and did not allow any interference by the political class or by the IB or the other senior officers in the work of the SPG. He ensured that in matters concerning the physical security of the Prime Minister his word was the law.

The R&AW continued to be responsible for co-ordinating the work relating to the bullet-proofing of the PM’s cars and for the maintenance of the cars used by the PM. For reasons which were not

clear, Rajiv Gandhi wanted the initial crop of officers of the SPG to be trained by Italian experts---- though the Italian security services were not particularly known for their expertise in this field. They used to impart the training in a guest house owned by the R&AW away from Delhi. There were complaints of rude behaviour by the Italian experts towards the trainees. It was even alleged that one of the Italian experts slapped a trainee. The R&AW brought these things to the notice of Rajiv Gandhi and told him that the rude behaviour of the Italians towards the trainees could create feelings of resentment in the minds of the trainees. This was not desirable. Thereafter, Rajiv Gandhi terminated the training arrangements with the Italians.

The situation in Punjab and Delhi kept going from bad to worse. The ISI expanded a provocative programme over the external services of Radio Pakistan, whose only purpose was to strengthen the feelings of alienation in the minds of the Sikh community in India and abroad. It kept pressing the Khalistanis to blow up the Bhakra Nangal dam and to damage the irrigation canal system in Punjab. Between 1981 and 1984, the Khalistanis mainly resorted to aircraft hijackings and targeted killings with hand-held weapons for drawing attention to their cause and for intimidating the Government and the people. After the assassination of Indira Gandhi, they started using IEDs frequently. Initially, they were detonating the IEDs through mechanical timers such as a clock. And then, they started using chemical timers of US-make given by the ISI. Thereafter, they showed considerable skills in remote- controlled activation of IEDs. Their ability to innovate was of great concern to the Indian security agencies. Coinciding with the first anniversary of Operation Blue Star in June, 1985, they carried out a number of explosions in different parts of Delhi with what came to be known as transistor radio bombs. They concealed IEDs inside transistor radio sets and left them in public places. When passers-by picked them up and switched them on, there were explosions causing casualties. There was considerable panic. The security agencies appealed to the public not to touch transistor radios if found anywhere, but to report their presence to the Police.

Rajiv Gandhi refrained from traveling abroad for about eight months after taking over as the Prime Minister. In June, 1985, he undertook his first official visit abroad. He paid a State visit to France, the US and Algeria. On his way back to Delhi from Algeria, he stopped over in Geneva to address the annual session of the International Labour Organization (ILO). On coming to know of this, Khalistani elements in the UK, the US and Canada conspired to kill him during his travel. The Indian as well as foreign security agencies took extraordinary precautions to foil their conspiracies. Some of these precautions, which were necessary, added to the resentment in the Sikh community. One of these precautions was to ensure that no Sikh would be deployed on any duty near Rajiv Gandhi and his family.

I was at that time posted as Counsellor in the Indian Permanent Mission to the UN organizations based in Geneva. I held concurrent charge as the Indian Consul-General in Geneva accredited to the Cantonal Government of Geneva. Since I had previously served in Paris in the 1970s and had a good knowledge of the French language, I was asked to act as the interface with the security agencies of France and Geneva, co-ordinate the arrangements and assist the SPG in whatever way I could. I felt many embarrassing situations in this role. A clean-shaven Sikh of foreign origin was occupying a senior position in one of the Air India Offices. I was asked by Delhi to persuade the Air India to send him out on tour so that he would not be present during Rajiv Gandhi’s visit.

In Geneva, I had prepared the entire security plan. There was a charming, young Sikh officer belonging to the Indian Foreign Service who was posted in the Indian Permanent Mission. I had made him in charge of co-ordinating the arrangements at the airport during the arrival and departure of Rajiv Gandhi, in association with the Geneva authorities. On coming to know of this, Delhi asked me not to associate him with any security- related duties. I pointed out that this would amount to a humiliation of the officer who had already been told by me that he would be in charge of the airport arrangements. Moreover, when every other officer in the Indian mission was being associated with the security arrangements, not to associate one officer just because he was a Sikh would be incorrect and exploited by the Khalistanis in their propaganda against the Government of India. Delhi then ordered that he should be put in charge of the 24-hour Control Room, which had been set up in the Permanent Mission so that he would not be anywhere near Rajiv Gandhi and his family during their stay in Geneva.

It was obvious this young officer felt very hurt when his duties were changed. However, he did not show it outwardly and performed his duties in the Control Room with great diligence. He never spoke to me even once about it. Three years later, on the eve of my transfer back to Delhi, there was a farewell party for me in the Mission. After Dr.J.S.Teja, the then Permanent Representative, had spoken praising me, this young officer asked for Dr.Teja’s permission to say a few words. After praising me very warmly, he made a reference in very polite language to his hurt over his removal from airport duty to Control Room duty during the visit of Rajiv Gandhi. I felt a very small man. How I wished I had resisted the pressure from Delhi and insisted on his performing the airport duty as originally scheduled.

One of the engagements for Rajiv Gandhi at Geneva was a reception hosted by the Indian association in a local hotel. The President of the association was a distinguished Sikh officer of one of the UN organizations. I had deliberately not kept Delhi informed of this fact after the embarrassment over this young IFS officer. I could sense a feeling of nervousness among some of the officers, who had accompanied Rajiv Gandhi when they saw a Sikh welcoming him as he arrived at the hotel for the reception. Another India-based Sikh used to come to Geneva often to attend multilateral meetings. Fortunately, Delhi did not ask me to keep him also away from Rajiv Gandhi. His name was Dr.Manmohan Singh.

One of the unfortunate, but understandable consequences of the assassination of Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh security guards was the over-cautiousness of the intelligence and security agencies and the paranoia about the Sikh community, which came to grip many of us, including me. We started playing safe by looking with suspicion at many Sikhs--- often even our closest friends. We started taking seriously all reports on alleged activities of Sikh extremists without proper verification. The sources and even some unscrupulous intelligence officers took advantage of this paranoia by feeding all sorts of reports of likely threats from Khalistani terrorists. Any Sikh---however reputed and distinguished--- who criticized the Government or the Prime Minister, was looked upon with suspicion as a hidden Khalistani. When not only sources, but also junior officers found that credence was being given to any report which spoke of a threat from the terrorists, there were attempts at fabrication. A directly-recruited telecommunications expert of the R&AW working in its Monitoring Division claimed to have intercepted a conversation between two Sikhs, which indicated a

conspiracy to kill Rajiv Gandhi. Fortunately, a retired Army Colonel, who was his supervisory officer, managed to establish that this expert had fabricated the intercept. He was sacked.

The IB and the R&AW used to prepare a collation of terrorist and other extremist suspects from whom threats could arise to the security of the Prime Minister. Many names were included in this list on the basis of single-source reports. It became bulky with hundreds of names. Often, these names did not have any identifying particulars such as the full name or the address or the passport particulars etc. Before the Prime Minister’s travels abroad, IB and R&AW officers accompanying the Advance Security Liaison Teams used to carry this list, hand it over to the local authorities and request them not to let any of the suspects figuring in the list enter their country before and during the visit of the Prime Minister. This bulky list and the lack of identifying particulars in many cases became an object of ridicule in many countries.

Before one of the visits of Rajiv Gandhi to Islamabad, when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister, an Advance Security Liaison Team had visited Islamabad. At a joint meeting of intelligence and security officials from the two countries chaired by the Pakistani Interior Secretary, the R&AW representative, before handing over the bulky list to the Interior Secretary, read out the names of suspects, who were resident in Pakistan---particularly in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. After he had finished reading, the Pakistani Interior Secretary mockingly said: “Alok (not the real name), I was very nervous as you were reading out the names. I was worried my name might also figure in your list. In that case, I might have been obliged to tell Benazir that our Indian friends look upon me as a security suspect and request her to remove me from all duties connected with Rajiv Gandhi’s visit. I am relieved my name is not in your list.” Everybody laughed----the Pakistanis heartily and the Indian officials with great embarrassment.

A similar drill was followed before a planned visit of V.P. Singh, when he was the Prime Minister, to Kuala Lumpur. When the suspects’ list was handed over to a senior security official of the Malaysian Government, he remarked: “ This is the suspects’ list? I thought it was the dictionary!” He then glanced through the list and found there were many names like “A.Singh”, “S.Singh”, “I.Ahmed” etc. Many names had no identifying particulars. The Malaysian official asked for the expansion of the names or the identifying particulars. Neither the IB nor the R&AW had them. They had just included these names because they figured in some source report or the other. The Malaysians were surprised. They asked: “ Do you mean to say you have included these names without even verifying whether such persons existed or not?” At that time, the Indian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur had a senior Sikh official from the IFS. One Malaysian officer remarked jocularly: “ We hope you have not put his name also in your list. We will face a mighty embarrassing situation.” After the return of the team from Kuala Lumpur, the IB and the R&AW undertook a drastic revision of the list and pruned it considerably.

Every year, before the Independence Day and the Republic Day, the headquarters of the IB and the R&AW receive a large number of reports on likely threats from their sources and their junior officers. All these reports used to be conveyed to the Commissioner of Delhi Police, the Home Secretary, the Director of the SPG and other officers involved in making the security arrangements. A co-ordination group consisting of representatives of the various security agencies met almost daily

and discussed these reports in order to decide whether any additional security arrangements were called for. Once the IB reported about the possibility of a terrorist strike on the route of the Republic Day parade. After discussing this, the co-ordination group decided to take additional security measures along the parade route. A few days later, the IB reported that in view of the strengthening of security measures along the parade route, the Khalistani terrorists were likely to strike away from the parade route in old Delhi. When this report came up for discussion before the co-ordination group, the Commissioner of Police of Delhi literally blew up at the IB officer and said: “ If we take additional security measures in Old Delhi too, you will report after a couple of days that in view of the tight security in Old Delhi, the terrorists are likely to strike in Karolbagh. We can’t function like this.”

Some years later, when P.V.Narasimha Rao was the Prime Minister, even A.N.Verma, his Principal Secretary, used to accuse the IB and the R&AW of play-it-safe reporting. He used to even allege that the intelligence agencies were preparing their assessments of threat perceptions before domestic and foreign travels of the Prime Minister without applying their mind to the reports. He complained that the two organizations had ready-made omnibus assessments of threat perceptions, which would suit any country and any occasion. He accused them of sending these omnibus assessments even without making them country-specific. He once pointed out that an assessment of likely threats sent by the R&AW before the Prime Minister’s visit to the US contained many paragraphs, which seemed to have been lifted from an earlier assessment on likely threats in Thailand.

Such instances of over-cautiousness and “play-it-safe” reporting could seem ridiculous in retrospect today when viewed against the wisdom of hindsight. But, it was not so in the 1980s when there was a sudden increase in the number and lethality of the Khalistani terrorist strikes and after the brutal assassination of Indira Gandhi by two of her own security guards and the assassination at Pune of Gen. A.S.Vaidya, who was living there after his retirement as the Chief of the Army Staff. The intelligence agencies had to disseminate to the physical security agencies reports indicating a likely threat of terrorism even before verifying them. It was not play-it-safe reporting, but prudent reporting. In fact a rule of prudence followed by the intelligence agencies all over the world is to alert the physical security agencies immediately after the receipt of a report indicating the likelihood of a terrorist strike without waiting till the verification process is completed. Report-and-simultaneously- verify is the rule of the thumb invariably followed by all intelligence agencies in respect of reports indicating a likely threat to a VVIP instead of verify-and-then-report.

In 1987, a source of the R&AW had reported that a Khalistani terrorist would be attempting to kill Rajiv Gandhi with a pistol when he visited the Rajghat and that he would take up position on the branch of a tree the previous night. There was no way of getting the report verified through a second source. A retired officer of the Air Force, who was then in charge of the VIP Security Division,