Article 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law. (1961)
The law fixes the time within which an action may be filed. If the period prescribed by law lapses, the action cannot be filed anymore.
The set of provisions dealing with prescription of actions is known as the Statute of Limitations.
Article 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period, according to Article 1132, and without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 559, 1505, and 1133. (1962a)
For example, a person can recover lost personal or movable property which he claims belong to him within a period of eight years.
However, if all the requisites of an ordinary acquisitive prescription of movable property are present, the possessor of the same becomes the owner of the movable property after only four years uninterrupted possession in good faith. In Tan vs. Court of Appeals,1 where the petitioner claimed that, through bad faith and fraud, he was led to assign his shares of stocks in 1977 to three corporate entities and where the case to reconvey the same was filed only in 1987, the Supreme Court ruled that the action had already prescribed, thus:
The next question is whether or not any action for reconveyance has nevertheless prescribed, on the bases of provisions governing reconveyance.
The rule anent prescription on recovery of movables (shares of stock in this case) is expressed in Article 1140 of the Civil Code, which we quote:
1G.R. No. 90356, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 355.
“Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor had acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period, according to Article 1132, and without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 559, 1505 and 1133.”
As it provides, Article 1140 is subject to the provisions of Articles 1132 and 1133 of the Code, governing acquisitive prescription, in relation to Articles 559 and 1505 thereof. Under Article 1132.
“Art. 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith.
The ownership of personal property also prescribes through uninterrupted possession for eight years, without need of any other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property lost or of which he has been illegally deprived, as well as with respect to movables acquired in a public sale, fair, or market, or from a merchant’s store the provisions of Articles 559 and 1505 of this Code shall be observed.”
Acquisitive prescription sets in after uninterrupted possession of four years, provided there is good faith, and upon the lapse of eight years, if bad faith is present. Where, however, the thing was acquired through a crime, the offender cannot acquire ownership by prescription under Article 1133, which we quote:
“Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a crime can never be acquired through prescription by the offender.”
Please note that under the above Article, the benefits of prescription are denied to the offender; nonetheless, if the thing has meanwhile passed to a subsequent holder, prescription begins to run (four or eight years, depending on the existence of good faith).
For purposes of extinctive prescription vis-a-vis movables, we therefore understand the periods to be:
1. Four years, if the possessor is in good faith;
2. Eight years in all other cases, except where the loss was due to a crime in which case, the offender cannot acquire the movable by prescription, and an action to recover it from him is imprescriptible.
It is evident, for purposes of the complaint in question, that the petitioners had at most eight years within which to pursue a
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reconveyance, reckoned from the loss of the shares in 1977, when the petitioner Vicente Tan executed the various agreements in which he conveyed the same in favor of the Executive Consultants, Inc., Orobel Property Management, Inc., and Antolum Trading Corporation.
We are hard put to say, in this regard, that the petitioners’
action is after all, imprescriptible pursuant to the provisions of Article 1133 of the Civil Code, governing actions to recover loss by means of a crime. For one thing, the complaint was not brought upon this theory. For another, there is nothing there that suggests that the loss of the shares was indeed made possible by a criminal act, other than simple bad faith and probably abuse of right.
In Dira vs. Tanega,2 where a partner took possession of the shares of a co-partner who refused to pay his obligations and participate in the partnership prompting the possessing-partner to conduct himself publicly, openly, and adversely as the absolute owner from 1947 up to 1961 of the shares pledged by the delinquent partner and of the assets of the partnership, and where the delinquent partner contended that a trust relationship was created between him and the other partner, the Supreme Court ruled that such delinquent partner can no longer file a case to claim the shares because such action had already prescribed. The Supreme Court pertinently ruled:
x x x In bad faith or in good faith, after eight years of actual adverse possession, appellee acquired clear ownership of appellant’s share by acquisitive prescription. According to Article 1132 of the Civil Code, “the ownership of personal property also prescribes through uninterrupted possession for eight years, without need of any other condition.” So, appellee became un-disputed owner of appellant’s share since 1955 or six years before this action was filed and since said year the allegation of trusteeship had already lost any basis whatsoever. Under Article 1140 of the same Code, “Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period” or for an equal period, in which latter case, the right to sue prescribes together with the title.
The action shall likewise be without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 559, 1505, and 1133. These articles provide:
Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title. Nevertheless, one who has
2G.R. No. L-23232, June 17, 1979, 33 SCRA 479.
art. 1140
lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Article 1505. Subject to the provisions of this Title, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.
Nothing in this Title, however, shall affect:
(1) The provisions of any factors’ acts, recording laws, or any other provisions of law enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner thereof;
(2) The validity of any contract of sale under statutory power of sale or under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) Purchases made in a merchant’s store, or in fairs, or markets, in accordance with the Code of Commerce and special laws.
Article 1133. Movables possessed through a crime can never be acquired through prescription by the offender.
Article 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. (1963)
The prescriptive period in connection with immovables is thirty years. However if within the thirty-year period, all the requisites for ordinary acquisitive prescription are already present in favor of the possessor, then the possessor shall be considered the owner of the property after 10 years of uninterrupted, adverse, public possession of the property in the concept of an owner in good faith. In extraordinary acquisitive prescription, if the immovable property is adversely in the possession of the possessor for thirty years, the right to sue prescribes with the acquisition of the title.
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Article 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years.
(1964a)
A mortgage is an accessory contract. It is constituted to secure a debt so that if the debtor fails to pay the principal obligation, the creditor can foreclose on the mortgage by selling the same in a public sale or bidding and the proceeds thereof are used to pay off the principal debt and interest if any. If there is any deficiency, the creditor can still go against the principal debtor to collect such deficiency. In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Tomeldan3 where the creditor, after extra-judicially foreclosing the property of the debtor on September 15, 1967, filed on March 14, 1977 a civil case to claim the deficiency, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the action had prescribed considering that the prescriptive period was 10 years from the time the cause of action accrued which was on September 16, 1967, to wit:
A suit for the recovery of the deficiency after the foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is precisely to enforce the mortgage contract.
Such being the case, Article 1142 of the Civil Code is likewise applicable to the instant case. Said provision reads: “Art.
1142. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years.”
Article 1143. The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in this Code, are not extinguished by prescription:
(1) To demand a right of way, regulated in Article 649;
(2) To bring an action to abate a public or private nuisance. (n)
Aside from the right to demand a right of way regulated in Article 649 and the right to bring an action to abate a public or private nuisance, there are certain actions which do not prescribe such as an action to declare a contract null and void,4 an action to quiet title initiated by the person having possession of the property,5 and an action to partition a property among co-heirs.6 Prescription does not supervene when the trust is merely an implied one7 unless expressly
3G.R. No. 51269, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 741; See also Caltex vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74730, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA 741.
4Bonanga vs. Soler, G.R. No. L-15717, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 755; Ras vs. Sua, G.R. No. L-23303, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 153; Garanciang vs. Garanciang, G.R. No. L-22351, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 229.
arts. 1142-1143
repudiated by the trustee.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment. (n)
For a contract to fall under this article, the agreement must be in writing. For example, a purchaser of a real estate evidenced by a written contract of sale may file a case for delivery of the property to him. Barring the applicability of laches, the purchaser has ten years within which to file the case for delivery. The cause of action on a written contract accrues when a breach or violation thereof occurs.8 In Espanol vs. Philippine Veterans Administration9 where the pension of a veteran’s widow, which was received by her pursuant to Republic Act No. 65, was cancelled on November 1, 1951 by the Philippine Veterans Administration (PVA) on the basis of a doubtful administrative policy which however was struck down as invalid on June 27, 1973 by the Supreme Court in another case, and where the said widow, on February 25, 1974 filed a complaint against the PVA for the collection of the said pension, the Supreme Court rejected the contention of the PVA that the action had prescribed by thus ruling:
The contention of appellant PVA that the action of appellee Maria U. Espanol to compel the restoration of her monthly pension and that of her children, effective from the date of cancellation on November 1, 1951, has already prescribed, inasmuch as the same was filed more that 10 years from the date of cancellation, is without merit.
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides that actions based on an obligation created by law shall be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. It is important to reckon the date, when the right of action accrues, as the same is the beginning for counting the 10-year prescriptive period.
5Gallar vs. Husain, G.R. No. L-20954, May 24 1967, 20 SCRA 186.
6Gerona vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-19060, May 26, 1964, 11 SCRA 153.
7Bueno vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1179.
8Lim Tay vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126891, August 5, 1998, 97 SCAD 103, 293 SCRA 634.
9G.R. No. L-44616, June 29, 1985, 137 SCRA 314.
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The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of such defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. x x x It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. x x x
The appellee cannot be said to have a cause of action, in compelling the appellant to continue paying her monthly pension on November 1, 1951, because appellant’s act of cancellation, being pursuant to an administrative policy, cannot be considered a violation of appellee’s right to receive her monthly pension. x x x x
It is only when this Court declared invalid the questioned administrative policy in the Del Mar vs. Philippine Veterans Administration, x x x, promulgated on June 27, 1973, can the appellee be said to have a cause of action to compel appellant to resume her monthly pension; because it is at that point in time, when the presumption of legality of the questioned adminis-trative policy had been rebutted and thus it can be said with certainty that appellant’s act was in violation of appellee’s right to receive her monthly pension.
The 10-year prescriptive period, therefore, should be counted from June 27, 1973 when the case of Del Mar vs. The Philippine Veterans Administration, x x x, was promulgated, and not from November 1, 1951, the date of the cancellation by appellant of appellee’s pension. The action of appellee, which was brought on February 25, 1974, is therefore well within the 10-year prescriptive period.
In Huang vs. Court of Appeals,10 the Supreme Court ruled that an implied trust, whether a constructive or resulting trust, is normally not subject to prescription. However, if the trustee openly and adversely repudiates the trust, it is only from that time when prescription can set in. The Supreme Court said:
The prescriptive period is ten (10) years from the repu-diation of the trust. It is ten (10) years because just as a resulting trust is an offspring of the law, so is the corresponding obligation to convey the property and the title thereto to the true owner.
In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Art. 1144 of the New Civil Code, which is the law applicable provides: “The following actions must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues: (a) Upon a written contract; (b) Upon obligations
10G.R. No. L-108525, September 13, 1994, 55 SCAD 289, 236 SCRA 420.
art. 1144
created by law; (c) Upon a judgment.”
Thus, the reckoning point is repudiation of the trust by the trustee because from that moment his possession becomes adverse, which in the present case gave rise to a cause of action by Dolores against the Huang spouses. However, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.
Article 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:
(1) Upon an oral contract;
(2) Upon a quasi-contract. (n)
An action based on an oral contract must be commenced within six years from the time the cause of action accrues. For example, A orally borrowed P2,000 from B to be paid on June 1, 1997 and B failed to pay on such date despite demand from A. A has six years from June 1, 1997 to file the case for collection against B.
Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contracts to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.11 Quasi-contracts are governed by Book IV, Title XVII, Chapter 1 of the 1950 Civil Code. One quasi-contract provided in the Civil Code is solutio indebiti. This occurs if something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it has been unduly delivered through mistake, thereby giving rise to the obligation to return what has been unduly received.12 In Municipality of Opon vs. Caltex,13 where a taxpayer mistakenly paid an amount which is not due, the Supreme Court, citing Gonzalo Puyat & Sons vs. City of Manila,14 ruled that the prescriptive period was six years as it is a quasi-contract of solutio indebiti under the Civil Code.
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
11Article 2142 of the 1950 Civil Code.
12Article 2154 of the 1950 Civil Code.
13G.R. No. L-21853, February 26, 1968, 22 SCRA 755.
14G.R. No. L-17447, April 30, 1963, 7 Phil. 970.
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(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon quasi-delict. (n)
In Virgilio Callanta vs. Carnation Phil., Inc.,15 an employee was unjustly and illegally dismissed by his employer. He filed a case with the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC) for illegal dismissal, reinstatement and for back wages three years, one month and five days from the time he was illegally dismissed. The NLRC dismissed the case on the ground that it had prescribed pursuant to the Labor Code which provided that such claim should be filed within 3 years. The Supreme Court overruled the NLRC because the prescriptive period is four years as the case involved “injury to the rights of the plaintiff,” thus:
As this Court stated in Bondoc vs. People’s Bank and Trust Co., when a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood, hence he should be protected against any arbitrary and unjust deprivation of his job. Unemployment, said the Court in Almira vs. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, brings ‘untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage earners.’ The misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs thus could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under all circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their means of livelihood.
It is a principle in American jurisprudence, which undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one’s employment, profession, trade or calling is a “property right,”
and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong.
The right is considered to be property within the protection of
The right is considered to be property within the protection of