Conclusiones del Capítulo

Mainstreaming can be seen as an example of ‘state feminism’, a term first used by Hernes to describe the use of state policy machineries by feminists working within the state to promote a feminist agenda (Hernes 1987). ‘State feminism’ is sometimes used more broadly to describe women’s policy machineries within state institutions, (women’s units, equality units and so on), whether or not they serve feminist ends and more specifically to describe alliances between feminist actors inside and outside the state where the state actors help the non state actors gain access to policy arenas and achieve policy goals (McBride and Mazur 2010). Whatever the precise definition used state feminism involves a view of the state as ‘a potential, but by no means certain, arena for social change for women’s movements, organisations and individuals’ (Mazur 2013 p4).

This model of the state as a potential arena for change marks a move away from socialist and radical feminist concepts of the state as constructed in the interests of either capitalism or patriarchy (Rhode 1994). Socialist and Marxist feminists built on and expanded Marxist theories of the capitalist state to argue that capitalism is sustained by the unpaid reproductive labour of women and by relegating women to a reserve army of labour which can be used to keep wages low. State welfare and family policies reinforce women’s role as unpaid workers in the home and low paid workers outside the home (Eisenstein 1979). In contrast Mackinnon and other radical feminists have characterised the state as patriarchal, institutionalising male

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dominance and female subordination. Mackinnon (1989) has argued that the

ostensible neutrality of the state disguised the way it ‘coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interests of men as a gender’ and that the state is male ‘the law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women.’ Hernes and other writers on state feminism took issue with these monolithic conceptualisations of the state, pointing to changes to state structures and practices as a result of feminist campaigns and arguing that in some instances the state could work to change women’s lives for the better (Hernes 1987). Building on this idea Watson argued that states were complex entities which should be seen as ‘a set of arenas and a collection of practices which are produced historically and not structurally given’ (Watson 1991 p186). This view of the state as a ‘network of institutions with complex and sometimes competing agendas’ (Rhode 1994 p1185) was both a reflection of post-modern rejection of grand unifying theories, and a response to feminist writers’ observation of practice on the ground (Watson 1991, McBride and Mazur 2010). It has led to an interest in the differences between states (Kantola 2006) and the ways in which the state can be ‘experienced as both enabling and constraining, as oppressive and responsive to pressure for change’ (Charles 2000 p28).

The most significant example of research on ‘state feminism’ is a major cross national study of the different forms state feminism can take carried out by the Research Network on Gender, Politics and the State (RNGS), an international network of researchers. (Goertz and Mazur 2008, McBride and Mazur 2010, Mazur 2013). The RNGS has focussed in particular on the relationship between ‘women’s policy actors’ inside the state and women’s movement actors outside the state concluding that the characteristics of the women’s movement, the policy

environment, particularly the role of left wing parties and the characteristics and actions of women’s policy agencies all impact on the state response to women’s movement demands. These elements will be discussed in more detail below.

Theories of state feminism have been complicated by the changing nature and role of the state. Kantola and Squires (2012) argue that ‘the concept ‘state feminism’ no longer adequately captures the complexity of the emerging feminist engagements with new forms of governance’ (Kantola and Squires 2012 p382). The concept of governance is often credited to Cleveland who argued for a move from ‘hierarchical

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pyramids’ with power at the top, to ‘webs’ in which ‘power is diffused and centres of decision plural’ based on ‘collegial, consensual and consultative’ decision making’ (Cleveland 1972 p13). Cleveland identified a blurring of the lines between the private and public sectors, arguing that social problems required both to work together to find solutions. The term has been widely adopted to refer to a range of processes including ‘good governance’ centred around efficiency, evidence based policy making, transparency and equity, the fragmentation of power among different tiers of regulation including the EU, national governments and devolved bodies, and the shifting role of the state from being a provider of services to a regulator of privately provided services (Rhodes 2000). It is also used to describe the application of private sector management techniques to the public sector including de-regulation, privatisation, contracting out of services, creation of internal markets within large public bodies and a split between purchaser and provider in the provision of public services, often referred to as New Public Management (Lane 2001). All these processes are marked by a shift from the state as a direct provider of services to the state as a regulator and facilitator, working in partnership with private companies and civil society organisations in the design, evaluation and delivery of policy and services (Meehan 2003) with a transference of authority to non-elected independent or quasi independent regulatory bodies (Banaszak et al 2003). For some this

represents the ‘hollowing out’ of the state with a shift from top down government to horizontal and fragmented systems of governance (Rhodes 1997). Richards and Smith in their study of governance in the UK, are more sceptical, arguing that the shift to governance represents adaptation and reconstitution of power by the state, which still exercises control through systems of regulation, contract management, performance standards and audit (Richards and Smith 2002).

In the UK the shift to these new systems of governance, with an enhanced role for civil society were central to the ‘third way’ politics of the New Labour government elected in 1997 (Meehan 2003). The third way was an attempt to find an alternative to both top down socialism and free market capitalism (Giddens 1998) and was described by Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, as combining the ideals of social justice associated with the left with the economic efficiency and innovation of the market (Romano 2006 p3). Throughout the late 1990s in a series of speeches Blair strongly associated the third way with a process of democratic renewal through

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devolution, processes of participatory democracy and partnerships between the state and civil society (Meehan 2003). Through these partnerships the state, civil society and the market would work together to develop and deliver policies to address social problems. The move to government as ‘facilitator’ (Meehan 2003) or ‘co-ordinator’ (Loughin 2000) and the emphasis on ‘evidence based policy making’ in NPM (Marston and Watts 2003) offers new opportunities for women’s civil society organisations to engage with policy making, particularly when they can position themselves as sources of expert evidence. At the same time the outsourcing of services has enabled some women’s civil society organisations to play a larger role in the delivery of services (Kantola and Squires 2012). However as Kantola and Squires argue there are risks of co-option and watering down of political demands in both the technical expert strategy and taking on public contracts. Some organisations and individuals may gain influence and credibility as ‘experts’ but only where the evidence they provide fits the overall direction of government policy. This often involves providing evidence of a ‘business case’ in support of feminist goals, for example that workplace equality policies aid recruitment and retention of female staff or that gender mainstreaming leads to improved policy making. Other

organisations may find themselves shut out of discussions altogether, particularly if they are seen as too challenging or lack the resources to present their ‘expertise’ in a way which public bodies recognise as expert. Tendering for public contracts may bring in resources to women’s civil society groups but again lead to co-option and reduced willingness to challenge government through fear of ‘biting the hand that feeds’. Smaller organisations may be unable to meet the reporting requirements of systems of audit and contract management.

Kantola and Squires conclude that the changing nature of the state has led to a change in the roles and strategies adopted by feminist civil society actors. These include a greater focus on professionalism and expertise, entering into contracts to deliver services on behalf of the state and the need to develop new sources of income from commercial activities or private donors, a process they describe as ‘market’ feminism. However this ‘market feminism’ does not appear to be a rejection of engagement with the state, rather a way of describing new forms of engagement which may emerge alongside more traditional campaigning. Despite the changing nature of the state and the new strategies adopted by some feminist actors in

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response, work by the RNGS and others suggests that the relationship between feminist actors inside and outside the state is still a significant one. The next two sections explore the opportunities and tensions faced by those in both roles and the relationships between them in more detail.