One of the most powerful discursive resources concerns the expression of attitudinal meaning.
The terms most commonly used in discourse studies to refer to attitudinal meaning are evaluation (e.g. Labov, 1972; Hoey, 1983; Carter, 1987; 1998; Hunston, 1994; 2000; 2011;
Channell, 2000; Hunston and Thompson, 2000; Bondi and Mauranen, 2003), intensity
(Labov, 1984), evidentiality (Chafe and Nichols, 1986), affect (Ochs, 1989), stance (e.g. Biber
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and Finegan, 1988; 1989; Beach and Anson, 1992; Barton, 1993; Conrad and Biber, 1999;
Charles, 2006a; Biber, Connor and Upton, 2007; Myers, 2010), stance and engagement (e.g.
Hyland, 1999; 2004; 2005; 2007; 2010),28APPRAISAL29 (Martin, 2000; Martin and White, 2005), or sentiment (e.g. Pang and Lee, 2008; Thelwall, Buckley and Paltoglou, 2012). In some works, the study of attitudinal meaning is limited to examination of modality (Halliday, 1985; 1994) or hedging (Holmes, 1988; Hyland, 1996a; 1996b). The term a writer chooses to use normally reflects the theoretical approach which is adopted or signals a different emphasis in approach, but sometimes it indicates that a different phenomenon is under consideration.
Labov (1972) and Hoey (1983), for example, use the term evaluation to refer to the function of a section of text. Carter (1987; 1998) and Channell (2000) use it to refer to the meaning associations a word acquires through its collocates. Used this way, it equates to semantic preference and semantic prosody. Generally speaking, evaluation, stance, intensity, evidentiality, affect, APPRAISAL and sentiment, refer to the various lexico-grammatical resources available to a user to express opinions and judgements. I choose to use the term evaluation, not only on the grounds that it is the most commonly used term and therefore covers a wide range of phenomena, but also because, although all approaches have useful things to say about the ways in which discursive resources are used by writers (or speakers) to align readers (or listeners) with their point of view, particular prominence is given in this study to Hunston’s (2000; 2011) model. Semantic preference and semantic prosody are obviously central to the expression of evaluative meaning. They are discussed in the next subsection. But there are aspects of the signalling of attitudinal meaning which operate at a macro-textual level. Models of evaluation which attempt to provide a more comprehensive model of the phenomenon are discussed in subsequent sub-sections.
28 Stance and engagement are sometimes dealt with as aspects of metadiscourse (e.g. Hyland and Tse, 2004).
29 I follow Martin and White’s (2005) convention of writing the term in upper case script.
84 3.5.2 Semantic preference and semantic prosody
Semantic preference and semantic prosody are central to the creation of meaning, so their analysis forms a central element of much work in corpus linguistics, as well as forming the basis of some approaches to studying evaluation in language (e.g. Channell, 2000).
Unfortunately, there is some confusion in the use of these terms and the concept of semantic prosody is contested. Starting with the distinction between the two concepts, we have already established that Sinclair (2004) conceives of semantic prosody as something which
determines meaning as a whole and governs choice, whereas semantic preference is simply a facet of collocation. Few writers, however, distinguish between semantic preference and semantic prosody and most writers on semantic prosody conceive of it in simpler terms than we see in Sinclair’s (ibid., 2004) writing. Before examining the way in which semantic prosody is understood by most writers, it is useful to consider the findings of scholars who have looked at semantic preference so that we might better distinguish between the two. Two such writers are Stubbs (2002) and Partington (2004b). Stubbs (2002: 65) demonstrates that large shows a preference for collocates denoting quantities and sizes, such as number(s), scale, part, amounts, quantities and area(s). Partington (2004b: 145-146), commenting on his own earlier work (Partington, 1998: 34-39), explains that the intensifying adjective sheer shows a semantic preference for five sets of semantically related words: (i) denoting magnitude, weight or volume; (ii) expressing the idea of force, strength or energy; (iii) expressing persistence; (iv) expressing strong emotion; (v) denoting a physical quality. The boundary between semantic preference and semantic prosody is somewhat fuzzy, as Stubbs
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(2002: 66) concedes, but semantic preference is purely a semantic phenomenon whereas semantic prosody is a pragmatic phenomenon (ibid.).30
Turning now to semantic prosody, few writers conceive of it in the way in which Sinclair (2004) does. The notion of semantic prosody commonly embraced is that described by Louw (1993). Louw (ibid.) argues that the collocational environment in which a word habitually occurs can imbue that word with a particular connotative meaning. Having taken on this meaning, the connotation remains even when the word is used in a context free of its typical collocates. When a word is used in a context which runs counter to its prosody, it is either the result of intentional irony on the part of the speaker or writer or, if done unconsciously, it indicates insincerity. Louw’s (ibid.) concept of semantic prosody as akin to connotation has been highly influential, with the result that most writers see it in terms of a binary opposition between negative and positive connotational meaning (Hunston, 2007). It is also seen as the property of a word rather than the property of an extended unit of meaning. CAUSE, for example, is said to have a negative connotation since it collocates with words such as problems, death, damage, concern, trouble, cancer and disease, while PROVIDE has a positive prosody, collocating, as it does, with information, services, support, help, money, protection, food, and care (Stubbs, 2002: 65). Even Sinclair, in some of his work, describes prosodies in these terms. He states, for example, that the verb HAPPEN typically collocates with words referring to unpleasant events (Sinclair, 1991: 112) and the subjects of the phrasal verb SET in overwhelmingly denote unpleasant states of affairs, for example rot, decay, malaise, despair, ill-will, and so on (ibid.: 74-75). In some work (e.g. Partington, 2004b)
30 Because semantic prosody is a pragmatic rather than semantic phenomenon, Stubbs (2002) prefers the term discourse prosody. Although this is a sound point, most writers continue to use the term semantic prosody, and so this is the term used in this project.
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semantic prosody is conceived of as gradable. For example, SET in is described as having ‘an extremely unfavourable prosody’ (ibid.: 135).
The notion of semantic prosody has come in for substantial criticism, notably from Whitsitt (2005), although others, even writers supportive of the concept, such as Hunston (2007), find fault with particular theoretical aspects or with the way in which the concept is
operationalised in the literature. Two aspects of Louw’s (1993) argument attract particular criticism. The first point of contention concerns Louw’s (1993) claims that semantic prosody provides evidence for intentional irony or brings to light insincerity. Hunston (2007: 260-261) concurs with this argument to a certain extent, agreeing that semantic prosody can help
explain a reader’s response to a text. But she takes issue with the idea that semantic prosody has predictive power, since this implies greater uniformity among language users than is the case. The second point of contention concerns the fact that Louw’s (1993) theory relies on the argument, criticised earlier for its potential circularity, that words have no intrinsic meaning but acquire their meaning from other words around them. Whitsitt (2005: 291-292) argues that it is impossible to prove that such a one-way flow of meaning from content-full to content-free words occurs and, if it occurs, is inevitable. He also cites examples of words which collocate with words denoting unpleasant things but which do not have a negative prosody, such as alleviate, heal, relieve and soothe (Whitsitt, 2005: 296-297). Hunston (2007:
266) concedes that this criticism has some validity. It highlights the inherent contradiction in claiming, on the one hand, that meaning exists only in context, and, on the other, that
meanings can be transferred between contexts. But she argues that it is undeniable that intertextual resonances do occur and, while one cannot say that meanings always transfer between contexts, one cannot argue that they never do. Of course, if, like Hanks (2013), one
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accepts that words have meaning potential, the paradox is resolved: the meaning potential of alleviate, heal, relieve, and soothe entails the idea of making an unpleasant condition less severe.
It is has been pointed out that conceiving of semantic prosody in terms of negative or positive connotation is simplistic, as is ascribing prosody to individual words (Hunston, 2007: 256).
Prosody, Hunston (ibid.) argues, is best conceived of in Sinclair’s (2004) terms as a
determiner of meaning which is expressed in extended phraseological units. Furthermore, as Partington’s (2004b) work shows, semantic prosody is context dependent in complex ways.
Even though he (ibid.) defines semantic prosody in terms of positive and negative
connotation, his discussion covers aspects of semantic preference and colligation as well as connotational meaning. He also shows that semantic prosody is not uniformly present. Its occurrence varies between the different forms of a lemma, and the same word form may be found in negative, positive or neutral contexts in different contexts. The evidence emerges from his comparison of the prosodies, in an academic corpus, of the semantically related set of words HAPPEN, OCCUR, COME about and TAKE place. He finds that the forms happen and happens occur twice as often in negative contexts as in positive, but happened occurs almost five times as often in negative contexts than in positive. All occur frequently in contexts which are neither positive nor negative. Grammatically, happen often occurs with modals or conditionals plus if. Happens and happened occur frequently in questions or relative clauses with what or why. Uncertainty or ‘non-factuality’ is therefore part of the meaning of HAPPEN (ibid.: 140). OCCUR also expresses non-factuality but is used in academic texts as a predicator following nominalizations of processes or actions, as in, for example ‘no violent behaviour
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had occurred’31 (ibid.: 141). COME about appears to be prosodically neutral and ‘seems to be used when writers wish to emphasize the concept of process rather than inherent
unpleasantness’ (ibid.: 142) and TAKE place connotes factuality (ibid.: 143). Finally, all of the words in this semantic set serve a cohesive function in texts, linking one clause with another, for example, ‘ask/look/consider/don’t care what happens, What happens depends on / is that, What happens...? […] When/If/Whether this happens...’ (ibid.: 137).
Partington’s (2004b) discussion highlights the complex nature of the lexico-grammatical system as a means for making meaning. Meaning involves semantic and pragmatic elements but it is not always easy, and may not be desirable, to fully distinguish between expressions of semantic and pragmatic meaning. The associations that a word-form has are highly context dependent. They depend on the lexical and grammatical environment in which they occur. It is also important to examine different forms of a lemma separately since they each build up different associations. It is important too to consider the discursive functions phraseological units fulfil. Perhaps, as Hunston (2007) argues, semantic prosody is best understood in Sinclair’s terms (1991; 2004) as referring to ‘the consistent discourse function of the unit formed by a series of co-occurrences’ (Hunston, 2007: 257). The words cause, happen and occur are indeed keywords in the JABS corpus, as are other terms used to express causation and events.
31 Use of italics and bold type face are Partington’s (2004b).
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3.5.3 Corpus-based and discourse approaches to evaluation