Congreso Venezolano de Diversidad Biológica, 2015.

Kronfeld makes a distinction between the quasi-permanent database which cor- responds to long-term memory, and the local database which corresponds to short-time memory and serves as discourse model. Respectively, there are two kinds of MoP_{’s (and also} IS_{’s): quasi-permanent} MoP_{’s and local} MoP_{’s. Ac-} cording to the individuation principle,MoP_{’s must uniquely identify an object to} the agent; however, nominal expressions in discourse do not always have enough content (and context) to uniquely identify. Instead of choosing a different epis- temic representation altogether for discourse, I would like to propose thatlocal

MoP_{’s should be allowed to violate the individuation principle, and I introduce} another epistemic feature calleddeterminacy: aMoP_{is determinate if and only} if the agent believes that the content of theMoP _{determines the referent —in} other words, if and only if the individuation principle holds for thisMoP_.

As an example of nondeterminate intensionalMoP_{’s, consider the following} specimen of the famous donkey sentences:

(3.13) if Pedro ownsa donkey, he beats it

It should be obvious that the use of the proper name “Pedro” introduces a local MoP _{into the common ground, but, I think, so does the use of “a donkey”,} despite the fact that it is only a variable under quantification. One reason is that it is referred back to by the use of the pronoun in (3.13). Furthermore, the hearer can refer back to it, for instance by asking: “What if it’s very young?”, read “if Pedro owns a donkey and the donkey is very young, does Pedro still beat it?”. It is clear that the use of “a donkey”, however it may be represented, must have a limited scope and must be constrained. Unlike theMoP_{of “Pedro”,} thisMoP_{cannot be freely referred back to.}

The MoP _{introduced by “a donkey” has no place in the quasi-permanent} database. One reason is economy: anything we might know about thisMoP_is entailed by the following standard interpretation of (3.13):

∀x(donkey(x)∧owns(Pedro, x)→beats(Pedro, x))

The use of “a donkey” in (3.13) is nonspecific, hence there is no (specific) entity which can be stored; there is only a variable. The MoP _{which represents “a} donkey” can be callednondeterminate. SuchMoP_{’s don’t determine a unique} object to the agent. Uses of intensional nondeterminateMoP_{’s are normally not} considered as referring expressions. This depends, of course, on how the term ‘referring expression’ is defined, but at the minimum, there must be something which is referred to —a specific referent— (Cf. [Jørgensen, 2000]). Following

Kronfeld (and Jørgensen), I view the property of being a referring expression as a feature of noun phrases, and while I do not seek to provide a definition of this term, the current analysis suggests that intensional nondeterminateMoP_’s are not referring expressions, and that all other types of MoP_{’s are, or at least} could be3

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What sense of determinacy could be applied to extensional MoP_{’s? Let’s} consider a straightforward example:

(3.14) Let me tell you aboutan interesting conversation I had yesterday. For ease of discussion, call the speaker Yuval and the hearer Ran. According to Kronfeld’s analysis, such cases are referring expressions, which, upon their recognition as such, cause the hearer to generate a new localMoP_:

The one and only xsuch thatxis the object the speaker wants to say something about.

In terms of the current analysis, Ran’s newcommon ground MoP_{can be some-} thing such as:

(3.15) The one and only conversation which Yuval wants to say something about”.

In the current discourse, (3.15) does make sense. But it makes less sense as a quasi-permanentMoP_{. According to the individuation principle,}MoP_{’s must} present a unique object to the agent. For (3.15) to satisfy the individuation principle, some reference to the referring act in which (3.14) was uttered seems to be required. Despite finding it questionable or at least artificial thatMoP_’s should be forced into uniqueness in such a way, I concede that theMoP_{, which} represents what the use of “a conversation” in (3.14) refers to, can be made unique. This is the essence of mutual individuation —assuming that it is com- mon ground that Yuval has a specific object in mind, mutual individuation is secured.

I believe determinacy is nevertheless relevant for extensionalMoP_{’s —namely,} as a feature of a speaker’s localMoP_{. Determinacy distinguishes between}MoP_’s which are intended to uniquely identify an object to the hearer, andMoP_{’s which} are intended to just introduce a new referent into discourse without the purpose ofepistemically identifying that referent. Definite descriptions are prototypical examples of determinateMoP_{’s and indefinite descriptions are prototypical ex-} amples of nondeterminateMoP_{’s, as the following examples from [Abbott, 2005]} suggest:

(3.16) i. Mary asked the oldest student in the class to explain everything. ii. * Mary askedan oldest student in the class to explain everything.

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An alternative definition would be to call intensional nondeterminate MoP_{’s variables,}

other intensionalMoP_{’s denoting description, and reserve the term ‘referring expression’ to}

However, the following examples suggest that nondeterminateMoP_{’s can some-} times be realized with definite descriptions:

(3.17) Yesterday I went to the new Italian restaurant around the corner. The waitress was nice.

(3.18) The kids outside are making too much noise and I can’t study.

In these examples, uniqueness or maximality are possible, but not necessary. In the first example, the waitress might be the only waitress in the restaurant but it might not. Moreover, the context does not suggest any unmentioned property which necessarily complements the description and makes it unique: both “the waitress who served you” and “the waitress who took your order” may be wrong; similarly “the waitress you thought was nice” could also be non-unique. The second example can be explained along similar lines. A denoting description must be relative to the referring act.

For the current purposes, I suggest the following distinction: there are two different kinds of local extensionalMoP_{’s, deriving from two different kinds of} intentions a speaker may have in referring to extensional MoP_{’s. On the one} hand, there are MoP_{’s that are intended to introduce a new referent into the} common ground, without identifying it —theseMoP_{’s are nondeterminate. On} the other hand, there areMoP_{’s which are intended to identify an object to the} hearer —theseMoP_{’s are determinate. Note that identification can be by virtue} of prior knowledge (familiarity) or by virtue of a description which uniquely determines the referent (uniqueness).