Curva de retención de humedad

A limited number of authors in the field of urban planning theory are pragmatic, and acknowledge the potential benefits of multiple strategies to secure access to services and

meet people’s needs. The urban poor are faced with needs that require serious attention (e.g.

security of tenure and housing and access to clean water), are vulnerable to abuses, violence and exploitation, and have very limited resources (Mitlin, 2008). In addition, the

39 governments have demonstrated their incapacity or unwillingness to address these needs at a required scale (Mitlin, 2008).

Given this context, it could be argued that organised civil society groups engage in a simultaneous use of a variety of practices to increase their opportunities to address their members’ or clients’ needs (Ibabao, Vallance, Memon, 2012). While there are some

practices which involve some form of opposition from the groups against the state (or other dominant structure) in order to obtain appropriate responses, there are practices that require engagement with the state to address their problems. There are a number of areas in which people may work with the state, such as issues related to work and income, access to land, basic services (such as water) and housing, campaigns for greater inclusion (e.g. on groups of ethnicity, gender, and age), or when they face a threat of dispossession by other groups (e.g. struggles against evictions) (Mitlin & Bebbington, 2006). Moreover, it could be argued that although a few authors have proposed this insurgent planning/co-production typology, they do not offer much clarity about the relationship between the two forms of planning practices (Ibabao, Vallance, Memon, 2012).

People adopt, therefore, a variety of actions to increase their opportunities of responding effectively to their problems; some strategies fit within the framework of insurgent planning while others within a co-production framework. Another way of conceptualising the

combined use of planning strategies by civil society groups is by their hybrid nature. Hybridity is defined differently by various authors. For example, Bhaba (1994) uses the concept in post-colonial studies to mean colonial subjects persistently displacing spaces that have been introduced by colonisers. In planning literature, Mitchell (1997) and AlSayyad (2001) suggest that hybrid spaces are produced by a combination of socio-economic and cultural forces. In this study, however, I suggest the term hybridity might be used to denote the use of both insurgent and co-production planning approaches by civil society groups as they conduct their collective practices in the planning space. The literature reviewed here suggests a need for a term that acknowledges the use of multiple approaches, such as when the elements of insurgent and co-production planning approaches come together and influence the relationships between actors and the scope of activities of the groups.

Mitlin (2008)15 proposes categories of multiple strategies adopted by the urban poor that involve both elements of self-help actions and partnerships with the government. These strategies are:

· individualised (or household) market based strategies which focus on individual advancement secured from other family members;

· collective self-help which is undertaken by people facing common needs and services and in complete absence of any state involvement;

· dependency-based strategies characterised by the poor improving their condition by using the existing institutional framework without challenging the cause of their condition;

· exclusion strategies in which the poor accept the impossibility of advancement through socially acceptable means and adopt methods associated with criminality; and,

· social movement strategies in which there are some explicit political demands and social interaction that extends beyond the formal organisational processes and associated coalitions and alliances.

Mitlin (2008) recognises that many of these collective self-help strategies are common in low-income and informal settlements because there is no other way that individuals alone can manage their situation. More importantly, she emphasises that few of these strategies involve explicit political action. Mitlin (2008) acknowledges that there have been cases when communities consciously withdrew their engagement with the state but that this appears to be relatively rare.

Likewise, Beard (2003) concludes that the mode of planning practice in which communities engage in moves constantly in different directions along a continuum; this ranges from participation in state-led projects to initiating structured and organised activities for long- term changes. In a healthy socio-political environment, all these modes would exist simultaneously, and a community would engage in different modes at different times and under different circumstances. People who have learned the skills and developed the consciousness necessary for insurgent planning do not restrict themselves from using only

one mode. Rather, a “savvy community” would continue to use various modes depending on

the context and desired outcome (Beard, 2003, p 30).

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41 Civil society groups who consistently take an oppositional stance against the government will have to redefine their relationship with the government if they engage in co-production

practices. The notion of “critical engagement” can form a basis by which both the government and civil society groups pursue different political, economic, and social

engagements (Bryant, 2001). It is defined as a “form of interaction between states and NGOs in which both cooperation and conflict prevail in the course of a common effort to pursue

social or ecological goals” (Bryant, 2001, p. 17). Critical engagement illustrates that

relationships between actors are characterised by complexity. As explained by Bryant (2001, p. 17),

While conflict or cooperation can predominate, the notion of critical engagement emphasises that the relationship is usually typified by the

simultaneity of both scenarios, with behaviour linked to spatially and temporally-defined issues.

Thus, a civil society group may work closely with the state on one issue, while in conflict with it over a different issue (Bryant, 2001). It is suggested that only reform-minded NGOs are likely to pursue critical engagement under any circumstance. Radical NGOs calling for revolutionary change and government overthrow are not likely to take part in such

interaction (Bryant, 2001).

Crucial to critical engagement is the mutual agreement that conflict needs to be kept within

bounds (Bryant, 2001). This may be achieved, for instance, by “ring-fencing” (Bryant, 2001, p. 17) conflict to the issue in question, thereby avoiding the spread of conflict from one area to another. Thus, a group may criticise one set of state policies while still having the

intention of working with the state in other matters. In turn, state leaders and officials may avoid reading NGO criticism as blanket condemnation, thereby reducing the likelihood of a heavy-handed official response. There are times when conflicts between the state and a NGO get out of control; however, these fundamentals of critical engagement are usually restored (Eccleston & Potter, 1996 as cited in Bryant, 2001, p. 17).

Both insurgent and co-production approaches to planning accord a key role to the agency of civil society groups in responding to the needs of the urban poor.