W/N petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies before filing his petition to the Supreme Court.
NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CFI. Petitioner did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust all available administrative remedies.
FACTS:
VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc.) alleges that the provisions of RA5487 (Private Security Agency Law) violate the provisions of the Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations of restraint of trade and tend to favor and institutionalize the PADPAO (Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Services, Inc.). Furthermore, VMPSI questions the provision on requiring all private security agencies or company security forces to register as members of any PADPAO chapter organized within the region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for8hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition when it charged Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the MOA. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil case against the PC chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security and Investigation Agencies). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the case is against the State, which had not given consent thereto.
ISSUE/HELD:
W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PCChief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.
YES. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner‘s motion to quash a notice of garnishment was denied for lack of merit. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the VETERANSMANPOWER V.COURTOFAPPEAL
PNB V.CIR
garnishment "may be public in character." The order of August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding, reads as follows:‖ The Philippine National Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its branch in Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff of this Court. It contends that the service of the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court contravenes Section11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads:" 'All writs and processes issued by the Court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance.' Following the law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order. The Court finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201 has, since June 19, 1965, already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment in an area encompassing the whole of the country, including Quezon City, since his area of authority is coterminous with that of the Court itself, which is national in nature.
... At this stage, the Court notes from the record that the appeal to the Supreme Court by individual employees of PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has already been dismissed
and that the same became final and executory on August 9, 1970. There is no longer any reason, therefore, for withholding action in this case.
[Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit. The said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970."
There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, but in a resolution dated September 22, 1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
ISSUE/HELD/RULING: W/N the funds mentioned may be garnished
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government owned and controlled corporation. The NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established — 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended."
In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, this Court, through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations."
Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment. It is an entirely different matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v.
Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is
"possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished
Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies Facts:
Petition for certiorari was filed to assail the validity of a writ of execution granted in favour of Atty.
Manansala (counsel for United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association—prevailing party). The writ sought to garnish the money of
People‘s Homesite and Housing Corp. (a GOCC) deposited in PNB.
PNB assailed the order on 2 grounds (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character‖. CIR denied PNB‘s motion to quash hence PNB filed this petition for certiorari.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n People‘s Homesite and Housing Corp. (a GOCC), can be considered a public fund and in effect exempt from garnishment? NO
General rule is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment however it is now settled in our jurisprudence that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." If the office or agency or entity has its own charter vesting it a separate and distinct corporate existence then it can sue and be sued.
Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished.
PNBVCIR
Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies Facts:
On Oct 26, 1978, during "KADING" the NPC, acting through its plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, caused to opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam as a result several towns in Bulacan were inundated (hardest hit in Norzagaray). About a hundred of residents died properties worth million of pesos destroyed or washed away. Petitioners were one of the many victims of the inundated town filed complaint for damages against NPC and Chavez.
NPC raised its defense that "in the operation of the Angat Dam it is performing a purely governmental function hence it can‘t be sued without the express consent of the State.
Petitioners opposed and argued that NPC is performing merely proprietary functions and that under its own organic act, Sec.3 (d) of RA 6395, it can sue and be sued in any court.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n NPC performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam? YES
2. w/n NPC to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort?
YES
It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A.
No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government.
(National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR) Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.
Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies Facts:
March, 1963 spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz were granted real estate loan of P48,000 by SSS with their located at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal as collateral.
Spouses Cruz complied with their monthly payments although there were times when delays were incurred in their monthly payments which were due every first 5 days of the month
July 9, 1968, SSS filed for the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by Spouses Cruz RAYOVCIFBULACAN
SSS V CA
on the ground: conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October, 1967 with the default on to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal debt and the interest thereon (Indebtedness as of June, 1968 P10,702.58 excluding interests). Notice of Sheriff's Sale was initially published in July 14, 1968 issue of the Sunday Chronicle.
Before second publication Spouses Cruz wrote SSS, demanding SSS to withdraw the foreclosure and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to-date in the payment of their monthly amortizations. Attempts of out of court settlement failed.
On July 24, 1968, the Cruz spouses filed for damages and attorney's fees against SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging that they had fully paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment. SSS In its answer stressed its right to foreclose the mortgage executed in its favor by private respondents by virtue of the automatic acceleration clause provided in the mortgage contract.
RTC: ruled in favor of Spouses, enjoined SSS from holding the sale and ordered them to pay the Spouses for Damages-P2,500.00 actual;
P35,000.00 moral; P10,000.00 exemplary PP5,000.00 attorney's fees.
CA: affirmed RTC‘s decision but eliminated P5000 moral damages; SSS filed for MFR which CA denied hence this appeal
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would have warranted the publications of the notices of foreclosure? Not, necessarily.
Records show that it was a certain 'Socorro J. Cruz' who was in arrears in the amount of P10,702.58 at the time the application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage was filed. SSS committed an error in picking the record of 'Socorro C. Cruz' instead of the record of 'Socorro J. Cruz'. SSS, however, denied having committed any error and insists that their motion for foreclosure covers the real estate mortgage of spouses David E. Cruz and Socorro C. Cruz. Court is convinced that the foreclosure proceedings should have been on the real estate mortgage of 'Socorro J. Cruz' and not Spouses Cruz.
2. w/n SSS can be held liable for damages? YES
SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government. SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not
thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights.
The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract and even for tort.
Even conceding that the SSS is not, in the main, operated for profit, it cannot be denied that, in so far as contractual loan agreements with private parties are concerned, the SSS enters into them for profit considering that the borrowers pay interest, which is money paid for the use of money, plus other charges. In so far as it is argued that to hold the SSS liable for damages would be to deplete the benefit funds available for its covered members, suffice it to say, that expenditures of the System are not confined to the payment of social security benefits.
SSS cannot be held liable for the damages as awarded RTC and CA as the basis used by the lower courts for the award of actual damages (cancelled trip abroad)were too speculative. It appears that Spouses Cruz's passports had already expired and they did not secure the necessary visas for their trip
abroad. No moral and temperate damages as the negligence of SSS is not so gross as to warrant moral and temperate damages. With the ruling out of compensatory, moral and temperate damages, the grant of exemplary or corrective damages should also be set aside.
Keywords: State may be sued provided there is an express/implied consent to be sued.
Facts:
Issue/Held/Ratio:
December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained 4 others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
A compliant for damages against, Third Party Complaint and cross claims were filed.
Respondent Judge Firme ordered Alfredo Bislig and Municipality of San Fernando to pay the heirs of Banina with P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the late Laureano Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's SANFERNANDOLAUNIONVFIRME
fees. The complaint against Estate of Nieveras and Balagot was dismissed. Petitioners filed an MFR which respondent Judge Firme denied hence this appeal on certiorari.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n municipality of San Fernando is suable? YES Under Art XVI sec 3 Constitutional Law, the State may not be sued without its consent. Consent can be implied or expressed. Expressed consent may be embodied in a general such as Act No. 3038 which provides for the standing consent of the State to be sued in cases of money claims; or special law such as in the Merritt case. Implied consent is when government enters into business contracts descending to the level of the other contracting party or when State files a complaint opening itself to counter claim. Municipal Corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
2. w/n municipality of San Fernando liable for torts?
NO
Test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
Nevertheless, Municipality are not liable for the torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable if it is shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In the case at bar, the driver of dump truck was on his way to Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando‘s municipal streets, a governmental function. The municipality cannot be held
functions and can be held answerable if it is shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In the case at bar, the driver of dump truck was on his way to Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando‘s municipal streets, a governmental function. The municipality cannot be held