Descripciones abreviadas de los casos de uso del sistema

TTCs have faced global legitimacy challenges since at least the 1970s when adverse health effects of tobacco use became widely accepted as scientific truth (Wynder, 1988). In this critical environment, sustained competitive advantage necessitate tackling social, political, environmental and health issues as part of a corporate strategy-pursuing business interest in the narrow sense of maximizing stockholder value is myopic and insufficient. It is undoubtedly the responsibility of TTC business diplomats to pursue their business interests. But the business interests of the industry must be strategic, long-term and holistic to include the interests of non-market stakeholders like

governments, public health regulators, citizens and advocacy networks. Honest representation, communication and negotiation by the TTCs with such non-market stakeholders are key to be accepted as a responsible actor in the international diplomatic arena. (Bach, 2010).

Our research indicates that TTCs have conducted business diplomacy in the exclusive financial interest of its investor constituency and in clear contravention to their declared Codes of Business Conduct that profess to a high ethical standard of opposing illicit trade in tobacco products. We conclude, therefore, that TTCs have engaged in rogue business diplomacy on the issue of illicit trade in tobacco products. The implications of these violations are twofold. First, persistence resistance by the powerful TTCs to the ITP regime thwarts efforts to eliminate this illicit trade. Eliminating illicit trade in this industry, however, could help governments gain (by recouping revenue lost) at least USD 31.3 billion annually in addition to avoiding millions of premature deaths (Joossens, Merriman, Ross and Row, 2010). Second, being complicit in illicit trade in tobacco products, while publicly opposing the trade, delegitimizes (moral legitimacy) TTCs in the eyes of its internal stakeholder group of employees as well as external stakeholder groups of consumers, governments and non-governmental organizations.

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