The previous section highlighted how the sequencing of processes prioritised economic liberalisation over conflict resolution and political liberalisation, due to donors’ ultimate goal of reinstating capitalism. It also posited that the specific sequencing and the particular kind of liberalisation promoted a peculiar type of institutional reform that hindered the development of state institutions. These important assertions are nonetheless insufficient to explain the change dynamics that impacted on the security sector in Mozambique.
Thus, this section details how economic liberalisation impacted peacebuilding and security reforms, demonstrating the disconnected and piece-meal approaches, as well as the contradictory policies that bedevilled reconstruction.
5.3.1 Reconstruction and Structural Adjustment at Odds
Mozambique’s transition from war to peace represented a critical juncture marked by the introduction of a democratic Constitution in 1990. This paved the way for the signing of the peace agreement between Frelimo’s Government and Renamo in 1992. The subsequent peacebuilding process took place during a post-Cold War global transition in which international development was still caught between the immediacy of humanitarian aid and the longer term commitments to development aid and security (Duffield 2001:
98-100, Junne and Verkoren 2005: 3-5, Pupavac 2006: 258). Moreover, unlike the more recent peacebuilding experiences of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Central African Republic (CAR), where Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) considered post-conflict recovery needs, attempting to align security and economic requirements, in Mozambique that did not take place. On the contrary, multidimensional peacebuilding as an agenda was still in its infancy, facilitating the primacy of economic liberalisation policies. Meanwhile, due to Mozambique’s simultaneous transitions, peacebuilding took the form of a multitude of programmes rather than a coherent plan, although the same is still observable in most current post-conflict settings. In the words of one interviewee:
in Mozambique’s post-peace agreement era there were no reconstruction policies, there were only emergency projects from which lessons were extracted and picked-up by the Government to formulate its subsequent programmes, with the aid of donors (4.1.2.5-05/05/05).
Yet, even in the absence of a coherent reconstruction strategy, peacebuilding efforts did take place, even though some were at odds with the requirements of the SAP. This confirms existing research that found that one of the most evident areas of contradiction is that of employment (Woodward 2002: 201-203). In Mozambique the SAP mandated privatisation of state assets drove significant numbers of formally employed people into the informal economy.47 The downside was that in terms of sequencing, this measure was carried out on the eve of a massive military demobilisation, which exacerbated even further the number of people unemployed (Cramer 2001: 103). Thus, by driving a portion of the labour force into the same precarious and growing informal market, the already sparse opportunities for economic reintegration of ex-combatants, refugees and the internally displaced were diminished. In addition, the fall in civil servants’ salaries that resulted from the adjustment of the economy (Wuyts 1996: 743, Arndt 1999: 20, Hanlon 2004: 7) reduced the likelihood of the abovementioned groups obtaining support from their extended families, given the rising number of people dispossessed. An area that potentially could have absorbed some of the war-affected populations into gainful employment was that of infrastructure recovery in the form of emergency relief and state reconstruction programmes. However, according to an interviewee employed by humanitarian organisations at the time:
47 A number of 38,000 lay-offs were reported by unions in the Mozambican media in October 1995 (Hanlon 1997: 96). However, it was difficult to find official primary data on the numbers of people laid-off and realistic estimates about the ratio/proportion of the formal/informal economy during that decade. In fact, the lack of accurate data about the economy underlined the flaws of the SAP design and the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) (National Statistics’ Institute) became a priority in terms of receiving donor capacity-building support. Regardless of the dearth of data, a common public perception
the populations were only hired to work on the rehabilitation of tertiary roads and small bridges in the context of humanitarian projects…at the beginning this engagement was random, although with time it became more of a practice in the context of emergency relief programmes” And he added “…the state? Authorities existed in Maputo…ok mostly in the cities…but you do have to realise that those were the days of the SAP, meaning that the state had to cut, cut, cut (4.6.4.5-05/05).
As part of the economic liberalisation, the Mozambican state was required to scale down spending, which meant that it was unable to launch programmes that might have actively aided people’s recovery from the devastating economic effects of the war. Yet, this was not simply a case of state default as a consequence of IFIs diktats. Reconstruction was actively hindered by the IMF orthodoxy that money should not be channelled into the economy until inflation had been brought under control. This stance was only softened in 1995 when, in an unprecedented move, donors publicly opposed the IMF, given that its policies also precluded them from providing aid funding for post-war reconstruction, whilst they had large budgets to spend (Hanlon, 1999, Hanlon 2004: 7, Manning 2009: 9).
Further to this, market liberalisation constrained the contribution of state institutions such as the armed forces towards public works like demining, rebuilding of roads, bridges, etc., although the GPA had originally foreseen their participation in activities of national reconstruction (GPA 1992: Protocol IV.I.2a). In the opinion of one interviewee, this was because their participation in these activities was considered by the IFIs to be ‘a state subsidy that distorted the workings of the free market’ (1.2.2.5-05/05). Hence, if the state
wanted to participate it had to do so by competing with alternative market suppliers in a given area.
In general, and given that at the national level the private sector and the NGOs community were embryonic or considered inefficient or corrupt, the main beneficiaries of post-war reconstruction, humanitarian activity and subsequent development aid were foreign organisations (4.1.1.5-05/05, Hanlon 1997: 65, Matusse 2000: 50-53, Alden 2001: 94-96, Negrão 2003: 4, Tollenaere 2006:
3). Demining provided an example of a sector where significant external financing resulted in donors determining which foreign commercial contractors and charitable international NGOs benefited the most from access to funding.
Data from successive annual Landmine Monitor Reports confirmed that amongst the former were companies like Ronco, Mechem and Minetech, and amongst the latter were organisations such as The Halo Trust, Norwegian People’s Aid and Handicap International (Landmine Monitor Reports on Mozambique, 1999-2005).
In light of the above analysis, it can easily be seen that Mozambique represented an excellent example of the argument that ‘economic policies that guide international implementation of peace agreements are often the weakest link, running at cross-purposes with the needs of war termination’ (Stedman et al 2002: 20).
Nonetheless, on a positive note, Mozambique’s peacebuilding was backed by generous contributions from donors, including financing for the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) as well as for other bilateral and multilateral reconstruction programmes.48 By promoting the development of political parties in general, and in particular the transformation of Renamo into a political party, a new form of democracy assistance was pioneered for subsequent peacebuilding contexts, and precedent was set with the creation of multi-donor trust funds to finance reconstruction programmes (Manning, 2002, Manning and Malbrough 2009). An example of a well-funded programme was DDR which took into account similar contemporary experiences elsewhere.49 Whilst implementation suffered from poor coordination and mismanagement (Ball and Barnes, 2000, Clark 1996: 18-21, Lundin et al 2000: 173-212, Manning 2009: 85) as well as shortcomings in terms of medium to long-term reintegration outcomes (Coelho 2002: 141-236, Lalá 2005: 155-185, Alusala and Dye, 2010), the sizeable funding was motivated by the recognition on the part of bilateral donors that the DDR
48 A donor conference and a subsequent meeting took place in Paris in June 1993 in order to obtain funding for the implementation of the GPA and to finance the remaining transition programmes. Whilst the GoM originally requested 412 million USD, the total donor pledge amounted to 450 million USD (Ball and Barnes 2000: 177). In addition, after the first multi-party elections were held in 1994, a World Bank Consultative Group Meeting dated March 1995 pledged 780 million USD, excluding debt relief (Alden 2001: 83).
49 There is data discrepancy concerning the full cost of DDR programmes in Mozambique. One article based on UNDP data states that the total amounted to 100,713 million USD, of which 26,045 million were paid by the GoM, with the rest coming from different donor sources (Lundin et al 2000: 186).
Another work based on a report prepared for the International Organisation for Migration by Creative Associates International presents the total figure of 112.9 million USD (Ball and Hendrickson 2005: 33).
Despite difficulties with data availability and accuracy, the numbers presented by Ball and Hendrickson for similar contemporary experiences - for instance Uganda with an amount of 43.2 million USD, Eritreia with 68.8 million USD, or Rwanda with 19.4 million USD - show that Mozambique’s DDR funding was substantial. In addition, the percentage paid for by donors matters, given that for example in Eritreia and Rwanda donor contribution was minimal, with most costs being supported by national governments for political reasons (Ball and Hendrickson 2005: 33-42).