It is the claim of the Ombudsman that since she was an impeachable officer, she could be subjected to contempt.
However, no due course has been given to the contempt action, thus, the Ombudsman’s claim was premature.
IN RELATION TO SECTION 40 OF THE LGC Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code: any person removed from office by reason of an administrative case is disqualified from running for any elective local office.
RELATED CASE: Lingating vs. CA
➡ The filing of motion for reconsideration by Sulong prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final. There is thus no decision finding Sulong guilty to speak of.
Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, to the office of mayor be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made pursuant to Sec 68 [16] of the Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory.
Political Law EXTRADITION
CASE: Government Of Hongkong Vs. Judge Olalia EXTRADITION, Defined:
EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with criminal investigation directed against him or execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal and criminal law of the requesting state or government. Thus characterized as the right of the a foreign power, created by treaty to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crimes within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative obligation of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of “accepting an advantage as agent”, and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of Hongkong. The Hongkong Depoartment of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent Muñoz; the DOJ forward the request to the NBI then to RTC. On the same day, NBI agents arrested him.
2. Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the order of arrest.
3. The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong Department of Justice thru DOJ.
4. DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the arrest.
5. Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition and arrest of respondent.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in extradition cases and that private responded is a “flight risk”.
6. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was granted. Hence this petition.
SUPREME COURT RULING
Honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extradites’ rights to life, liberty, and due process. Where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.
We should not deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extradite from fleeing our jurisdiction.
“Clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. The potential extradite must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to show and clear and convincing evidence that he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded in the court for the determination and otherwise, should order the cancellation of his bond and his immediate detention.
Political Law ARTICLE VII, SECTION 21; PROCESS OF TREATY MAKING; ROME STATUTE
CASE: Pimentel vs. Office of Executive Secretary FACTS:
1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Charge du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.
3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the President.
SUPREME COURT RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are:
negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be
submitted for registration and publication under the U.N.
Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.
Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties.
It is usually performed by the state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
Political Law ARTICLE II, SECTION 28; ARTICLE III, SECTION 7
CASE: Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel FACTS:
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks.
The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions.
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed ―that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting.
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.
Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad‘s position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious
―consensus ever embodied in an instrument – the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962. Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain and the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon.
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. This initial petition was followed by several other petitions by other parties. The Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the people‘s right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
SUPREME COURT RULING
YES. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,the Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation‘s problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest.
Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: ―Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its
Political Law dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.
In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation, so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people.
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth,[120] and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled that the right to information ―contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.
Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow
neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed ―policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Intended as a ―splendid symmetry‖ to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution.
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose.
Political Law CYBER CRIME LAW AND LIBEL
CASE: Disini vs. Secretary of Justice FACTS:
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice”
even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be overturned as the
They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be overturned as the