El Desarrollo Sustentable

Political position is sometimes modelled in two dimensions rather than the traditional con- tinuum. These dimensions are usually a left–right economic dimension and a libertarian– authoritarian social dimension. The argument for this more complex approach is that the two dimensions are in practice orthogonal, so it is not unusual to find that parties that are, for example, right-wing on economic issues still have a diversity of positions on social issues. This being the case, the hypothesis that voters moved to leftist parties as a result of the recession could be more accurately tested using a two-dimensional model, since movement along each dimension can be analysed separately. In two-dimensional terms, this hypothesis posits that voters would have moved left along the economic dimension, with no motion along the social dimension. The alternative hypothesis that voters were inclined to move to the extremes also applies particularly to the economic dimension. There is no expectation of movement along the social dimension. This is because in a harsh economic environment voters may be more open to more radical economic policies but there is no obvious reason why this should lead to a change in their other views.

The one-dimensional model discussed in the previous section has been modified to produce a two-dimensional model, designated Model 5C. As discussed earlier in the chapter, party position has been measured along both the economic and social dimensions, as well as a general left–right dimension. The general dimension used in the previous model has been substituted with the economic and social dimensions, each of which is modelled quadratically like the original. The two dimensions are not modelled as interacting because it as assumed

5.6. BEYOND LEFT AND RIGHT: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 135 Figure 5.6: Party support by economic left–right position

2004 2009 2014 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 optimistic neutral pessimistic 0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10

party position

predicted preference

Predicted party support by party’s economic left–right position in each year among voters holding different prospective economic assessments. These are shown along with their 95% predictive intervals. Party position ranges from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). The economic assessments shown are those for highly optimistic voters (measured assessment of+2), neutral voters (0) and highly pessimistic voters (−2).Source: EES, ParlGov & CHES

that motion along one dimension is completely independent of motion along the other. As before, no further random effects terms have been included owing to the very low variance of those terms.

Figure 5.6 shows predicted support according to year and economic assessment towards a party at different positions along the economic dimension. In making these predictions, the party’s social position has been held to be in the centre. This only affects the vertical offset of the curve, not its shape, as the model does not allow the two dimensions to interact. Once again, it appears that optimistic voters in 2004 had a tendency to prefer right-wing parties and pessimistic voters left-wing voters, although these tendencies appear stronger than in the unidimensional model. Neutral voters still appear to prefer the centre. Similarly, the magnitude of these tendencies has declined by 2009 but unlike the unidimensional model, the optimistic and pessimistic voters still have a visibly right-wing and left-wing tendency

Table 5.4: Directional and extreme tendency along economic dimension

Group Year Directional tendency Extreme tendency Optimistic 2004 +3.09[+1.50,+4.68] −0.042[−0.093,+0.009] 2009 +1.06[−0.40,+2.52] ₋0.057[−0.102,₋0.013] 2014 +0.72[−0.64,+2.08] ₋0.015[−0.058,+0.027] Neutral 2004 +0.07[−1.19,+1.32] ₋0.048[−0.089,₋0.007] 2009 ₋0.52[−1.69,+0.64] ₋0.064[−0.099,₋0.028] 2014 ₋0.54[−1.59,+0.52] +0.005[−0.029,+0.038] Pessimistic 2004 ₋2.96[−4.47,₋1.44] ₋0.054[−0.103,₋0.005] 2009 ₋2.10[−3.50,₋0.70] ₋0.070[−0.112,₋0.027] 2014 −1.80[−3.10,−0.50] +0.025[−0.015,+0.065]

Similar to Table 5.3, except that the dimension analysed is the economic left–right spectrum rather than the general left–right spectrum. A positive directional tendency here indicates a preference for the economic right and negative a preference for the economic left. Source: EES, ParlGov & CHES

respectively. Each group in both years prefers parties near the vertex over parties further away but given the extreme location of the vertices for optimistic and pessimistic voters in 2004, this may not be a particularly useful measure for those groups. In 2014, the directional tendency of each groups appears to be maintained, with optimistic voters preferring right-wing position and pessimistic voters left-wing positions, with neutral voters still close to indifferent. Each of the 2014 curves has flattened somewhat compared to the previous years. This suggests that voters in 2014 were more open to extreme positions and less open to centrist positions while retaining the same directional preference as voters in previous years.

Numeric measures of each group’s directional and extreme tendencies are given in Table 5.4 along with their predictive intervals. These mostly confirm the predictions made above. Op- timistic voters do have a rightward directional tendency in 2004, with rightward point estim- ates in the other years as well, although the latter are not significant. Similarly, pessimistic voters have a leftward directional tendency and this is significant in every year. Neutral voters have no significant directional tendency in any year. The extreme tendency, described by the quadratic curvature, of optimistic voters is negative but not quite significant in 2004. In the context of the strong rightward tendency for this group, this figure is not especially meaning- ful. In 2009, however, this figure is significantly negative suggesting that optimistic voters in this year generally preferred centrist parties over more extreme parties. By 2014, this figure was no longer significant with a point estimate close to zero, suggesting that these voters were less averse to extreme economic positions than they had previously been. Pessimistic voters had a similar trajectory, with their extreme tendency significantly negative in 2004 and 2009

5.6. BEYOND LEFT AND RIGHT: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 137 but with a positive albeit no longer significant point estimate in 2014. The extreme tendency for neutral voters was not significant in any year, although even in this group the point es- timate in 2014 was significantly greater than in 2009 (difference is 0.068 points, SE=0.025, p<0.01).

In summary, generally speaking, voters who believed the economy was improving gener- ally supported economically right-wing parties and those who believed it was getting worse generally supported economically left-wing parties, even when controlling for the spatial dis- tance between the party and the voter. Not much changed between 2004 and 2009, other than a slight weakening of this tendency. This suggests that the recession sparked no major immediate shift in economic policy preferences. There was little if any change in this tend- ency between 2009 and 2014 but there was an increased tendency to prefer more extreme economic positions over centrists ones. Since this took place in the post-crisis period, it sug- gests that the political response to the crisis did lead to a shift in policy preferences away from the economic mainstream towards the extremes.

Turning to the social dimension, the relevant predictions are summarised in Figure 5.7. For these predictions, the economic position is held in the centre while the social position is varied. The expectation was that these relationships would not have changed over time but this does not appear to have been the case. Optimistic voters do have similar looking curves in each year, with a directional tendency towards libertarian positions in all years, though somewhat less so in 2014. Pessimistic voters appear to have a strong centrist tendency in 2004, with an evidently negative curvature and a vertex close to the centre. By 2009, the curvature has flattened considerably, though the vertex is still close to the centre. In 2014, the curve is still quite flat but there is now a clear tendency to prefer authoritarian positions. Neutral voters are quite similar, starting with a clear negative curvature and a preference for libertarian positions. In 2009, the curve starts to flatten and by 2014 the curve remains relatively flat but the vertex has moved to the centre. In other words, it appears that optimistic voters in 2004 were libertarian-leaning and pessimistic voters centrist but by 2014, all groups had shifted to the right, so that optimists were centrist and pessimists authoritarian-leaning.

Table 5.5 presents the directional tendency and curvature of the relationships between party preference and social political position in the same manner as previously. Once again, these confirm the patterns shown in the visual analysis. In 2004, optimistic voters had a clearly libertarian tendency, neutral voters a not quite significant tendency in the same direction and pessimistic voters an approximately centrist tendency. The point estimates of directional tend-

Figure 5.7: Party preference by social libertarian–authoritarian position 2004 2009 2014 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 optimistic neutral pessimistic 0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10

party position

predicted preference

Predicted party preference by party’s social libertarian–authoritarian position in each year among voters holding different prospective economic assessments. These are shown along with their 95% predictive intervals. Party position ranges from 0 (libertarian/post-materialist) to 10 (traditional/authoritarian). The economic assessments shown are those for highly optimistic voters (measured assessment of +2), neutral voters (0) and highly pessimistic voters (−2). Source: EES, ParlGov & CHES

ency have changed slightly between 2004 and 2009 but these changes are not significant. The largest of these differences, that for optimistic voters, is 0.53 points (SE =0.92, p = 0.57). Between 2009 and 2014, on the other hand, the estimates for all three groups has shifted in the authoritarian direction. In the case of optimistic voters, this change is not significant (difference is 1.11 points, SE=0.86, p=0.20) but it is significant for neutral (1.38 points, SE = 0.69, p = 0.04) and pessimistic voters (1.66 points, SE = 0.84, p = 0.05). Interest- ingly, not only were pessimistic voters the most authoritarian group in 2004 but they were also the group with the greatest shift in that direction between 2009 and 2014. As for the extreme tendency or curvature, this was not significantly different from zero for optimistic voters in any year. For neutral voters, this was significantly negative in 2004 but not in 2009 and 2014 and the increase between 2004 and 2009 was not significantly different in any case (0.022 points, SE=0.023,p=0.34). The curvature for negative voters was significant and

5.6. BEYOND LEFT AND RIGHT: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 139 Table 5.5: Directional and extreme tendency along social dimension

Group Year Directional tendency Extreme tendency

Optimistic 2004 ₋1.90[−3.21,₋0.59] ₋0.014[−0.057,+0.028] 2009 −2.42[−3.65,−1.20] −0.013[−0.051,+0.025] 2014 ₋1.32[−2.50,₋0.14] ₋0.020[−0.060,+0.019] Neutral 2004 ₋1.08[−2.12,₋0.03] ₋0.036[−0.070,₋0.002] 2009 −1.27[−2.24,−0.30] −0.014[−0.044,+0.015] 2014 +0.11[−0.82,+1.04] ₋0.014[−0.045,+0.017] Pessimistic 2004 −0.25[−1.50,+0.99] −0.058[−0.099,−0.017] 2009 ₋0.12[−1.28,+1.04] ₋0.016[−0.052,+0.020] 2014 +1.54[+0.40,+2.69] ₋0.007[−0.046,+0.031]

Similar to Tables 5.3 and 5.4, except that the dimension analysed is the social libertarian– authoritarian spectrum rather than the general left–right spectrum. A positive directional tendency here indicates a preference for the more traditional or authoritarian parties and negative a preference for more libertarian or post-materialist parties. Source: EES, ParlGov & CHES

negative in 2004 but by 2014 this curvature was almost zero. This difference was not quite significant (0.051 points, SE=0.029,p=0.08).

The changes in directional tendency over time are surprising. The fact that there is no significant change between 2004 and 2009 suggests that there was no immediate reaction to the crisis in terms of social preferences, which accords with the expectation that the social dimension would be unaffected by the crisis. On the other hand, the change in directional tendency between 2009 and 2014 indicates that in the years after the initial recession, there was a general shift in preference towards traditional or authoritarian positions. Furthermore, the more pessimistic the voter about economic conditions, the stronger the shift. This is partic- ularly interesting, since pessimistic voters were also the least libertarian in the first place. This suggests that there is a link between concern for the condition of the economy and embracing traditional values. As for extreme tendency, given that the changes in curvature between the years was not significant for any of the groups, if there was any increase in openness towards extreme positions on the social spectrum, this would have been modest at best. In fact, in most of the cases the curvature is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that a linear relationship is possible. In these cases, there is also a clear preference for one or the other end of the social dimension. This suggests that, unlike for the general and economic dimensions, the social dimension is not one on which there is a strong tendency to prefer the centre over the extremes.

5.7

Conclusion

This chapter has tested four hypotheses relating to the changing patterns of support for parties occupying different political positions during the Great Recession and its aftermath. In partic- ular, levels of support were examined for parties at different positions along several political dimensions. The first hypothesis concerned party position along the European integration spectrum. The hypothesis was that pro-integration parties lost support to anti-integration parties as a result of the recession. It was found that there was such a shift in support but that it mostly occurred not so much during the recession but in the following years. It was further found that this change was mediated by an individual’s prospective economic assessment—the more pessimistic the voter, the more likely that voter was to support anti-integration parties. This was only true in 2014, voters in previous years having preferred pro-integration parties irrespective of economic assessment. Taken together, these findings indicate that an increase in anti-integration sentiment did not arise during the recession but in the post-recession period and that this increase was economically motivated. This suggests that voters started to feel that the institutions of the EU were at least partly responsible for either the continuing eco- nomic problems or the unpopular austerity policies introduced in response. This would also explain the division according to economic assessment, as those voters who were optimistic about the economy at that point were presumably those who believed that austerity polices would be effective.

The second and third hypotheses concerned support for parties at different positions along the left–right political spectrum. The hypotheses were that the Great Recession led to a short- term increase in support for right-wing positions and to an increase in support for extreme positions respectively. The results supported the hypothesis of increased extreme support but not the hypothesis of increased right-wing support. It was found rather that voters became increasingly indifferent to whether a party was on the left or the right immediately following the recession, whereas voters beforehand had tended to prefer right-wing parties when they were optimistic about the economy and left-wing parties when pessimistic. Support for more extreme parties increased both during the recession and during the years following it. These findings challenge both the luxury goods model of Durr (1993), in which optimists are sup- posed to prefer the left and pessimists the right, and the idea that the Great Recession pushed voters to the right (for example, Lindvall 2013; Bartels 2014). This thesis differentiates itself from those earlier studies by controlling for the economic voting effect, so it is likely that this

5.7. CONCLUSION 141 discrepancy can be explained by left-leaning and right-leaning voters having different attitudes towards the economy.

The second and third hypotheses were also tested using a two-dimensional model of the political space rather than the usual spectrum. The results for the economic dimension were similar to those for the single left–right spectrum. Before the recession, optimism was a pre- dictor of right support and pessimism of left support but this difference closed over time. Most of the change occurred during the recession rather than in the period following it. Unlike the single dimension, there was still a discernible difference between optimistic and pessimistic voters by 2014. There was also an increase in support for more extreme economic positions and this mostly took place in the aftermath period. It was expected that the social dimen- sion would be unaffected by the recession but this proved not to be the case. There was an increase in support for parties holding traditional or authoritarian values, particularly in the period between 2009 and 2014, and this increase was strongest among pessimistic voters. Un- like the economic dimension, voters seemed to be indifferent to the extremeness of a position on the social spectrum, a linear relationship between position and support being plausible in most cases.

The final hypothesis was that the other hypothesised effects were strongest among those voters who believed their national economy was worsening and this was indeed found to be the case. This is an important finding because this links the other findings with the economy and is evidence that those results are in fact related to the recession and the timing is not merely a coincidence.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the changes in party support during the re- cession itself were quite distinct from those of the following period, during which austerity measures were widely introduced. By far the most prominent change during the recession itself was a shift towards the centre on economic issues, regardless of economic perception. Then, in the period following the recession, support for extreme economic positions increased, with no strong pattern of preference for whether those positions were on the left or the right. At the same time, support shifted from parties holding libertarian or post-materialist social views to those holding traditional or authoritarian ones. Similarly, there was a shift in sup- port from pro-integration to anti-integration parties. As previously mentioned, all of these effects were strongest among those voters who were pessimistic about the economy. This is interesting because it suggests that the most striking political effects of the Great Recession

may actually have been induced more by the political response to the recession than by the recession itself.

This and the two preceding chapters have examined patterns of party preference during the Great Recession from several different perspectives. In order to gain a more complete understanding of the political consequences of the recession, the following chapters explore the same time period using different dependent variables. The next chapter looks at the change in patterns of turnout during the crisis and whether that too is mediated by an individual’s prospective economic assessment. Chapter 7 then examines voters’ attitudes towards the EU and further European unification, so as to establish whether the voter response to austerity politics was indeed stronger than the response to the recession itself.

Chapter 6

Economic abstention: turnout intention in the face

of economic pessimism

An understanding of what drives voter turnout is an essential part of electoral behaviour ana- lysis. Studying vote choice alone risks missing an important part of the electoral decision pro- cess and therefore introducing a bias into the analysis, since voters usually have the option of not voting at all and the exercise of this option may depend upon some of the same factors that also influence the party choice of those who do vote. Despite this possibility, voter turnout has