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7. ELICITACIÓN

9.3 Documentación requerimientos del sistema

9.3.1 Especificación requerimientos del sistema

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This study relaxed an assumption found in many earlier firm­level studies of logics that the boundaries between different institutional domains are themselves fixed or static over time. As a result, I explored the intersection of alternative logics as a force of long­term institutional change. Institutions change as alternative logics, and the societal actors assigned to protect them, come together to create practices that reflect a

compromise or blending of existing logics that pushes joint strategies and outcomes in new directions. Thus, in contrast to studies that delve into ideal types in isolation from other institutional logics, this dissertation looked at logics in action as a force of long­ term substantive change.

From this perspective, the issue in understanding change processes was not

simply to identify why some members of society might call for a new type of institutional change, such as strengthening the rules that protect the security of critical infrastructure organizations. I also identified the ways that prescriptive calls for new directions interacted with existing institutional logics and structures in shaping realized outcomes. For instance, Holm’s (1995) basic insight that “[n]ew institutions are not created from scratch but are built upon older institutions and must replace or push back preexisting institutional forms” (Holm, 1995) provided insight into the Coast Guard’s development of the Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSCs) that were built off previous experience with Area Safety Committees. According to Purdy and Gray (2009), ideal type institutional logics are not deployed fully formed but become part of the toolkit of

actions as various individuals come to mobilize to try to enact change within preexisting networks of interests, actors and beliefs. Again, we found evidence of this with the emergence of the security logics after 9/11 and how the various actors mobilized to enact change and how those actors reacted to change.

Purdy and Gray (2009) advanced research into examining institutional hybridity by proposing an initial typology to categorize the way in which a new logic may come to influence an existing institutional field: transformation, grafting, bridging and exit. We found evidence of these through the field research and have developed a clearer

understanding of the variance resulting from the different approaches inherent in the various typologies. Transformation referred to situations in which a desired new institutional logic came to replace existing practices; others call this a “replacement” outcome, as one institutional logic is simply replaced by another (Thornton, Lounsbury & Ocasio, 2012). This was clearly evident when the TWIC was introduced and the new actors, the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security

Administration (TSA), sought to nationalize existing access strategies with implementation of a national transportation worker identification credential.

Purdy and Gray (2009) identified another outcome of conflicting institutional logics as grafting. Rather than replacing existing practices, the new logic comes to be placed at the periphery of existing dominant logics. The new logic does not transform the core of the existing system but instead becomes incorporated within existing logics without changing core beliefs or practices. To a limited extent, this is what happened with the Coast Guard’s installation of AMSCs and their successful implementation of security assessments and AMSPs. However, we discovered that the successful

implementation of these was not fully and accurately explained by the “symbolic” implementation illustrating what Purdy and Gray (2009) describe as grafting in which new ideas are ceremoniously accepted for external legitimacy but do not penetrate into the substantive activity of the existing institutional structures. Investigating further, we realized that while grafting started to tell part of the story, it was not the whole story. Thus, we turned to Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012) who further elaborated on these different categories of institutional hybridity. Under the category of

transformational change, they include the cases of replacement and blending as Purdy and Gray (2009) proposed, but also introduce the concept of a segregated case of

institutional hybridity, where both logics exist but remain fully separated from each other in their implementation. Again, however, the success of the AMSCs and AMSPs were not exactly the right fit as the two logics did not so much coexist as they did form something new.

This is where the York, Hargrave and Pacheco (2016) study built on these concepts in a further elaboration of the role of logics in shaping both the processes and outcomes of institutional change. These authors differentiate between hybridization and blending as ways in which distinct logics co­inhabit a similar institutional field. They propose that logic hybridization “differs from blending [in the Thornton, et al., 2012 usage] in that the goals of incompatible logics are integrated as complementary; they do not merely coexist. … [Instead], hybridization processes change the relationship between incompatible logics, eventually leading to a new hybridized logic that integrates the incompatible logics.” That is, York, et al., (2016) suggest that hybridization reflects an outcome in which new logics can emerge that encompass elements of both new and

existing beliefs and practices. And this, we believe, is where our research points as the ideal situation for understanding the long term effects of a punctuated transnational terror attack on long­term institutional change. The issue that emerged, and is still not yet fully resolved is how to rethink public­private boundaries in the face of new security concerns. Who is responsible for security? Who governs the day­to­day implementation of new security initiatives and plans? And who pays for more secure infrastructure

organizations?

These questions relate to the additional issues that I raised in my initial research questions. The role of the private sector, as well as differences between transformational and incremental change, arose not from the desired goals espoused in legal plans or Department of Homeland Security strategies but instead within the efforts to turn ideal security logics into actual organizational practices. To further address these issues, I look first to the lessons of the TWIC implementation and then to the AMSP to further ground our understanding of the long­term institutional effects of transnational terrorist events on long­term institutional change.