ESPECIFICACIONES GENERALES DE LA CONTRATACIÓN

the vessel arrived at Alexandria at 15.30 on 26 May with a cargo of grain and she anchored in the inner port giving a notice of readiness at 11.40 on the following day,

27 May. That notice was rejected on the ground that the vessel was not equipped with the necessary vacuvators for the discharge of cargo in accordance with clause 18 of the charterparty so that, consequently, the vessel was not ready for the discharge of cargo. No vacuvators were put on board the vessel until 12.00 on 29 May when three of them were put on to the ship. It was doubtful whether any vacuvators could have been put on board the vessel before that time and the three vacuvators that were put on board the vessel were capable of discharging cargo at a greater rate than that specified in the charterparty. The charterparty provided that there should be six vacuvators and three more vacuvators could have been obtained within a matter of hours. Three more vacuvators were obtained at 11.30 on 15 June at which time the vessel was still waiting in the inner port without having starting the discharge of cargo. There was a finding by the arbitrator that any lack of vacuvators between the arrival of the vessel at Alexandria and 15 June was not causative of any delay in the berthing of the vessel. The relevant provisions of the charterparty were:

‘‘Notification of the vessel’s readiness must be delivered at the office of Charterers . . . at or before 4 p.m. . . . laydays will then commence at . . . 8 a.m. on the next business day whether in berth or not at discharge.

Notice of readiness at port of . . . discharge is only to be tendered at the office of Charterers, Receivers or their Agents on official business days during office hours not after 4 p.m. . . .

Owners to supply sufficient vacuvators . . . to operate same capable of discharging at charterparty rate of discharge. Cargo to be discharged by Receivers . . . at the average rate of 1,500 tons per weather working day of 24 consecutive hours provided vessel can deliver at this rate . . . .’’

By an addendum it was agreed that the discharging rate be amended to 1,000 metric tons per weather working day and for the owners to guarantee minimum six vacuva- tors at the discharging port.

It was decided by Mr Justice Staughton (as he was then) that:

(1) There was no express link between the notice of readiness clause and those requirements as to vacuvators; all that was required before notice of readi- ness was given was that the vessel ought to be ready; and that had no connection with vacuvators which the owners would supply for the opera- tion of discharging. The vacuvators were essentially equipment which was to emerge from the shore when the operation of discharge was to com- mence. The vessel as a vessel was ready and all that had not been done was to supply the equipment which the owners were to supply for the purpose of discharge. In the circumstances, the notice of readiness which was given on 27 May was a valid notice.

(2) However, if the vessel had not been, in point of a physical state, ready to discharge on 27 May and the vacuvators were an essential part of the vessel’s readiness, the vessel would still have been ready at any rate from 29 May because at that time there were three vacuvators on board and a further three could have been obtained within a matter of hours.

(3) If the notice of readiness given on 27 May had been invalid then once the vessel became ready a further notice period was necessary; here the court

would have required a great deal of persuading to reach the view that the charterers, who had had notice of the vessel’s arrival, were entitled to allow her to sit there for a period of just over two weeks and not pay demurrage or bear the cost of the time that had elapsed merely on the ground that they had not received notice from the owners that another three vacuvators could be obtained within hours.

The judge’s decision in fact upheld the award of the arbitrator. In making his decision Mr Justice Staughton did not have to give a ruling between the competing principles in The ‘‘Tres Flores’’32_{and Armement Adolf Deppe}33 _{(because of what he} decided in (1) above) but he did consider it just in case he was found to be wrong on appeal in respect of his decision in (1) above (in fact the case never went to appeal). He considered, by way of obiter, the more difficult issue which was, if the ship was not, in point of her physical state, ready to discharge on 27 May, whether the notice was still valid because she could have been made fit within such time as the charterers could conceivably have required for her to start discharging. His lordship appeared to think that it was a marginal point but, at the end of the day, he rejected the application of the Tres Flores32_{approach and was of the opinion that the} facts of the instant case fell within the Armement Adolf Deppe33_{principle. In coming} to this conclusion he relied (inter alia) on the words of Lord Justice Roskill (as he then was) in The ‘‘Tres Flores’’32_:

‘‘In my judgment the essential distinction between the present case, on the one hand, and

Armement Adolf Deppe and The ‘Delian Spirit’ . . . on the other, is that in those latter cases the

matters which remained to be done before the vessel could begin to discharge or load were in the nature of normal and usual preliminaries which would require to be carried out in every case whereas the fumigation in the present case could not so be described.’’

Mr Justice Staughton said that he would be prepared to describe the supply of vacuvators in the present case as normal and usual preliminaries, at any rate in the case of a vessel which has to be discharged in that way, in contrast with the fumigation in the Tres Flores32_case.

Mr Justice Staughton also has some obiter dicta regarding the giving of a further notice of readiness (see decision (3) earlier in this paragraph) but, since this aspect will be considered later in Chapter 6 (see paragraph 107 et seq.), no further mention will be made of it except to say that, in view of the Court of Appeal decision in The ‘‘Mexico 1’’, and later cases, he was probably wrong on this point.