It can be reasonably concluded that U.S. counter-narcotics policy, during the time-scale of Plan Colombia, has been militarised. Evidence produced throughout this chapter supports this position.
The long-standing military ties between the U.S. and Colombia prior to the drug conflict, be it training or funding programs with anti-communist aims, made increased military support, if not inevitable, then certainly accepted with greater ease than in Mexico, as explored in the next chapter. Before the strengthening of ties between the U.S. and the Colombian military in prosecuting counter-narcotics, American faith and funding was placed with the Colombian National Police. This was still a paramilitary organisation, and so
American counter-narcotics support was already taking a decidedly militarised direction, even without principally supporting the Colombian military, as Plan Colombia measures eventually would. Also, leaving aside Colombia’s late-1990s drug issues and security crisis, the DOD was made lead agency for counter-narcotics in 1988, and the prominence of
Southcom in the Latin American region dovetailed with the end of the Cold War. Southcom’s need to justify its existence and the financing and resources it consumed, matched with the DOD’s status as the principal agency for prosecuting America’s foreign counter-narcotics policy, altogether boosted U.S. counter-narcotics militarisation.
However, this was not American support foisted upon another country solely in service to its own national security interest (even if that was the primary motivator). It was also in Colombia's interest to accept the counter-narcotics support on offer, given how drug money helped to feed its civil conflict. Pre-Plan Colombia policy, such as breaking the cartels and squeezing production in Bolivia and Peru, actually intensified coca cultivation in
Colombia. The resultant revenues played a significant role in sustaining the civil conflict, even if the U.S. initially preferred to maintain an artificial distinction between the two security problems. Congress approved emergency funding for Plan Colombia, but for year- on-year expenditure only, subject to annual oversight to ensure that counter-narcotics remained the focus and not counterinsurgency. This was always a difficult line to walk, and
after 9/11 and the commencement of the War on Terror, there was no longer a need to maintain this illogical distinction. The Bush and Uribe Administrations were in sync on the need to embark on a muscular, militarised strategy of counter-narcoterrorism.
As a result, the Colombian military and national police experienced significant growth in numbers of personnel. This was especially the case for the ground forces of the army and CNP, in order to retake territory formally occupied by guerrillas, to clear coca crops, and to facilitate economic and social regeneration in those areas to create secure spaces. While this Consolidation phase emphasises economic and social development,
military initiatives, such as Sword of Honour, still show that hard military power is utilised in the counter-narco insurgency cause, as well as soft socio-economic power.
In truth, militarisation was always on an upwards trend. American military aid was well underway before Plan Colombia, with support allocated for a 1000-man counter- narcotics brigade (U.S. Department of Defence 1998), which itself overtly boosted U.S. military involvement and support for the then-lead agency, the Colombian National Police. With Plan Colombia itself, 75 percent of the total budget allocation went to military aid (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.108), intended to help form an entire counter-narcotics battalion, not just a brigade, plus support from helicopters, improved training, ammunition, intelligence, and communications equipment. All of these represented a direct injection of American military assets into Colombian counter-narcotics. The 9/11 attacks and their fallout only increased support, with military aid going towards the formation of a counterinsurgency battalion (Crandall 2008, p.139; Isacson 2005, p.25). This amounted to an additional counter- narcotics force in all but name, due to the intertwining of counterinsurgency and counter- narcotics in the Colombian civil conflict. Counterinsurgency support also saw the direct involvement of U.S. Special Forces on the ground in a training capacity, continuing the role they had undertaken for years, going back to the days of the Military Training Teams and the hunt for Pablo Escobar.
Of the $9 billion spent by the United States between 2000-2013, $4.2 billion was dedicated to counter-narcotics funding for both the Colombian military and national police, with $670 million for direct weaponry and equipment transfers, $400 million for air wing operations, and $2 billion to fund DOD involvement in Plan Colombia (Beittel 2012, p.38). Essentially, the majority of Plan Colombia funding went into security and principally military assets, illustrating direct 'making military', as well as institutionalisation because it was carried out for such a prolonged period of time, and could not be regarded as a temporary
Concerning institutionalisation, this had begun pre-Plan Colombia, with the military allowed significant say over national security policy. Military authority was backed up by presidential decrees, which explicitly allowed the armed forces and the police to take the fight to drug traffickers, and even introduced effective marshal law for drug offences, until overturned by the Supreme Court. Institutionalisation is demonstrated by the confidence displayed by the United States in gradually leaving the Colombian military to guarantee their own state security. Fiscal issues in domestic U.S. politics have played a role in reducing military expenditure, and the Obama Administration’s desire to disengage from protracted conflicts around the world has seen increased American draw-down in various theatres (Feickert 2014).
Yet it is likely that, even absent these factors, the growing strength and proficiency of Colombia’s security forces has become entrenched, with Colombian counter-narcotics forces even exporting their expertise to train regional neighbours’ forces, especially Mexico
(Acierno and Kinosian 2015). Under the Democratic Security and Consolidation phases, the Colombian security budget and manpower availability grew substantially to solidify the security gains made in both counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics efforts. All said, the increase in budget, manpower and the continuous involvement of security forces in counter- narcotics, all points to a long-term trend, not a temporary state of affairs, and is thus
institutionalised.
As alluded to, counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics are essentially one and the same in Colombia, and so violence associated with the civil conflict could, for most of Plan Colombia, be regarded as violised, at least in regards to domestic Colombian policy actions. However, U.S. counter-narcotics policy, the main objective of study, has sought to limit the scale of violence. This is not to say that the U.S. has discouraged it completely, nor abstained from indirect involvement, as targeted assassinations of FARC commanders demonstrates (Priest 2013; Guardian 2013). However, consider the aims of the Leahy Amendment in general, the human rights terms and conditions for Plan Colombia approval specifically (presidential waivers notwithstanding), and State Department efforts to fund governmental and non-governmental civil and human rights awareness and institutions (U.S. GAO 2003). These demonstrate an effort to keep violence minimal and targeted, and is thus in-keeping with levels of violence associated with militarisation, not violisation. Ultimately, the United States exerts a great deal of influence in Colombia, but cannot dictate all strategic aspects, as highlighted by the more complicated issues surrounding violence and human rights,
we shall see when compared to Mexico, the fact is that Colombia was actively fighting a civil conflict with a counter-narcotics dimension, but warfare was still a defining factor. Therefore, it is little surprise that militarisation was the outcome and was the pursued policy by both Colombia and its American supporters.
While the U.S. military has not had a sizable presence on the ground, it has deployed hundreds of personnel in small training and advisor units for decades. Additional input of weaponry, equipment and intelligence assets has contributed to ‘making military’ in
Colombia, largely by empowering the native security forces with such militarised resources. This process has been underway for over fifteen years, since the start of Plan Colombia, and even before, during the operations against the cartels in the 1980s. A stronger, larger
Colombian military establishment is here to stay, is not a temporary measure, and has thus become institutionalised. Finally, while violence has clearly been perpetrated on a large scale, it is the responsibility of Colombian parties, whether government forces, guerrillas or
paramilitaries, and is not the direct responsibility of U.S. counter narcotics policy. Taking all factors into consideration, U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Colombia meets all three elements required to be deemed ‘militarised’. The U.S. counter-narcotics relationship with Mexico is very different, however, as explored in the next chapter.