Estudio de las cenizas de bagazo de caña de azúcar CBCA

The radical critique has served, if nothing else, to cast doubt on certain presuppositions of hegemonic stability theory. Chief among these have been the twin assumptions that hegemonic actors are Liberal by inclination, and that by virtue of their predominance, can influence or coerce other actors to be more liberal than they might otherwise have been.’^ A growing body of work has criticised the assumed liberal nature of hegemons, both in the case of historical examples, and with reference to the United States.®® Strange has argued that:

"after the war, when the United States used its persuasive powers, backed by 77 78 79 80 Russett op cit p227. Ibid p228. Strange 1987, op cit p559.

See F Lawson "Hegemony and the Structure of Intemational Trade Reassessed: A View from Arabia." Intemational Organisation 1983, 37:317-337; D Laitin "Capitalism and Hegemony: Yombaland and the International Economy." International Organisation 1983, 36:687-713; T McKeown "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe." Intemational Organisation 1983, 37:73-91; P Cowhey and E Long "Testing Theories of Regime Change: Hegemonic Decline or Surplus Capacity?" International Organisation 1983, 37:157-188.

coercive leverage, to get others to help establish liberal economic arrangements, the evidence throws even more doubt on the effectiveness of US hegemonic dominance .... Yet as Alan Milward’s recent study of the negotiations between the Americans and Europeans has shown in considerable detail, the West Europeans were successful in resisting attempts to insist on a full blown customs union between the recipients of Marshall Aid"*^

There is much to commend the view that US policy represented a somewhat opportunistic form of liberalism, rather than an unwavering commitment to liberal ideals.®^ This equivocal attitude suggests not only that the United States was not invariably successful in imposing its views on the system, as Strange pointed out (and by extension may not have been as strongly hegemonic as the traditional realist model supposes), but also that a commitment to liberalism in trade is a poor indication of the state of the hegemony in question.

Much more influential, according to radical analysts, are the ability to provide an outflow of capital for investment and the provision of a stable intemational currency supported by discounting facilities (often known as lender of last resort facilities) in times of financial crisis.®^

Finally, the radical critique has highlighted the latent state centric bias of hegemonic stability theory, which overlooks the important interdependencies operative within the contemporary intemational system. Further, it is apposite to question the apparently uncritical application of historical models of hegemony to the present day. The global political economy of the post 1945 period is significantly different from that of the nineteenth century, and still more from that of previous centuries. Drawing direct parallels between the British hegemony of the nineteenth century, and that of the United States since the end of the Second World War is fraught with methodological

Strange 1987, op cit p561; A Milward The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51. 1984, London: Methuen.

Strange 1987 op cit p563. Idem.

danger.

The radical critique has alerted analysts to the continued centrality of the American political economy within the global system. The problem, however, lies in convincingly demonstrating that this continuing centrality signifies the continuance of the previous hegemonic position. Strange, Gill and the radical school, insist that the character of the hegemony is all that has changed; from a direct, relational predominance to a more indirect, embedded, structural hegemony. To the radical school, the structural hegemony is now less powerful today than was the case in the 25 years after 1945.®^

On closer inspection, it becomes difficult to discern any great difference between the change in the character of American hegemony outlined by the radicals, and a simple decline in the said hegemony as favoured by realist tradition. Although the radicals may have warned, not without justice, of the dangers of underestimating the basis of American power, they have failed to convincingly demonstrate that American power is not, in fact, in decline. If relational power is no longer as important, in terms of forcing others to do your will, the United States ought still to be able to use its great structural power to bring about desired ends. This being so, the period since the loss of outright hegemony, usually identified by realists as the period between 1968 and 1973,®^ ought to exhibit continued American dominance.

Examination of the intemational system since the early 1970’s casts serious doubts on the radical case. A direct relationship between structural power and continued hegemony cannot be realistically posited. Therefore this analysis will focus on the ability of the hegemonic power to bring about its desired policy goals, with reference to the issue area of armaments collaboration in the North Atlantic area and, using the device of discrete episodes of regime formation and change within the issue area, assess whether US hegemony is indeed in decline. The effects of this process on the evolution or otherwise of an armaments collaboration regime in this period will be 84

85

Ibid passim, but particularly p564; Gill op cit passim. Strange 1987 op cit p562.

examined.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and liberation of Eastern Europe, the Gulf War of 1990-91, the growing prominence of the newly united Germany and apparent advance of the European Community, both economically with the introduction of the single market in 1993 and politically with its recent role in Yugoslavia, beg important questions about the role of both the radical and realist cases in the analysis of the intemational system.

The organisation of the post-Cold War intemational order lies outwith the scope of the present analysis. It is pertinent, however, to speculate that the dramatic political and strategic changes of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s will have an equally dramatic impact on the armaments collaboration issue area, and on the position of the United States as hegemon of a rapidly changing system.

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