1. Normativa en el sistema educativo y sus referencias a la ED
1.1 Europa y sus políticas educativas: El origen de la educación basada en
Niger Equatorial Guinea Bangladesh Sudan Samoa Nepal Sao Tome and Principe
Myanmar Tuvalu Cambodia Afghanistan Madagascar Mali Senegal Timor-Leste Comoros Lao PDR Mauritania Solomon Islands Djibouti Benin Central African Republic
Ethiopia Sierra Leone
Somalia
Democratic Rep. of the Congo Lesotho Guinea-Bissau Eritrea Kiribati Angola Vanuatu Zambia Mozambique Guinea Gambia Bhutan Burkina Faso Burundi Malawi
United Rep. of Tanzania Uganda Yemen Liberia Chad Togo Rwanda -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Difference between average product complexity of new products exported to the South and to the North
E. Developmental regionalism and South–South
cooperation: Integration beyond liberalization
1. T
HE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONALISMDevelopmental regionalism can be understood as a development-led regionalism that accepts globalization as a historical trend, but rejects the market-led approach to globalization. Developmental regionalism aims at maximizing the benefits of regional cooperation with the goal of achieving an advantageous insertion of the members’ economies into world markets. This goal is not an end by itself, but only a means to accelerate economic, social and human development.
Developmental regionalism is concerned with both the (a) internal economic development and domestic integration, while at the same time, with (b) strategic integration of the regional trading blocs into the world economy. As is the case with other forms of regionalism, the most basic level of cooperation covered by developmental regionalism is that of trade. However, the concept of developmental regionalism goes beyond the domain of trade per se, and includes other, more ambitious forms of intervention, such as industrial policy. The term “industrial policy”, in the context of developmental regionalism, is to be interpreted in the broadest possible sense. As such, it can involve a variety of policy tools, and not only those traditionally associated to trade policies proper –– from tariff and non-tariff barriers, to subsidies, concessional loans, direct provision of infrastructure and other public goods (UNCTAD, 2007), promotion of research and development and science and technology activities, State- owned enterprises and State-controlled mixed enterprises, and many others. For greatest impact and efficiency, these policies should be harmonized and coordinated among participating countries in the regional association.
Under developmental regionalism, trade amongst regional partners is favoured with respect to extra regional trade, implementing strategic trade policies consistent with each member State’s domestic industrial policies. Strategic trade policies may include traditional or less traditional tools — such as tariffs, import and exports quotas and bans, and technical and phytosanitary standards. In tandem with its holistic vision of development, regional trade can also be promoted through coordination of investment to strategic areas such regional transport and other ancillary infrastructure. Prioritizing investment in strategic areas of common interest and common constraints can help to overcome the pre-existing bias against regional trade caused by the colonial legacy that characterizes many LDCs and other poor countries. As many developing countries are better connected to other continents than to neighbouring countries, they cannot fully benefit from the potential gains of regional integration. In this context, “Regional trade facilitation projects can directly reduce the transport costs of intraregional trade and unleash a virtuous circle of increasing trade and economies of scale in the transport sector, and reducing transport costs, which in turn may further stimulate intraregional trade” (UNCTAD, 2007: 183). While, as noted above, a strong developmental State is an asset that LDCs usually lack, this weakness represents a constraint that can progressively be overcome. In order to speed up in a harmonious fashion economic and social development, the promotion of developmental regionalism should go hand-in-hand with strengthening the structures, institutions, capabilities typical of the developmental State at the national level.
This kind of developmental regionalism aims at fostering industrialization and accelerating economic and social development of member countries both
Development-led regionalism accepts globalization as a historical
trend, but rejects the market-led approach to globalization.
Developmental regionalism goes beyond the domain of trade per se, and includes other, more ambitious
forms of intervention, such as industrial policy.
For greatest impact and efficiency, these policies should be harmonized and coordinated among
participating countries in the regional association.
as goals per se, and as a means of successfully integrating their economies in the global web of market relations. In the context of globalization, new developmental regionalism strives to exploit to the maximum extent the benefits that can stem from negotiating with other blocks and economic powers from a position of relative strength, such the one allowed by member States’ collective ability to act as a single player. The expanded regional market generated through inter-State cooperation, along with temporary protection policies for domestic capital, contributes to secure benefits for domestic firms over their foreign competitors. In fact, developmental regionalism assumes the need for gradual and sequenced trade liberalization together with conscious and planned policy actions are enacted to build up productive capacities. The existence of such productive capacities is seen as a necessary condition that will eventually enable domestic businesses to participate in global market activities (Bowles, 2000; Nesadurai, 2002, 2003; Chandra, 2009).
2. E
XAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONALISM The experience of developmental regionalism is still in its infancy in most of the developing world. African countries, supported by the AfDB and the NEPAD as well as other partners, are also embarking into similar initiatives to promote the creation of development corridors, and redress long-standing infrastructural gaps. Although in general these initiatives are at a more incipient stage than those in the Asian region, notable examples are: the North South corridor, which connects Durban and Dar es Salaam, and the Maputo corridor linking South Africa’s northern and eastern regions to the port of Maputo. So far, the most successful examples of its practical realization can be found in Asia. Indeed, the region where these processes are most advanced is East Asia, a region where a positive, proactive view of integration has been prevailing for a long time (Taga, 1994; Fujita; Kuroiwa and Kumagai, 2011). Some examples are:First, the recent experience of trilateral economic cooperation between China, the Republic of Korea and Japan constitutes a successful example of development regionalism. Trilateral cooperation in North-east Asia began in 2000, and has been focusing particularly on environment protection, transport and logistics, and finance, and research and development. In the manufacturing area, particular attention was devoted to the IT sector. The latter covered several areas, from telecom service policy to network and information security. Yet, the main strategic goal was the joint development of new technologies such as next- generation Internet, open source software, and radio frequency identification (RFID) sensor network. The three North-east Asian countries were aware of the key role of IT for overall economic upgrading and industrial competitiveness.
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea adopted proactive government commitments in order to generate synergy effects in technological development and, more broadly, to enhance their firms’ international competitiveness. In the North-east Asian cooperation context, developmental regionalism adopted an Aikido-like approach, as it did not resist globalization as a whole, seeking rather to use its own momentum to carve for its members a solid position in the global marketplace, fostering proactive integration, cooperation, coordination and harmonization (Doidge, 2007; Yoshimatsu, 2008).
Second, since the mid-2000s, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a catalyst role for of regional cooperation and integration in East Asia. To this purpose, the Bank established in 2005 a new Office of Regional Economic Integration. The ADB faces various challenges in effectively promoting regional cooperation and integration, due to inadequate resources to address capacity-related constraints (Hamilton-Hart, 2003), other technical and political difficulties, and the accusation of focusing too much on East Asian integration to
Developmental regionalism aims at fostering industrialization and accelerating economic and social development of member countries
both as goals per se, and as a means of successfully integrating their economies in the global web
of market relations.
Since the mid-2000s, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a catalyst role for of regional
cooperation and integration in East Asia.
the detriment of the other constituent regional groupings. However, the ADB has been able to make an increasingly effective contribution to regional cooperation and integration initiatives and activities, especially those aimed at enhancing productive capacity in the less developed countries of the region (Dent, 2008).
The ADB supports proactive integration, rather than passive integration. While the latter does not go beyond the removal or reduction of trade, focusing exclusively on economic liberalization and deregulation, proactive integration implies a far more comprehensive range of forms of policy cooperation, coordination and harmonization. The ADB stance stems from two main sources of inspiration: (a) its mandate of providing development capacity assistance to the region’s less developed countries; and (b) the persisting influence of Japanese developmentalism, that still pervades the policy approach of both the Bank and of East Asian governments (Taga, 1994).
Third, the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) is one of the subregional “growth polygons” that were established since the early 1990s to foster the process of regional integration among the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As these subregional zones include very poor countries, they face significant challenges. The BIMP-EAGA has tried to overcome these challenges by adopting the principles of developmental regionalism, promoting activities aimed at enhancing the economic capacity and prospects of lesser-developed countries in order to foster their integration into the regional economy. The BIMP-EAGA initiative has achieved a measure of success, yet progress towards substantial subregional development cooperation is still inadequate (Dent and Richter, 2011).
3. T
HE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL SUPPORT MECHANISMSWITHIN DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONALISM
:
THE CASE OF THE ADB COORDINATED GMS PROGRAM
The ADB-coordinated Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program (see chart 36) can also be considered a successful example of developmental regionalism. However, this case of good practice also illustrates the importance of an integrated regional development approach to ensure that LDCs also benefit. The GMS, which started in 1992, involves all the major actors around the Greater Mekong area, such as Thailand, China, and all the LDCs in the region, ASEAN and ASEAN’s development partners including Japan. It is the only regional cooperation programme specifically targeting all LDCs in the region. The core of GMS is to enhance the infrastructure of industrial development in the region by implementing programmes in areas of transport, telecommunications, energy, tourism, trade facilitation, investment, human resource development and agriculture (Chang, 2011) . The basic strategy is to attract private investment to the region and facilitate cross-border trade, investment and tourism by strengthening infrastructure linkages. To enhance transportation linkage over the region covering three East Asian LDCs, Thailand, Viet Nam and Yunnan Province as well as Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of the PRC, the GMS programme introduced three economic corridor projects: (a) the East-West Economic Corridor (Myanmar, Thailand, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam); (b) the North–South Economic Corridor (China – Yunan, Guangxi, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand, Viet Nam and Myanmar); and (c) the Southern Economic Corridor (Cambodia, Thailand and Viet Nam). As of 2009, the GMS Program had completed 44 projects with total investment of $11 billion (Chang, 2011).
The basic strategy is to attract private investment to the region and
facilitate cross-border trade and investment and human resource development by strengthening
infrastructure linkages.
The GMS Program involves powerful actors operating far beyond the
GMS region who tend to have major control over the flows of goods, investment and technology.
The interests of those international players often contradict the wider developmental goals of LDCs and people’s immediate needs within the