Evento migratorio

Although there is a great deal of academic work on the Chinese media and its twists and turns during market reform (for example, C.-C. Lee, 2000b; Lynch, 1999; Y. Zhao, 2008), empirical audience research has been relatively limited, especially qualitative research. A number of exceptions exist which I will examine in the first part of this chapter, but relatively little of the interpretative and theoretical tradition of enquiry discussed in chapter one has so far had much influence.¹ Apart from this neglect of audience, other gaps have also opened up in the field with the recent proliferation of new media technologies such as the mobile phone, DVD and the internet, which have created a dynamic but inevitably unstable area of study.² It is therefore necessary to look at the conditions under which audiences‟ uses of media such as DVD and downloading have developed during a period of state-led marketisation and reform. New media technologies are themselves a product of China‟s increasing linkage to the global economy and the economy‟s growing commercialism, but what is of interest here is how they fit into both new and pre-existing structures that regulate the Chinese media landscape and, moreover, how these developments have been addressed by existing scholarship – a topic I shall address in the chapter‟s second section.

Keeping track of such a moving target is a challenge. In fact, when I first started my preliminary investigations into foreign film-watching in Beijing in 2005, the old VCD format was still quite widely available in China, with DVD a relative newcomer. Film downloading, likewise, was only just beginning to have an impact, yet by 2006, when my research began in earnest, DVD had all but replaced VCD,³ and many viewers were using the film sharing sites that had begun to multiply online. These developments will be

1 The major qualitative study of Chinese television audiences is still Lull‟s ‘China Turned On’ (1991).

Zhang Tongdao (2003) also undertook a series of quantitative surveys into television audiences. In addition, a number of surveys have looked at the effects of film and television viewing upon Chinese values (see G.

C. Chu & Ju, 1993; Dong, Tan, & Cao, 1998; Harwood & Zhang, 2002). I will examine these in more detail below.

2 There are major studies of internet development by Tai Zixue (2006) and Zheng Yongnian (2008) as well as regular statistical surveys by the official China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC). Case studies of new media uses have been rarer, though a qualitative study of students‟ internet use was conducted by Chen Yanru (2009) as well as a survey by He Guoping (2009) and a hybrid survey and interview study on DVD and downloading by Wen and Wang (2008).

3 In 2003 VCD sales reached over 300 million discs but DVD production was already 485 million and sales of players were also growing rapidly (Cai, 2008, p. 132).

described in more detail in part three of the chapter, but just as I question the apparent conflict between the state‟s dual goals of media control and commercial profitability (see C.-C. Lee, 2000a, p. 10; Lynch, 1999, pp. 7, 10), so I suggest that the apparently

subversive (pirate/underground) nature of the younger generation‟s adoption of the new digital viewing technologies (see Cai, 2008, p. 144; K. Hu, 2005, pp. 181-184) is perhaps something of an over-simplification.⁴

Audience Research in China

From the late 1950s till the early 1980s, the media research tradition in China was basically confined to „political analysis‟ and „rhetorical studies‟ (B. Zhou, 2006, pp. 119-120) but the first survey by the Beijing Journalists Association in 1982 saw the

beginnings of a conceptual turn towards the study of „audiences‟ rather than the undifferentiated „masses‟. Largely influenced by the US communications research paradigm (see chapter one), this change was officially institutionalised in 1996 when

„communications studies‟ (chuanboxue) was established in the Peoples‟ Republic of China (PRC) as a field of study (B. Zhou, 2006, p. 124).

Within this new field, Zhou suggests that most academic studies have tended to concentrate on analysing the media‟s effects on audiences with a second strand looking at audience composition, though because of a lack of funding for fieldwork, the use of quantitative methods has been somewhat slower to develop (B. Zhou, 2006, p. 126).⁵ The adoption of a cultural studies approach to audience research has been rarer still, with much work instead consisting of policy elaborations, commentaries or critical reviews rather than grounded research (B. Zhou, 2006, pp. 124-127).⁶ Few articles refer to theory

4 As Yu Haiqing recently put it (2009, p. 19), „The apparent dichotomy of control versus freedom has constituted the internal logic of China's information and communication technology (ICT) development and dominated Western scholarship on Chinese new media‟. However, „Dichotomies of state versus people and market, and socialism versus capitalism are no longer sufficient to explain concrete issues and cases‟.

5 Zhou analysed the three most influential Chinese academic journals covering mass communications („Journalistic University‟, „Journalism and Communication‟ and „Modern Communication‟) between 1985 and 2002 (B. Zhou, 2006, p. 122).

6 That is not to say there is no cultural studies work in China, but rather that such an approach is not frequently used in empirical audience studies (Cao, 2004, p. 30; Keane, 1998, p. 482). For an exceptional instance, see Zhang Kai‟s interviews with eight women about Chinese soap operas (2009). Most audience-related articles tend instead to offer critical comment, for instance, on the reasons for declining audience numbers for programmes such as Chinese New Year shows (see Y. Liu, 1998) or soap operas (see Q. Wu &

Wei, 2007) or domestic film attendance (see Gao & Du, 2004) with recommendations for addressing these problems.

specifically, although there are introductions to Western theories, and among those that do, „uses and gratifications‟ is the most frequently cited (B. Zhou, 2006, p. 128).⁷ Overall, in spite of greater diversity and increasing output, there is still, as Zhou puts it, „a great gap‟ in Chinese audience research. He therefore calls for case studies using cultural studies and reception analyses which are „often neglected in Chinese journals‟ (2006, p.

129).⁸

Studies of uses of new media, including internet, mobile phone and other digital based technologies, have also been rather narrowly focused. Kluver and Yang‟s (2005, p.

307) review of English language research on the internet in China notes that while there has been much analysis of the potential democratising impact of the web (for example, Tai, 2006, pp. 285-292; Zheng, 2008, ch. 7), there has been little on the cultural effects of internet use.⁹ Similarly, Wei Ran‟s review (2009, pp. 120-122) of Chinese language studies of new media found that most research focused either on technical or marketing aspects and overwhelmingly offered a general, non-empirical analysis without a political or theoretical focus.¹⁰ Consequently, Wei concludes that „few insights are available to shed light on the processes of how millions of Chinese adopt, consume, apply, and re-invent new media technologies, [or] on the social, political, and economic implications of the widespread of new media technologies‟ (p. 123).

In his preface to his own research on Chinese television audiences, Zhang Tongdao argued that this general lack of empirical research in Chinese media research was the result of the Chinese academics‟ preference for „impressionistic and aesthetic evaluation‟ (T. Zhang, 2003, p. 1 preface). As Zhang put it „as far as the Chinese media research situation is concerned, the most urgent requirement at present is the American school‟s empirical research method‟ (2003, p. 1 preface). However, over the years there have been a number of studies, particularly by Chinese scholars based in the US, which have used survey methods to look at the degree of influence of foreign media imports, mainly via television and cinema. Dong, Tan and Cao (1998), for instance, surveyed 439

7 See, for instance, Guan & Qi‟s study of audiences for military programmes (2009, p. 146).

8 For a similar call for more audience-oriented study from the perspective of comparative film studies, see Zhang Yingjin (2007, pp. 30-32).

9 Kelly Hu‟s observational study (2005) of online Chinese speaking fans of Japanese dramas is an exception which I will consider in DVD and Downloading: New ‘Guerrilla Audiences’? below. He Guoping and Yao Yao have also published on downloaders of US dramas (2007).

10 Harwit and Clark make a similar point (2006, p. 14).

high school Chinese who were asked to indicate on a seven point scale how far they recognised American values in what they had watched. These values („equality, freedom, competition, individualism, honesty, ambitious, responsibility, tolerance, wealth, broad-minded [sic]‟) were chosen on the basis that they were believed to be both typical of Anglo-American culture and largely contrasted with traditional Chinese values such as harmony and collectivism (Dong, Tan, & Cao, 1998, p. 321). The obvious problem is that the American values researched in the study were pre-selected for the students by the researchers themselves and the vocabulary used to express them was potentially rather loaded.¹¹ And although the values‟ relevance to the students‟ own concerns was also measured, ranking the importance or usefulness of such values to individual life experiences is inherently problematic because of their highly abstract nature and the potential for diverse interpretations of their meaning. We might wonder, for instance, at the values and outlooks explaining the low importance attributed to wealth by

interviewees (1998, pp. 120-121). So, when the authors conclude, after statistical analysis, that Chinese viewers‟ recognition of American values in TV and films and their degree of relevance to their own lives can predict acceptance of such values (1998, p. 326), this is something of an unacknowledged leap of faith on several levels.¹²

Another such survey, by Harwood and Zhang (2002), was based on Gerbner‟s

„cultivation theory‟ which comes out of the linear media effects tradition of

communications research, noted in chapter one. The authors surveyed over 400 Chinese medical college students to see whether watching imported, mainly Western, television programming influenced support for traditional Chinese values. Using a „Chinese Value Survey‟, students were asked to rate the importance (from 1 to 5) of a list of traditional values associated with personal character (e.g. working hard, trustworthiness, solidarity with others, etc.) and a set of values associated with hierarchical relationships (e.g.

respecting tradition, loyalty to superiors, etc.). The survey also asked participants for estimates of their weekly viewing hours of 12 categories of Chinese and 8 categories of

11 Even taking the English terms used, the difference in positive or negative connotations between

„equality‟ v. „equal opportunity‟ or „ambitious‟ v. „aspiring‟ is considerable, notwithstanding the fact that care was taken over their translation (see Dong, Tan, & Cao, 1998, p. 319).

12 The researchers claimed that although „wealth‟ was on average rated low as a personal value, it was ranked highly as a feature of American films and that such recognition correlated with acceptance of American values (see Dong, Tan, & Cao, 1998, pp. 318-319, 326).

imported programming. Overall, the results showed that the „Chinese personal values‟

were strongly supported, though the hierarchal values were less so (Harwood & Zhang, 2002, p. 256). But when correlated with the viewing figures, the researchers found that viewers who reported watching more imported TV were less inclined to endorse these personal values (2002, p. 257). When broken down into the viewing of particular genres, it emerged that Chinese music performance shows, Chinese children‟s programming, imported films, and imported sport programmes were negatively associated with such values (2002, p. 258). The authors suggested that this was due to the fact that each of these programme types was imbued with an aspiration-oriented, materialist, individualist and/or competitive ideology. However, although this may seem plausible enough, as Harwood and Zhang themselves accept, a correlation does not necessarily mean a cause (2002, p. 260). The authors also noted that their measure may lack reliability, particularly as the list of personal values yielded an almost uniformly high degree of support. After all, who would not support „trustworthiness‟? But their admission itself evades a rather more severe problem inherent in such ranking exercises. What does it actually mean when we tick a box to say, for example, that we believe „trustworthiness‟ is very important, or when we judge that „loyalty to superiors‟ is rather less so? Would agreeing with one‟s bosses, for instance, count as loyalty even if one knew they were wrong, or would it be more loyal to tell them frankly? Posing this question indicates, at the very least, how abstracting values into lists conceals as much (or more) than it reveals.¹³

Although not exclusively focused on audience research, another earlier study of social attitudes in China by Chu and Ju (1993) also touched on media use, and

particularly the degree of Western influence. Despite being questionnaire-based, their research went somewhat beyond narrow value-ranking exercises and was not only much more extensive, with 2000 urban and rural residents in or around Shanghai, but far more detailed, containing 360 items in total on a wide range of topics (1993, pp. 42-44).¹⁴ Although Chu and Ju accepted that such research can never be wholly objective given

13 Similar problems affect a study by Chen which attempted to find correlations between Chinese students‟

values and patterns of internet use (S. Chen, 2009, p. 45).

14 As well addressing media use, questions focused on both work and home life and often had moral implications: „If you are not living with your parents, when was the last time you visited them‟ (p. 65), „Do you often chat and spend your leisure time with your neighbors?‟ (p. 93), „Do you like your present work?‟

(p. 106), „If you had a difference of opinion with someone in your work unit, how would you handle it?‟ (p.

139), „How do you think you should treat your ancestors?‟ (p. 232).

that it is necessarily subjective in the choice of questions, they nevertheless emphasised the collection of „concrete data‟ (1993, p. 4) over ethnographic participant observation which they argued is often of limited generalisability and prone to observer bias (1993, pp. 16-18). They similarly critiqued text-based analysis of literature or journalism as too subjective for their purposes (1993, p. 19). From their results, they concluded that since 1949 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) all but destroyed the social underpinnings of the traditional structure of Chinese values and that the failures of the socialist system that replaced it left an ideological and moral vacuum. This gap, they suggested, was filled in the 1980s by an influx of loosely understood Western values, largely conveyed by the images of affluent lifestyles on film and television (1993, p. 13). In fact, Chu and Ju‟s title, ‘The Great Wall in Ruins’, concisely expresses their basic standpoint: published in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, their analysis is pervaded by a nostalgia for an older, morally secure China, in spite of their emphasis on the objectivity of their data collection.¹⁵

Apart from criticising the corrosive effect of the Cultural Revolution on moral values (1993, p. 171), Chu and Ju suggest that the other major influence on changing moral values was the Western media. Overall, not many participants in the survey reported much exposure to Western films and TV, and the main group to which Chu and Ju referred in assessing the effects of the Western media was a small group of younger, well educated Shanghai urbanites (1993, p. 55). The authors noted that this group was less traditional: according to the survey results, they were more likely to argue with elders and more likely to turn to friends than relatives for help. Results also showed that this group was more liberal in attitudes to divorce and cohabitation, more inclined to be fun-loving and apparently lacking in work ethic. Some of these patterns reflected general differences in the findings between young and old, but were more sharply pronounced among high consumers of Western media (1993, pp. 88, 102, 127-130, 210). As a result,

15 In an autobiographic sketch, the authors explain that Chu escaped to Taiwan with his family in 1949 and moved later to the USA whereas Ju was a student in China during the Cultural Revolution (pp. vii-xii).

Both seemed concerned about the loss of traditional values in the Maoist period. As they put it, „In olden day China, people were motivated to excel by a desire to bring glory to their ancestors. This traditional value served as one the few ideological incentives of the past. The Party‟s attack on ancestors, however, particularly during the Cultural Revolution has put this Confucian value under a dark cloud‟ (1993, p. 12).

For an account of other aspects of nostalgia in China, including nostalgia for revolution itself, see Barme (1999: ch. 12).

Chu and Ju argued that this group represented the vanguard of a wider, but regrettable, trend towards urban individualist values and away from traditional Chinese norms:

„What seems to be highly appealing to young Chinese, our data suggest, are [sic]

a life of affluence and perhaps a “happy-go-lucky” lifestyle which viewers of American television programs and movies may easily perceive. It seems that young people in China, who grew up in a cultural vacuum so to speak, are particularly vulnerable to that kind of hedonistic lifestyle which can be readily projected onto what they see on the video tubes and cinema screens. They do not pause to think whether those images are compatible with their own cultural heritage, or to ask whether these images reflect any reality at all‟ (1993, p. 320).¹⁶ Such views perhaps inadvertently paralleled the nationalistic line in the Chinese media after the 1989 crisis (B. Xu, 1999, pp. 104-105), but whatever basis there may be in Chu and Ju‟s general fears about the decline of public virtues in China, with hindsight, the idea that the Western media was eroding Chinese people‟s work ethic seems a little dubious now. The post-1992 intensification of market reform, for instance, considerably increased the competitive pressure on state employees to become more efficient and increasingly to take the leap into private entrepreneurship (see Duckett, 1998, pp. 108-109; Guthrie, 1999, p. 25). Indeed, it may well have been the previous economic

stagnation of the state-sector that sapped a sense of commitment among younger people, especially against the background of exposure to alternative lifestyles in the Western media which could be contrasted to socialist reality – something that Lull argues was one of the factors in the 1989 Tiananmen protests.¹⁷ Chu and Ju suggest, plausibly enough, that youthful disillusion and foreign media exposure may have been in a relationship of mutual reinforcement, but while other studies have agreed with this general proposition, and with no opportunity for follow-up questioning of this informants, it does not offer a

16 Chu and Ju (1993, p. 320) also expressed approval for the idealism of the young participants in the 1989 Tiananmen protests though their anxiety over China‟s moral decline seemed to evoke their deeper concerns.

Ironically, this anxiety over so-called „spiritual pollution‟ was itself shared by some of the conservative Communist party leaders who were decisive in supporting the suppression of the Tiananmen

demonstrations and had supported the „anti-spiritual pollution‟ campaign of the early 1980s (see MacFarquhar, 1997, pp. 357-360).

17 This is a theme pursued by Lull (see following section) who looked at audience reactions to both foreign and domestically produced programming: for instance, ‘Xin xing’ (‘New Star’), a 1986 pro-reform soap opera pitted a heroic reformist official against an old, bureaucratic boss. Lull found that not only did viewers appreciate the criticism of the state bureaucracy implied in the series but often added to it by commenting how the fictional reformer could not possibly have behaved as heroically in real life as he did on screen (1991, pp. 119-120).

precise analysis of why this group in particular stood out from other sections of society (1993, pp. 166-167).¹⁸

The studies I have noted were largely focused on the impact of the still relatively recent spread of television in China during the 1980s and 1990s, in a research tradition that sought to measure or correlate its psychological and cultural effects. Some similar research is still carried out. Huang Huilin and colleagues (H. Huang, Wang, & Jiang, 2007a) published a survey of children‟s viewing habits and values in the capital, concluding that China faced a dangerous loss of national culture in the face of foreign

The studies I have noted were largely focused on the impact of the still relatively recent spread of television in China during the 1980s and 1990s, in a research tradition that sought to measure or correlate its psychological and cultural effects. Some similar research is still carried out. Huang Huilin and colleagues (H. Huang, Wang, & Jiang, 2007a) published a survey of children‟s viewing habits and values in the capital, concluding that China faced a dangerous loss of national culture in the face of foreign