Introduction
The Orange Order has suffered declining membership for the past forty years. Members project culpability outwardly: at the media and its presentation of the institution’s activities; at a Parades Commission which is anti–Orange; at nationalists waging a ‘cultural war’; at political deals which have allowed nationalists and republicans into prominent positions in Northern Ireland’s government and on local councils; and society at large, charged with moving away religion. This chapter considers an alternative explanation: that of the decline in social capital. This argument is a more general explanation of Orange decline than those previously analysed, one which has afflicted other, less controversial groups. It suggests a reduction in participation and networks as atomisation diminishes collective action and solidarity. Whilst Orange Order members did not use the term ‘declining social capital’, there is cognisance of its presence and impact. One member contended:
People behave completely differently now than how they used to. They aren’t joining organisations in a way they once did, religious or otherwise. It’s often talked about kids not going outside and mixing with friends and groups and organisations like they once did and, sure, it might be a bigger thing amongst younger people but I don’t think it’s just them. You see plenty of adults not signing up and getting stuck in like a few decades ago. That is why the Orange Order, just like the Boys’ Brigade and Scouts1 and Freemasonry
and of the like, are seeing their numbers decline.2
1 Scouting UK has reported a growth in membership figures across the Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 2 Marc O’Callaghan, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Liverpool, 20 January 2015
Within civic society, social capital theory highlights the salience of spheres of mutual trust, cooperative participation, and active citizenship develop through voluntary association.3 Groups establish and
accumulate social capital, trading it as a resource. Social capital is the social norms and trust that enables a society to function effectively. Countries rich in social capital enjoy, the theory claims, the wholesome outcomes attached to vibrant civic societies. In societies that are divided however, the development of social capital along social cleavages, both reflects and, to critics, encourages division, intolerance, and civil unrest along lines of identity. Instead of favourable outcomes, such societies can contain disharmony, disunity, and sectarianism.
This chapter will explore the utility of declining social capital as a means of explaining Orange retreat by answering the question: to what extent has a decline in social capital meant that the Orange Order has struggled to attract new recruits amid a broader atomisation of society? It explores the theoretical and methodological richness – and problems – associated with the models presented by Putnam, Bourdieu and Coleman. The chapter explores whether societal trust can operate in the same way in Northern Ireland as in a less socially and politically divided polity? If not, does social capital operate in a different way? The chapter assesses the value of the theory in terms of understanding why civic and fraternal organisations may struggle for members and relevance.
Defining social capital
Social capital theory asserts that greater associational life is linked to the enhancement of democracy and civic wellbeing.4 Core values associated with the concept are those of trust, camaraderie,
3 Coleman, Foundations of social theory (1994); Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work (1993)
4 See: A. de Tocqueville, On Democracy in America (London: Sanders and Otley, 1835); A. Ferguson, Essay on the History of Civil Society, 5th Edn (London: T. Cadell, 1782); L. J. Hanifan, ‘The Rural School Community Centre’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 67 (1916) Pages 130–138
association, and public spiritedness.5 Writing on the American experience, Jacobs, for example,
identified the importance of informal networks of shopkeepers and their customers in particular neighbourhoods. He contended that this social capital was needed to develop trust and communication amongst a relatively unchanging population in order to generate local civic wellbeing.6
Bourdieu drew on classical economic theory to explain social capital, focusing on rational choice theory as a means of demonstrating cooperation.7 Bourdieu maintains that social capital exists and is
developed to serve the self–interests of the participants, contending: ‘the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutional relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition [… provide] each of its members with backing of collectively–owned capital’.8 For Bourdieu, social capital is ‘actors engaged in struggle in pursuit of
their own interests’.9 Virtuous broader societal outcomes are merely welcome by–products. Largely
accredited with popularising the theory because of his clear and concise definition, Coleman explores social capital within an educational context and similarly uses rational choice theory to explain participants’ behaviour and what motivates the cooperation found within social capital.10 Expanding
on the work of Coleman, Putnam explored the way in which civic organisations contributed to stronger democracy in northern Italy,11 and then examined the decline of social capital and civic society within
the American experience.12
5 The concept gained popularity in the 1990s and 2000s following the works of Robert Putnam, James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu.
6 J. Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1961) 7 Bourdieu, ‘The forms of capital’ (1986)
8 Ibid Page 248
9 M. Siisiainen, ‘Two concepts of social capital: Bourdieu vs. Putnam’, ISTR Fourth International Conference, The Third Sector: For What and for Whom?, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland (2000) Page 10
10 Coleman, ‘Social capital in the creation of human capital’ (1988); Coleman, Foundations of social theory (1994)
11 Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work (1993) 12 Putnam, Bowling Alone (2000)
Social capital has been defined and interpreted in a number of different ways, but core themes can be extracted. Social capital is a resource, vital to creating self–sustaining communities and ‘[makes] possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible’.13 It is a resource
individuals and groups exhibit through trust and social norms that participants accumulate within a social network, and is made available through those same networks and the social activities associated with them. These resources establish implicit expectations, obligations, and trust. As a result, social capital is a similar resource to physical capital because individuals and groups can accumulate it and exploit it for their personal benefit.14 However, just as there are similarities, there are also differences.
As with other forms of capital – such as economic or human – social capital is a resource but, Bourdieu differentiates social capital from its resource counterparts because, unlike economic or cultural capital, social capital is made up of obligations and social trustworthiness that is convertible into economic capital. Through voluntary association, social capital is shared by the participants contributing to that group. Even though the capital is being harnessed by the self–interest of participants, the aggregation of self–interest means that social capital is a collective phenomenon.15
Coleman’s argument differs, however, with Bourdieu’s here. Whereas Bourdieu gave great emphasis to economic theory, Coleman defines social capital purely in terms of its function, contending:
It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors whether persons or corporate actors within the structure […] Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors.16
13 Coleman, ‘Social capital in the creation of human capital’ (1988) Page 98
14 F. Herreros, The Problem of forming social capital: Why trust? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 15 Bourdieu, ‘The forms of capital’ (1986) Page 243
Coleman’s definition stresses that social capital exists between people in the form of social relationships. By definition, this cannot be developed by a lone individual and can only exist within a structure of relationships between and amongst social participants. At a basic level, social capital exists amongst – for example – office workers of a small firm who enjoy each other’s company and encourage and support one another to work better. As a result, the team as a whole becomes more effective than if each of the employees worked in isolation without the social contact of others. This example would be in keeping with Jacobs’ micro–level analysis of social capital found amongst people familiar with each other but the theory can be expanded to a macro–level to describe relationships between wider populations who do not know one another well, if at all. In Putnam’s analysis, the theory of social capital is the ‘norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement’.17 Whilst it can
exist amongst co–workers, family, and friends, social capital can be applied to wider, generalised social norms and networks that exist at a societal level.
At both micro and macro–levels, a salient element of social capital theory is that social networks have value, producing cooperation and bridging, and thereby providing the basis for social cohesion.18
Social networks provide the necessary framework within which participants can operate and exploit. Putnam contends that a well–connected individual in a society with poor levels of social connectivity will not benefit as significantly as the same well–connected individual in a well–connected society.19
Social networks allow participants to interact with and influence individuals within that structure who have relationships across a range of other social networks, providing the opportunity for all
17 Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work (1993) Page 167 18 J. Field, Social capital (London: Routledge, 2008) Page 14 19 Putnam, Bowling Alone (2000) Page 20
participants to accrue, develop, and exchange social capital. It is impossible, therefore, for social capital to prevail without the necessary social networks that frame its existence.
In addition to the significance of those social networks, Putnam offers two further features of social capital theory, which he claims to be equally as important, remain: norms of reciprocity or obligation, as well as social trust. Reciprocity relies upon a quid pro quo mentality existing between individuals and within groups; one participant will do something – an act of charity, beneficiation, or gift – for another, in the expectation that another participant (or someone acting on their behalf) will return the patronage. Putnam extends the definition: ‘more valuable, however, is a norm of generalised reciprocity: I’ll do this for you without expecting anything specific back from you, in the confident expectation that someone else will do something for me down the road.’20 Putnam has however been
accused of interpreting reciprocity is purely benign terms, failing to take account of social capital development that undermines effective local governance or good conduct and ignoring competition and attrition within and between groups. To that end, Chambers and Kopstein contend reciprocity requires recognition from other citizens, including from opponents with whom one strongly disagrees.21 As a demonstration of this reciprocity, Graham uses the example of the 1947 film It’s a
Wonderful Life, in which the protagonist – George Bailey – faces ramifications following the loss of a
significant sum of money only to find the local residents of Bedford Falls, to whom he had previously shown great selflessness and generosity, had raised funds to support him in this dire situation in repayment of his altruism.22 As in It’s a Wonderful Life, ‘reciprocity acts as a glue bringing together
social, economic and political relationships […] not just based on trust; they ultimately depend on individuals being trustworthy’.23
20 Ibid Page 21, original emphasis
21 S. Chambers and J. Kopstein, ‘Bad Civil Society’, Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 6 (2001) Page 839 22 Graham, Beyond Social Capital (2016) Pages 22–23