Factores estratégicos

The second major methodological concern that emerged from this study was the need to articulate my understanding of public policy and the process through which it is developed and implemented. I wished to conceptualise policy in a way that allowed for Maori and other interest groups to be considered as active policy players, rather than merely the recipients or targets of policy. Yet, at the same time I did not want to diminish the strength of Maori arguments asserting that government-defined Maori Affairs policy has acted to oppress, subvert and side-line Maori desires for greater self­ determination (see Fleras and Elliott 1 992:ix) .

As a result, the research is based on the assumption that policy is not a fixed unidimensional entity. Rather, it is constructed, multifaceted and thus open to transformation. Policy is certainly subject to different interpretations by numerous policy players in different temporal and political contexts. Obviously, political parties use policy to promote the ideological goals upon which they are founded. These goals

are not necessarily guides to policy actions, but indicate an important parameter by which political actions are judged by those who sympathise with 'traditional' party agendas (Castles and Shirley 1996:90) . Although far from being homogenous groupings, certain constituencies may be powerful enough to influence policy if political parties back particular policies or issues to gain the support of specific constituent groups or stand the middle-ground to attract supporters beyond their natural party constituencies (Edelroan 197 1 :4; Cheyne, O'Brien and Belgrave 2000:3 1). As a result, a change in the political party or parties leading government can bring with it significant effects on the direction of policy. This is particularly so immediately after an election when there is pressure on government agencies to generate 'shopping lists' of new initiatives and the lifespan of existing programmes is at risk (Considine 1 994: 137- 138) .

In addition, powerful elite interests, such as those concerned with business, can affect policy decisions in some circumstances. Minority interest groups may also have the opportunity to influence policy, if usually only in relation to specific issues concerning them. The bureaucratic cultures and organisational processes embodied by the government departments and agencies that make up the 'government sector',

where policy is developed, can have an effect on the policy process. This may provide consistency and stability but can also result in lost capacity for innovation as ideas increasingly become 'routine' (see Eisenstadt 1968:xvii; Considine 1994:4- 1 4) . Finally, individuals (particularly politicians and government sector officials) may have an enormous influence on policy formulation and implementation, although their actions are always subject to the social, political and economic context in which they are made (Cheyne, O'Brien and Belgrave 2000:22).

Given this range of possible policy players, opinion varies as to the ideas and practices defined as policy, based on varying analyses of the social context and different assumptions about power and social relations. There are also many different measures of what society could and should look like, as well as ideas of what role the state should play in creating it (Drake 200 1 : 19). Considine ( 1994:4) has defined

'policy' as: "the continuing work done by groups of policy actors who use available

public institutions to articulate and express the things they value". If we too understand policy in this way, it is possible to acknowledge that, even when policy appears to be seemingly ad hoc and unpremeditated, the policy process consists of a number of policy players attempting to assert their value judgments, often unconsciously, over others. Where relevant, the thesis draws attention to these differing perspectives and the respective influence of such policy players in relation to CTG and Maori Affairs policy more generally.

The discussion above clearly indicates that I do not regard policy as just something that particular governments do (or do not do) . Yet, over the course of this particular research project, I have moved from the assumption that policy is highly negotiable, as a result of the contestation described, to a much more ambiguous conclusion. A review of the literature concerned with past Maori Affairs policy (see Chapter Two) demonstrates that broader state agendas regarding national cohesion and legitimacy continued to dominate public policy, at least in the Maori Affairs portfolio, well into the 1990s. The current research indicates that the CTG strategy was mediated at different times by some of the varied influences described above. Yet, in addition to attempting to achieve its own particular ideological and political goals, the Labour-Alliance government was also driven by a need to defend state legitimacy through national cohesion, even if its own members were not necessarily conscious of this fact. In pursuing such an argument, the following section necessarily provides some detail as to my understanding of the state and the processes by which policy is developed within its institutions.

The Plural State

Some Maori (e.g. Awatere 1984; Sykes 2000) have depicted the state largely as an oppressive institution. Certainly, the state has played a leading role in facilitating the exploitation of their lands and resources, in addition to actively attempting to

destroy Maori social and cultural systems. Nevertheless, Pears on (200 1a: 1 8) has noted

that, even in cases of colonisation where indigenous peoples undergo exploitation and domination, "the process of state formation fosters conditions that furnish even the most powerless of peoples with possibilities for frustrating the plans of the powerful". This is particularly so if, as in the Aotearoa New Zealand case, the colonisers do not have the numbers or strength to use completely coercive means of control and rely on policies of co-option, limited self-regulation or devolution to maintain their power. The 'spaces' created by these policies become sites of struggle within which indigenous peoples may achieve greater control over their own lives.

It must thus be acknowledged that, in addition to acting as an oppressor, the state has distributed resources and promoted policies that have benefited Maori (see Brass 1985:26; Dyck 1989:7) . This contradictory role comes as no surprise given the fact that the contemporary state is an assemblage of agencies, institutions and processes, including central, regional and local government, the judiciary, the police and the armed forces. The actions of one arm of the state thus frequently offsets the goals pursued at another level or within another body of state authority (Ben-Tovim et al 1986:23; Renwick 1990: 104; Mulgan 1997: 3-5). The blurring of the lines between Maori and the state through the decentralisation of state services and responsibilities to Maori organisations has also made it more difficult to analyse Maori Affairs policy as inherently oppressive. Rather, I argue that it represents a 'balance sheet' that includes both 'liabilities' and 'assets' (see Young 1998:5) .

The theoretical frameworks that have been applied to policy analysis are various and infer different roles for the state, debating the influence (or not) that this abstract entity has in shaping policy. These frameworks exist on a continuum in which the core sociological tension between agency and structure is played out. The inherent difficulties involved in public policy-making range correspondingly from low to considerable to severe depending on the theory (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987:333) . Based on the belief that no one theory explains everything, this thesis assumes an eclectic view, being influenced by a range of theoretical understandings (see Jessop

200 1 ) . From pluralist theories (for an overview in the Aotearoa New Zealand context,

see Mulgan 1997), I draw the assumption that the state is both complex and contradictory, consisting of a variety of competing interests that are not always compatible with each other. Thus, the state is a plural, active agent that wishes to protect its own (multiple) interests and legitimacy, as well as that of others.

A further assumption is that the state constitutes only one institutional order amongst and interdependent with other systems (Jessop 200 1). For example, conflict theorists (for an overview, see Giddens and Held 1982) have maintained that there is a direct connection between the political and economic spheres. I agree, but argue that interests other than capitalist ones also vie for influence and scarce resources. In recent years, the state has also been challenged externally by the global economics and supranational political structures that globalisation has produced and internally by calls for devolution of political power within the state. The autonomy of the state has thus been attacked from both outside and inside its political borders (Giddens 1998:64; Graham 2000 : 193- 194; Drake 200 1 : 1 53) .

Internal challenges to the state are of particular significance for this thesis, as such pressure has often come from interest groups based on identity and culture that emerged out of new social movements following World War H. These have forced recognition that there are multiple social worlds and a greater acknowledgment of cultural and ethnic diversity. Such changes have had significant consequences on the state. New issues have been brought onto the political agenda, with some real policy objectives achieved by social movements and changing public attitudes. There have also been modifications in political opportunities and patterns of alliance, authority or representation (Drake 200 1 : 105- 106) .

Yet, the development of plural principles and policies to accommodate such diversity has often been incremental and incomplete. This is not due to any 'conspiracy' formulated by conservative politicians or bureaucrats. Faced with claims made by multiple groups, the state simply cannot fully comply with the demands of any one and thus fails in the eyes of all. Indeed, governing within a democracy, the

state cannot go too far in the accommodation of plurality without risking its own legitimacy and longevity (Drake 200 1 :40) . This is because pluralism brings with it the risk of social fragmentation and the dilemma of coping with majority mandates antagonistic to plurality. The latter is particularly an issue when, in order to optimise opportunity and to maximise liberty across a diverse population as a whole, some majority group privileges and freedoms must be curtailed or removed (Drake 200 1 : 4 1 - 42) . As a result, the state promotes national cohesion and the preservation of the constitutional status quo as a means of legitimating itself. Yet, when traditions are changed and there is greater public contestation about the legitimacy of the state, even more effort is required on the state's part to continue being considered legitimate (Habermas 1989:275-277).

In recent years this has seen a renewed focus on the status of citizenship, which has long mediated such legitimacy in democratic states (Miller 2000:42). The 'homogenised' notion of citizenship described earlier, in which nation and state are regarded as one and the same (Oommen 1997: 135), has been used to promote solidarity, national cohesion and legitimacy. Often in tension with the actions of governments within liberal-democratic states who, in practice, have had to venture beyond the confines of liberal theory to deal with the challenge of diversity, such citizenship discourse has prolonged the hegemony of so-called liberal-democratic values (Kymlicka 200 1 :4-5) . This has given the impression of equality or social justice because the state has the power to define both of these in ways in that ensures 'success' (see Chapter Two).