Mediterranean area
Capital Operations that “There was no defined strategy as to the type of projects and sectors to be supported, at either the level of the Commission or the EIB or at the level of the financial intermediaries”. (p. 19).
The Commission’s official reply to the Court of Auditors Report highlights improvement measures: “A strategy for risk capital operations has been defined within the ENPI”. (p.28).
However at the level of the Regulation (Article 6(4) of the MEDA regulation) which created FEMIP’s Risk capital facility, there is evidence of strategic thinking: “Risk capital shall be used, first and foremost, to make available own funds to undertakings in the production sector, in particular those that can bring together natural or legal persons who are nationals of a Community Member State and of Mediterranean non-member countries or territories. Risk capital shall be used primarily to strengthen the private sector, and in particular to reinforce the financial sector in MEDA countries. It shall add value clearly, by offering financial products and terms that are not available locally”. (p.19).
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008
The evaluation found that: “The EC adopted a responsive strategy towards regional and country-specific situations with the promotion of a consistent framework of intervention between the global and regional strategies‘ overarching objectives and regional and country cooperation strategies.” (p.2).
JC 2.3 The PSD strategies and programming of the Commission took into account the national/regional priorities
I-2.3.1
The Commission conducted a policy dialogue with national authorities on PSD strategies
I-2.3.2
CSPs/RSPs clearly link the Commission PSD support to national/regional overall and PSD specific strategies and programming
I-2.3.3
Stakeholders consider that Commission support to PSD is aligned to the overall and sector specific national priorities
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation
The report gives strong evidence that the Commission’s cooperation strategy, which included PSD, was influenced by national priorities. In turn national priorities had been framed by larger strategic agreements, such as the 1995 AA. The 1996-1999 and 2000-2002 National Indicative Programmes have been built upon the 9th Tunisian Development Plan. Supporting the economic environment of the private sector was one of the NIPs’ two main priorities. « Les PIN 1996- 1999 et 2000-2002 (MEDA) se sont appuyés sur les objectifs fixés par le 9ème Plan de Développement tunisien (1997-2001) en se focalisant sur les priorités suivantes :
a) Soutenir les réformes économiques dans les domaines macroéconomique et fiscal, privatisation, déréglementation du transport maritime et des ports, commerce extérieur, secteur financier et domaine des politiques sociales ;
b) Améliorer l’environnement économique pour le secteur privé à travers la
privatisation des entreprises d’État, l’attraction d’investissements étrangers,
le développement de services aux entreprises et une mise à niveau de la formation professionnelle», p. 5.
were largely influenced by the government’s five-year plans, in turn framed by the 1995 AA. « Les Plans quinquennaux de développement établis par le gouvernement ont incorporé les axes et les objectifs de l’AA, les traduisant en plans d’action politico-économiques. […].Ceci ressort fortement de l’analyse des Conventions de Financement des programmes, tant pour l’ABG que pour l’ABS. En ce qui concerne l’ABG, à partir de la FAS III, le lien entre les programmes et les réformes établies par les Plans de développement du gouvernement ressort de manière particulièrement détaillée (CJ124).», p. 22.
The evaluation reports the strong alignment of the Budget support programmes with the National Development Plans’ objectives. « L’alignement par rapport aux objectifs du gouvernement (CJ222).Le niveau élevé de correspondance entre les programmes d’AB et les objectifs et les orientations des Plans de Développement a facilité l’établissement d’un cadre d’évaluation des performances aligné sur les systèmes gouvernementaux, qui à son tour a facilité l’appréciation conjointe des résultats généraux et spécifiques visés par les programmes d’AB », p. 28.
In terms of the GBS’ achievements, the evaluation reports sound information exchanges between the donors and the government, and high flexibility, which in turn contributed to the implementation of complex measures. « Pour les FAS, la bonne coordination et l’échange constant d’informations entre les cofinanciers et le gouvernement ont contribué à une certaine flexibilité dans l’appréciation de la réalisation de mesures complexes », p. 28. L’ampleur et l’articulation du cadre de dialogue politique et sur les politiques, dans lequel les programmes d’AB s’insèrent et auquel ils contribuent, représentent une des caractéristiques spécifiques de l’AB en Tunisie et, plus en général, dans la région (CJ113). ». p.20.
The evaluation also reports the governemen’s strong ownership of the reform processes supported by the GBSs and high commitment « Les renvois aux matrices de FAS dans les paragraphes ci-dessus montrent comment dans chaque sous-secteur celles-ci contenaient des liens très stricts et pertinents par rapport au contenu des réformes, non seulement en termes d’orientations générales et de grands objectifs, mais surtout pour leur référence aux „actions à ne pas négliger / oublier’, témoins et/ou garants de la qualité du processus, dont l’appropriation par le gouvernement était très élevée ». p. 44. « La détermination
et l’expérience des institutions tunisiennes sont à la base du succès du processus de réforme appuyé par l’AB ». p. 83.
Findings at JC level –
Moldova Evaluation
No information aside from the information provided in Annex 1 on the Overall context, which specifies that the Partnership and cooperation Agreement (PCA) which is the legal basis for the EC’s engagement with Moldova agreed in 1998 for a 10 years term. It includes SMEs under the Economic area of cooperation.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation
The evaluation reports that the FOMYPE programme helped design the national SME policy (“libro azul”) (p. 36). It reports also however that “the EC programme on micro and small enterprises had no clear sectoral strategy on which it could align itself” (p. 61).
Findings at JC level
Burkina Faso (1999-2008)
Evidence of dialogue with PS stakeholders in the country:
« Le Gouvernement du Burkina Faso ainsi que le secteur privé et la société civile en sont les principaux bénéficiaires. Les projets qui ont été financés par l’UE ont connu une forte implication de ces bénéficiaires à toutes les étapes : conception, exécution, suivi et évaluation. » p.36
Guyana
“Commission interventions in private sector development are consistent with the GoG strategy, with the Commission’s strategy in Guyana and with the general aim of Commission support to private sector development. However, the amounts allocated to private sector development over the period 1995-2000 seem too negligible to attain the objectives presented in the Commission strategy.” P.36
“However, some GoG priorities have not been funded through the Commission’s support to the extent expected. This is particularly the case of private sector development, vocational training, the sugar sector and the transport sector. In fact private sector development benefited from the SYSMIN instrument mobilised during the first period under observation but during the second period no other funding was agreed at the time when GoG finalised its National Competitiveness Strategy and Guyana Action Plan for the sugar sector.” p.74
Findings at JC level -
Microfinance Findings at JC
level - BizClim BizClim was a centralised operation, often operating in countries and regions where PSD was not a priority in the NIPs/RIPs. This fact was explicitly acknowledged during programme design:
« In the text of the FA it was acknowledged that, during the 9th EDF, the EC envisaged concentrating the respective National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPs and RIPs) primarily on social sectors and physical infrastructure. Consequently, PSD could not be expected to be a focal sector in many NIPs and RIPs but rather constitute a cross-cutting concern. It was therefore important that relevant private sector initiatives were put in place at an all-ACP level, to make sure that those options clearly expressed in the Cotonou Agreement for PSD were duly taken on board. »
Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environmnet Facility, p.9
However, in terms of engaging with national priorities, it was noted in the Final Evaluation that dialogue with national governments and coordination with priorities, as defined by ongoing budget support operations, was less than optimal in some cases:
“Policy support from national governments and RECs to those initiatives that were reviewed during the field missions has been generally strong but with a few exemptions being the most notorious case the ‘misunderstanding’ about the scope of BizClim work in Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, in Liberia (both cases already mentioned in 3.3.2). In terms of coordination with budgetary support initiatives, there is a window open to the future for interventions designed to follow up BizClim work. The EC Delegation in Barbados, for example, is moving towards the “thirdgeneration” of budget support schemes, which implies more hands- on involvement and monitoring of government programmes receiving EC funding. TA and advice from intra-ACP BizClim-like programmes may play an important role to coordinate budgetary support schemes under the 10th EDF and beyond. »
Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environmnet Facility, p.34
Findings at JC level
MEDA II
There is evidence of analysis and consultation conducted at the stage of the identification of the needs and the preparation of the response, but the access to the related documentation is often difficult. (p34)
There is an overall consensus between the Commission and its partners that efforts should be concentrated on strengthening the economy (including private sector) and the social delivery mechanisms and on generating income and employment opportunities in a general way rather than targeting specific populations. (p51)
The second pillar of Barcelona (development of an economic and financial partnership to establish a free trade area) is undoubtedly a driving force since national policies aim increasingly at opening-up of the economies and are concerned with the competitiveness of domestic enterprises, notably vis-à-vis the EU that is a major trade partner. (p26)
At bilateral level the Commission aimed at responding to the demands expressed by the partners. All the fields of intervention supported by MEDAII have supported complex structural reforms that were national priorities. These were largely driven by their domestic priorities and it was not always demonstrated that the proposed measures were sufficiently strategic to alleviate the internal and regional constraints to achieve the Barcelona objectives. (pii)
In most cases, national priorities and, therefore, the demands from the partner for support are generally not determined by the Barcelona process. It is only, and then only to a certain extent, in the development of the private sector and the opening- up of the economies to international trade that there is convergence with and mutual support for the Barcelona and national objectives. (p30)
A major proportion of the resources provided in MEDAII (€1.99bn) has been dedicated to systemic economic reforms (Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco) with a view to improving the legal andregulatory environment of business and trade activities. These interventions have been carefully tuned to the specific country specifications, their priorities and their capacity to implement the reforms. The most ambitious programmes were implemented in Tunisia (with the successive structural adjustment facilities), Morocco (reform of the fiscal system and of public administration), and in Jordan (Sector Reform Facility) since in these countries the reforms supported by the Commission were also mainstreamed in the national plans. (p39)
Regional interventions suffered from insufficient ownership in the countries in which they were implemented due to the fact that they were not directly addressing national issues. (p94)