La Federación de 1920: el anarquismo

When analysing the trial and error method employed by KBS Media in the 1990s, it is important to note that KBS endeavoured to export enough domestic broadcasting content

to artificially boost the production of export-oriented programmes. In other words, it was keenly interested in programme exports, despite the tenuous prospects for success.

A key question is why KBS was initially interested in programme exports and made constant efforts to export its products through KBS Media. Needless to say, an economic incentive seems to have been the primary factor in these persistent export attempts, as Park Jun-young states above. However, it is unlikely that KBS expected KBS Media to profit from export success. In effect, neither the government nor the broadcasting stations anticipated the great success enjoyed by programme exports in the 1990s.

According to media studies researcher Cho Hang-je, who worked at the KBI in the 1990s, KBI briefly researched the potential for selling domestic broadcast products on the international market in the mid 1990s, at the demand of the government. Cho recalled that the government wanted KBI to research how the Korean broadcasting industry might reduce the huge trade imbalance in broadcast programmes which was mainly due to the increase in US programme imports by the newly formed cable channels. However, this research was not successful because most KBI researchers thought that Korean broadcasting content would not be competitive enough on the international market.211 As Cho stated, in the mid 1990s neither the government nor media researchers recognised the export potential of domestic broadcasting content. In addition, KOCCA’s senior researcher, Lee Man-je, claimed in his interview that KBS most likely regarded the possibility of domestic programme export success as slim at best. Thus the broadcasting industry’s negative attitude towards programme exports contrasted sharply with KBS Media’s persistent export attempts over the years.

Historical and political factors may help to explain this inconsistency. To begin with, the quasi-governmental structure of KBS may have been an inhibiting factor in its attempts to export. KBS began as a state-owned broadcasting station and developed in the advantageous monopolistic situation created by the military governments. Media studies researcher Joo Chang-yun claimed that the two military governments allowed KBS to build itself into a cultural, political and ideological institution in its own right, protected by the monopolistic advantages it enjoyed throughout the 1980s.212 After the Chun Doo-whan

211

Interview with Cho Hang-je, 27th July 2010 in Seoul, Korea. Cho is a professor in the Media Studies Department at Pusan National University.

212

regime enforced Mass Media Reorganisation in 1980,213 KBS and MBC dominated the entire broadcasting scene throughout the 1980s. KBS became the major beneficiary, acquiring three nationwide channels (KBS1, KBS2 and KBS3). This indicates not just an increase in the number of audiences, but also a growth in income because KBS was allowed to broadcast advertisements despite its mandatory licence fees. In return, KBS accepted the role of propaganda distributor to promote the national culture, common good, morals and, above all, the rapid economic development of Korea under the autocratic leadership of the military government. As mentioned above, KBS’s pro-government bias finally led to the emergence of the nationwide licence fee boycott movement by parts of the television audience in the mid 1980s.

The initial trial of animation exports started in the mid 1980s, when KBS was still under the direct control of the second military government. This fact signifies that in the 1980s KBS executives seem to have been sensitive to the government’s export-oriented policies in their business decisions. The comment of media studies researcher Cho Hang-je reveals that the specific status of KBS as a quasi-governmental organisation may have been responsible for the unprofitable export results of KBS Media:

The typical discourse undercurrent in government policies has been that Korean industry should work harder to compete in the overseas market because the domestic market is too small to make enough profits and enrich the national economy. The Korean broadcasting industry, which had started to perceive its industrial potential in the early 1990s, shared the government’s view, but the broadcasting industry did not know how to enter the overseas market.214

Regarding the relationship between the government and broadcasting stations, Cho Chung- hyun, MBC’s Executive Managing Director, stated that the terrestrial broadcasting stations, especially KBS and MBC, could not completely disregard government ideology even now, although direct government intervention in broadcasting had almost entirely vanished.215 In

213

As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the Chun regime forced the three terrestrial stations to merge into just two, KBS and MBC, in order to tighten government control of the broadcasting stations.

214

Interview with Cho Hang-je, 27th July 2010 in Seoul, Korea.

215

Interview with Cho Chung-hyun, 29th July 2010 in Seoul, Korea. As an example, Cho described how both KBS and MBC started to broadcast dramas about the Korean War after the inauguration of the right-wing Lee Myung-bak, who was in office from 2008 to 2012, despite the fact that drama viewers showed little interest in the war. Cho believes that these dramas reflect the government’s intention to emphasise the present ceasefire status of the Korean peninsula to the public, in order to give credence to the right-wing regime.