FORMA ORGANIZATIVA MODULAR DEL CURRÍCULUM

Australia’s underlying distrust of rapid decolonisation soon soured relations with independent Indonesia. The Sukarno government began to act against conditions the Netherlands had imposed during independence negotiations, most importantly the continued Dutch sovereignty over West Papua.32 Sukarno argued that by definition Indonesian independence would be incomplete without the ‘liberation’ of this

territory.33 Negotiations proved fruitless, and in 1960 the Netherlands announced that West Papua would eventually become an independent state. Indonesia responded with a military buildup and a series of incursions into West Papua, backed by the threat of outright invasion. Lacking international support, the Netherlands handed formal control to the UN in August 1962. But the UN sponsored act of self-

determination was farcical, because Indonesia already had a substantial presence in the territory. The province of ‘Irian Jaya’ was formally incorporated into Indonesia in May 1963.

Despite backing Indonesian independence, the Labor government had continued to support the Netherlands’ sovereignty over West Papua.34 In the 1940s, West Papuans were seen by Australia as ethnically or racially different to other ‘Indonesians’, and politically less mature, although this objection could just as well apply to many other areas which had become part of Indonesia. A more important consideration was that West Papua shared a land border with PNG, which was regarded as a vital territory for the defence of Australia. The Dutch were considered more trustworthy partners in the defence of the island than the new ‘Asiatic’ Indonesian state, which might even pose a threat to Australia’s colony.35

Wendy Way, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989. See also Lee, ‘Indonesia’s independence,’ pp. 146-147.

31

George, Australia and the Indonesian Revolution, p. 74.

32

The territory is and was known by a variety of names, but West Papua has come to be the most commonly accepted in Australia.

33

For a brief account of the dispute, see Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian relations, pp. 20-24.

34

George, Australia and the Indonesian Revolution, pp. 144-149.

35

For departmental discussion, see ‘Document 82, Kelly to Burton, 11 June 1947,’ in Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia’s Independence: Documents 1947, ed. Philip Dorling, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1994; ‘Document 455, Truscott to McIntyre, 11 July 1949,’ in

These security concerns remained at the heart of Menzies’ policy. His longstanding support for Dutch colonialism as a bulwark against Asian powers was only

reinforced by hardening Cold War attitudes in Australia, and by the growth in influence of the PKI in Indonesia.36 As Catley and Dugis write,

The Australian government was obsessed with the idea that the existence of [sic] ‘aggressive, united or monolithic force’ would cause another World War, and it saw a politically unstable Indonesia, at the mercy of communist interests, as a potential threat to the security of East New Guinea and Australia itself.37

Accordingly, from 1950 until 1962, Australia openly opposed Indonesia’s ambitions in West Papua, and attempted to muster support for the Netherlands in the UN. Throughout the 1950s Australia and the Netherlands discussed coordinating their administrations, and Australia sought involvement in development and defence of the western half of the island.38

However, the United States opposed these efforts. Washington calculated that while the Netherlands and Australia might be disgruntled with a lack of support from their superpower, they would certainly not break their alliances. On the other hand, failure to support Indonesia over West Papua might well destroy a key strategic relationship by driving Sukarno into the hands of the Russians.39 Without support from the United States, Australia was forced into an embarrassing back down, with nothing to show for its decade long support of the Netherlands. This reversal began in 1959, when Australia stated that it would recognise any peaceful settlement between Indonesia and the Netherlands, although this was unlikely. In January 1962 Barwick, the new Minister for External Affairs, completed the policy reversal, publicly

Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1998; ‘Document 492, Pyman to McIntyre, 21 September 1949,’ in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49: Volume XV: Indonesia 1949, ed. David Lee, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1998.

36

Hilman Adil, Australia’s policy towards Indonesia during Confrontation, 1962-66, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977, pp. 15-18; Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian relations, pp. 21-23; Alan Renouf, The frightened country, South Melbourne, Macmillan, 1979, pp. 406-408.

37

Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian relations, p. 21.

38

Ibid., pp. 21-24; Gregory Pemberton, All the way: Australia’s road to Vietnam, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1987, pp. 75, 79; Renouf, The frightened country, pp. 415-416.

39

Richard Chauvel, ‘Up the creek without a paddle: Australia, West New Guinea and the ‘great and powerful friends’,’ in Menzies in war and peace, ed. Frank Cain, St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1997, pp. 56-60; Pemberton, All the way, 72-99.

declaring that Indonesian incorporation of West Papua would not be harmful to Australia’s interests.

Apart from a realistic assessment of Australia’s impotence, Barwick had concluded that the real threat to security lay in needlessly angering Indonesia, and possibly encouraging its links to Communist China.40 As such, it marked a return to Chifley’s concern for the effects of Australian policy on Indonesian domestic politics. But damage had already been done to the relationship, although Australia had sought to quarantine the West Papua issue from wider relations.41