formula generalizada de la fórmula de Hardy Cross

It is widely recognized in the health sciences that power dynamics exist, including relations of power between researchers and the subjects in the contexts they study.²⁵ The ways in which asymmetrical power relations can shape one’s theory may vary greatly.

I’m interested here in ways that power operates which may not appear obvious. For instance, subjects may simply agree with the interviewer in order to placate him, or because if they do not answer in a way that an interviewer desires, they may fear that he will portray their culture in a way that perpetuates negative stereotypes. It is the latter of these two forms of abuse that I will argue Nussbaum is guilty of committing, especially in her narrative approach and her use of reflective equilibrium.

3.1 Negligence of Power in Nussbaum’s Use of the Narrative Approach

I begin my discussion of neglecting power dynamics with the narrative approach since this method of justification is especially susceptible to this criticism. As a theorist from a very privileged social and global position, Nussbaum has the opportunity to discuss her worldview with as many or few people as she desires, and she is also able to determine whether (and to what extent) she wishes to incorporate others’ considered judgments into her theorizing.

Susan Okin criticizes Nussbaum for her dismissal of the voices of poor people.

She focuses exclusively on the empirically-driven two volume book by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Voices of the Poor, which “broke new ground by asking poor people themselves about their poverty and its impact on their lives” (Okin

25 In the health sciences, theorizers have discussed the ways in which science is biased against women. This is due in large part to the power disparities within research between men and women. For instance, see Dickson (1993), Figert (2005), and Messing (2014). Also, the social sciences have discussed the ways in power has shaped theory; see Smith (2014) and Zavella (1996).

2003, 304). This book reveals several discrepancies between the perspectives of poor people and Nussbaum’s elaboration of several key capabilities. For example, the poor are less concerned with using practical reason as Nussbaum defines it, that is, as forming a conception of the good and critically assessing it. Instead, the poor generally know what a good life is and simply want the ability to live it. Okin (2003), following the voices of the poor, argues that they merely seek work to “earn them a living and restore their self-respect” (311). The ability to gain self-respect is on Nussbaum’s list. However, the poor are not concerned with having the opportunity to reflect on the good life (despite often doing so).

Furthermore, Nussbaum claims that work itself must create the space for practical reason; that is, having the ability to form a conception of the good and critically reflect on it. However, Okin argues that the poor are not interested in using work as a space to develop practical reason, but rather as simply a means for earning a living. These examples illustrate that if Nussbaum had sought the perspectives of the poor, then she may have re-considered certain items on her list. For example, perhaps she would revise her account of practical reason and her understanding of the nature of work.

In defense of Nussbaum, Rutger Claassen makes a distinction between a philosopher-hermit, who believes his theory has no practical relevance, and the philosopher-king, who believes his theory is best for society and thus does not seek compromise or to alter the theory, and the philosopher-citizen, who proposes his theory to be considered in the democratic process. Claassen uses these distinctions to argue that Nussbaum is defending a partial conception of justice that is merely used as a point of departure to be considered under democratic discourse. He argues that Nussbaum is a

"philosopher-citizen" since she clearly recommends “her theory to a democratic public, trying to persuade them, all the while respecting the consent of the people” (Claassen 2011, 502). In other words, contrary to Okin, he believes Nussbaum has adequately situated herself as a philosopher who can present a universal list of capabilities because she has interacted with others from different social strata and differently situated geo-politics, and as a result of these interactions presents the list as a humble and workable document.

The problem with Claassen’s defense is that my criticism, following Okin’s, runs much deeper than simply being concerned with her having interactions with others or not.

I concede that Nussbaum is considered a philosopher-citizen insofar as she believes her theory ought to be put into practice by both international governing bodies and state constitutions, and Nussbaum does claim that her list is in principle revisable. However, I am concerned that the interactions she has had with diverse others have lead her either to conclude without warrant that she has received further confirmation of her list, or to outright dismiss those who question the list.

As Okin puts it, “their interpreter [Nussbaum] has allowed her own voice to dominate” (Okin 2003, 297). A primary concern for Okin is the fact that Nussbaum speaks on behalf of the Indian women she interviews. We have no real insight into their thoughts and perceptions of the world except those Nussbaum shares with us. We are not afforded the questions of the interview or their direct responses, making it possible for Nussbaum to selectively include data that supports her values and interpret what they say without accountability. This allows Nussbaum to make assertions such as “people who once learn and experience these capabilities don’t want to go back”, which she then uses

in order to turn interview data into evidence for her position (Nussbaum 2000b, 152-3).

There is no way to verify this statement from the interviews, and in fact it could be the case that people may be hostile towards some of Nussbaum’s capabilities. We have no insight into possible challenges the women might have raised to the list, whether it be identifying values not included or criticizing items that are. Nussbaum is able to appear as though she has gained cross-cultural support for the list, and yet she presents no real challenge to it. In this sense she continues to import her values into the list, or at the very least, we have good reason to suspect that she has done so even if inadvertently. At the very least, she has not yet provided rational warrant for her assertions. Nonetheless, whether Nussbaum has or hasn’t, the main point is that she has not provided a reliable and accurate guide for interpreting and using the data she collects from her conversations.

Thus my response to Claassen’s defense of Nussbaum is that he fails to pay attention to how she interacts with others in order to derive support for her list.

Alison Jaggar also contends that Nussbaum does not consider the power

inequalities between her and the Indian women she interviews. Nussbaum’s power, as a Western scholar, relative to the Indian women she interviews, may influence how Vasanti and Jayamma respond to her questions. If the respondents are trying to placate her, they might simply say what she wants to hear or respond in a way that best represents their culture to a Westerner. We have no evidence showing that Nussbaum’s respondents were given a genuine opportunity to raise concerns, which may be a result of the power

inequalities between her and the Indian women. Nussbaum could easily have treated them merely as a source of information—someone whose subjectivity is stripped solely for the purpose of gathering information.

One reason Vasanti and Jayamma may have been treated as mere objects from which to glean information rather than as subjects participating in genuine dialogue is for the purpose of using their input to “confirm” features of Nussbaum’s theory. I am not claiming Nussbaum intentionally does this, nor am I claiming that she has covertly sought to construct a theory that support her own worldview. The problem is that this method of justification lacks any form of feedback loop that requires a theorizer to critically engage her critics. The poor Indian women Nussbaum dialogues with “provide information about the particular details of their lives…but ‘we’ retain the authority to collect this information, assess the moral worth of the reported desires and aspirations, and generalize the results into a universal theory” (Jaggar 2006, 319). Thus, Nussbaum is able to proclaim the values she finds most praiseworthy as fully universal since “others”

find her list plausible.

A goal of the narrative approach is to offer support for Nussbaum’s list from people who inhabit different geo-political positions and accept different comprehensive doctrines. This provides part of the cross-cultural verification Nussbaum seeks. However, this approach seems to be plagued by a problem of power asymmetries between the theorizer and her subjects, which allows Nussbaum to claim that capabilities from her list represent values shared by nearly everyone, and yet is only confirmed by her own

authority.