Las fuentes de la hagiografía y su clasificación tradicional

Another debated determinant of counterfactual mutability concerns the

action effect, whereby research has shown that people may be more likely to

generate counterfactual thoughts following action than inaction (Byrne, 2005; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). One of the earliest investigations into the effect was conducted by Kahneman and Tversky (1982a), in which participants were asked to consider two hypothetical scenarios. In the first, Paul considered switching his stocks from Company A to Company B, but decided against it. In the second, George considered the same switch in stocks, and decided to make the switch. Thus the outcome of Paul’s decision can be seen to stem from inaction, whilst the outcome of George’s decision is the result of action. Participants were informed that both Paul and George would have been better off by $1200 if they had chosen the alternative course of action (or inaction), i.e. Paul would have been better off financially had he swapped his stocks, whilst George would have been better off had he not swapped his stocks. Participants were asked to judge which investor would experience the most regret at this loss of income. The vast

majority (92%) of participants believed George, the actor, would feel more regret than Paul, the non-actor.

Numerous other studies have replicated this effect, leading Gilovich and Medvec (1995) to conclude that the action effect is one of the most robust findings in the counterfactual literature. For example, using a variety of

hypothetical scenarios, Landman (1987) demonstrated that good outcomes were viewed more favourably, and bad outcomes more negatively when these were achieved through action, than when the same outcomes were achieved through inaction. Gleicher, Kost, Baker, Strathman, Richman and Sherman (1990) varied the salience and outcome valence of the investment scenario, and also found that where outcomes were negative, actions were associated with greater

experience of negative affect than failures to act. When outcomes were positive, participants were found to experience greater positive affect following action, but only when the counterfactual alternative was made highly salient. Similarly, in Avni-Babad’s (2003) experiment, participants were provided with a version of the investment scenario, minus counterfactual information regarding how the

investment would have turned out had the investor decided to do the opposite (i.e. act or not act). The action effect was replicated – participants judged that the actor would generate more counterfactual thoughts, and would experience

greater levels of regret than the non-actor, even in the absence of prior counterfactual information.

In Ritov and Baron’s (1990) experiment, participants were asked to imagine a scenario in which they had a choice of either killing 5 people (i.e.

through action), or letting 10 people die (through inaction). The authors found that participants consistently opted to do nothing. This provides further evidence for the action effect, as the potential regret stemming from action was judged to be significantly greater than the comparative regret resulting from inaction. In addition, Zeelenberg, van der Pligt and Manstead (1998) coded data from 64 cases presented on Dutch TV show ‘I Am Sorry’, which gave individuals the opportunity to apologise to individuals they had fallen out with. The authors found

a significant focus on actions, with most participants choosing to apologise for things they had done, as opposed to things they failed to do (Study 1). This finding was further replicated in a second experiment (Study 2a) using a large scale survey of the Dutch population, in which participants were asked whether they typically felt more regret following actions or failures to act. Once again, results indicated that the majority of participants reported experiencing more regret following actions than inactions.

Connolly, Ordóñez and Coughlan (1997) also replicated the action effect in their experiment using a hypothetical scenario in which the person described either switched, or didn’t switch, from aspects of a required university course. The authors found that participants judged that a person who experienced the same outcome as a result of action would experience greater regret in response to a negative outcome, and greater elation in response to a positive outcome, than a person who experienced the same outcomes as a result of inaction. As the same results were obtained whether the action was the result of the persons’ own choice or through random computer re-assignment, the authors’ claim this

demonstrates that control and responsibility for action do not appear to be key to the prevalence of the action effect. Further, Byrne and McEleney (2000)

(Experiment 1) used Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982a) original investment scenario, and found that participants judged the actor to experience more regret than the non-actor, when the outcomes of the scenarios were both known and the same. These findings were also replicated in Experiment 3, which used a variation of the investment scenario, but with a negative outset, demonstrating that results were not dependent upon a neutral initial scenario state.

Other research has identified potential explanations for the effect.

According to Norm Theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) actions are rendered more mutable than failures to act as a result of inaction being perceived as more

normal. Thus, in deciding to act, a person is acting ‘abnormally’, and thus

counterfactual alternatives become more readily available (i.e. the event is more mutable), than if one is considering the same outcome caused as a result of inaction. Kahneman and Tversky (1982a) suggest that this may lead to emotional amplification, whereby people have a tendency to react more strongly to those events for which it is easiest to imagine another outcome occurring. This has been attributed to mental models (Byrne & McEleney, 2000), and the more explicit representations people hold in mind for action (this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4).

Additional research has identified limitations to the action effect including N’gbala and Branscombe (1997) who found that the effect only occurred when people were able to directly compare the consequences of action with those of inaction. In addition, by providing a measure of mutability the authors found that whether the action/inaction versions of events were presented alone or together, they were both mutated with equal frequency, seemingly contrary to norm

theory’s account. Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van Dijk and Pieters’ (2002), also found evidence that the action effect only occurred when prior information was both available and positive. However, a more extensive introduction to the action effect literature and potential explanations for the effect is provided in Chapter 4, in which I investigate the potential for default options to improve satisfaction with extensive choice, due to the predicted impact of defaults (or inaction) upon counterfactual thought.