Grupo focal

I am Nuraldin Kianuri, the Chairman of the Tudeh Party. . . . I am not the same person I was when I entered prison a few months ago. I would like to thank the authorities for the

opportunity both to study history and to present here my findings to the public, especially to the party youth. "Kianuri Exposes Half-Century of Treachery by the Soviets, the Marxists, and the Tudeh Party,"

Ettela'at, 28 August 1983

May Day 1983

On May Day 1983, television viewers were startled by the unscheduled appearance of two Tudeh leaders confessing profusely for having committed "treason," "subversion," and miscellaneous "horrendous crimes." In the next twelve months, eighteen others made even more sensational "revelations" in a series of "interviews," "press conferences," and

"roundtable discussions." Negating their whole lives, they recanted their beliefs, their party, their colleagues, and their own pasts. The Tudeh protested that their leaders had been "brainwashed" with "mind-altering drugs" provided by MI6, MOSSAD, and the

― 178 ―

CIA.[1] _{It was as if the Tudeh could not admit—even to itself—that that its leaders could have}

succumbed to torture. True revolutionaries were supposed to die rather than betray their ideals.

These Tudeh recantations received more publicity than all the others put together. The reasons are obvious. The regime considered Marxism the main ideological rival of Islam. Unlike liberalism, nationalism, and monarchism, it challenged religious metaphysics, held out a utopian future, and offered a comprehensive view of the past and the present. In short, it was a total ideology. Moreover, the Tudeh—despite its Soviet associations—was reputed to be the

most experienced and organized of the leftist parties. Unlike the others, it could not be dismissed as a mere university mini-group. Furthermore, it contained "stars"—celebrities, established writers, veteran prisoners, and recent parliamentary candidates. These

recantations, writes Parsipour, had "historic significance" for many members of the Iranian intelligentsia had at one time or another supported the Tudeh party.[2] _{Similarly, E.A. writes}

that many leftists at first gloated over the Tudeh crackdown but soon found the television recantations bewildering: "They had trouble believing their eyes and ears."[3]

Two months before these May Day recantations, some two hundred Tudeh organizers, including thirty members of the central committee, had been arrested. There has been much speculation about these arrests. Some claim that the defection of the Soviet vice-consul in Tehran to Britain led to the uncovering of a vast Tudeh "espionage" network. But in his memoirs, the vice-consul denies any link between his defection and the arrests. He also reveals profound ignorance of the Tudeh party and stresses that the KGB had explicit instructions to keep away from local communists because they were deemed to be security risks: "Every intelligence officer in the KGB knows that the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party categorically forbids the KGB to approach members of other communist parties."[4]

The likelier reason for the arrests was the party's increasing criticism of the regime— especially after the government closed

― 179 ―

down its newspaper, purged its members from the ministries, jettisoned some radical legislation, especially land reform, and, most serious of all, made the fatal decision in mid– 1982 to take the war into Iraqi territory after the liberation of Khorram-shahr.[5] _Urging

acceptance of a UN peace offer, the Tudeh warned that the continuation of the war would "play into the hands of the imperialists." It also warned that the Hojjatieh Society—a highly conservative group started in the 1950s as the Association to Combat Bahaism—was infiltrating the regime to sidetrack the revolution.[6] _{Just before these arrests, the Tudeh had}

published in a Soviet paper articles criticizing the regime on these issues as well as on the sensitive question of women's rights.[7] _{According to the vice-consul, the Soviet government}

had predicted the Tudeh crackdown knowing well that the clergy, like the Bolsheviks, had no intention of tolerating rivals.[8]

The May Day program was shared by Kianuri and Behazin—two figures well known throughout Iran. Kianuri was dubbed the "Communist Ayatollah" both because he was the grandson of the famous Shaykh Fazlallah Nuri and because he had often appeared on television vociferously praising the Islamic Republic as the best bulwark against U.S. imperialism. He had been elected party chairman on the eve of the revolution after a bitter struggle with his predecessor, Iraj Iskandari, who had hoped to stem the rise of Khomeini by allying with the secular National Front. Iskandari had lost the struggle when the National Front leader himself had submitted to Khomeini.

Iskandari had disliked Kianuri ever since the early 1940s. He labeled him a "post-Stalingrad Tudehi"—that is, a newcomer who had not belonged to the Fifty-three. He associated him with his brother-in-law Kambakhsh, whom he held responsible for the arrest of Arani and the Fifty-three. What is more, he distrusted him as a dangerous adventurer who had advocated foolhardy policies and permitted Rouzbeh to carry out unauthorized actions. During

Iskandari's tenure as chairman, Kianuri—as well as his wife, Maryam Firuz—had been forced out of party politics into semiretirement in East Germany. Ironi-

― 180 ―

cally, this enmity saved Iskandari from the recantation shows. Continuing to criticize Kianuri and the Islamic Republic, he was soon forced to return to Western Europe where he died in 1991—thus becoming one of the last survivors of the Fifty-three.

Behazin, who shared the podium with Kianuri, was well known as the president of the Writers' Association. He had made his literary debut in 1941, when, as a wounded war hero, he had published a collection of short stories. Over the years, he had published more short stories and essays, translated Balzac and Sholokhov, and written an account of his 1970 prison experiences. He had also been very much in the news during the last months of the old regime when he had been rearrested for launching a pro-Tudeh paper and reviving the

Writers' Association. Soon after his 1983 arrest, his wife complained to Ayatollah Montazeri that she had not been permitted to see her husband and that her son too had been arrested. "My son," she said, "is being used as a pawn against his own father."[9]

Kianuri and Behazin turned their recantations into long history lessons.[10] _{Surveying the last}

hundred years, they focused on flash points when the left had supposedly "betrayed" the people of Iran: the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–9; the Jangali Revolt of 1917–21; the rise of Reza Shah in 1921–25; the Kurdish and Azerbaijan uprisings in 1945; the Soviet oil demand and the Tudeh participation in Ahmad Qavam's government in 1946; and the campaign to nationalize the oil industry in 1951–53. Historians cannot complain that the Islamic Republic does not take the past seriously. They might, however, find its methods of revising history somewhat unorthodox. Like most ideological regimes, it harbors an unhealthy interest in history.

Behazin kicked off the program. He argued that throughout history leftists with "alien ideologies" had "betrayed" the Iranian masses. To illustrate this, he reached back to the Constitutional Revolution when secular Democrats had helped the government disarm those allied with the clerical Moderate party. As he put it, "This was our first deed of betrayal." He

― 181 ―

continued with a long list of crises in which the left had failed to stem the rightists— especially the 1953 coup and the White Revolution. "What better proof of treason than the simple fact that in 1960s the Tudeh called not for a revolution but for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy." Behazin held himself "personally responsible" for these

"treasonable offenses"—some of which had occurred long before this birth. He said that Marxism had no future in Iran both because it offered nothing but empty slogans and because Islam in general and the clergy in particular had deep social roots going back "one thousand years" and concluded, "Marxism has hit a cul-de-sac. What is more, Islam with its policy of 'Neither East Nor West' can shield Iran from imperialism."

Kianuri's recantation was equally long on generalities but short on specifics. He conceded that the party had been insincere when it mouthed the slogan "Neither East Nor West": "Because of our historical links to the Soviets we did not really believe in this slogan." "This," he argued, "was the mother of all our other infringements [takhallof-ha ]." He claimed that his recent confinement had given him the opportunity for the very first time in his life to reflect

on history and understand why Islam—in contrast to Marxism—had such an attraction for the masses, especially recent migrants into the cities.[11]

As a result of intensive study, Kianuri had come to the conclusion that the communist

movement had persistently erred because it was afflicted with four fatal bemari-ha (diseases):

vabastegi (dependency); idolouzhi-ye beganeh (foreign ideology); khodparasti (self-worship);

and nashenakht-e Iran (not knowing Iran). The first made the Tudeh ideologically, politically, and organizationally dependent on the Soviet Union: "We were subjects rather than comrades of the Soviet Communist party." The second gave it an alien worldview: "We tried to solve the problems of Iran with Marxism—an irrelevant ideology." The third racked the party with personal rivalries, jealousies, and power struggles: "Our party leaders, like the rest of the Iranian intelligentsia, were corrupted by egoism and selfishness." The fourth disease made communists ignorant of their

― 182 ―

nation: "We knew more about Europe than about Iran. We had no idea how our workers and peasants thought because we had not bothered to study our own history." Academics may be flattered by this equation of ignorance with "high treason." One wonders how many

politicians would pass such tests.

These diseases explain the most "treasonable mistakes." In 1944, the Tudeh had supported the Soviet demand for an oil concession even though, according to Kianuri, "we had much

misgivings on this issue and two months earlier had vehemently opposed the granting of a similar concession to the Americans." "This demand caused as much consternation as the Tobacco Crisis had done in 1892." In 1945, the Tudeh had supported the Soviet-sponsored revolts in Kurdestan and Azerbaijan even though their preparations had been hidden from the party itself. "Our leaders had been kept totally in the dark." In 1946, it had entered Qavam's coalition government although "it is now perfectly clear that this gentleman was an American tool." "Our entry into the coalition cabinet is clear proof of treason [khiyanat ]." In 1948, Rouzbeh had tried to destabilize the government by assassinating the anticourt journalist Massoud. Here Kianuri mentions in passing that the "party itself was not involved in the assassination." In 1951, the Tudeh had failed to support Mossadeq, and instead had accused the oil nationalization campaign of being "dependent on the Americans." "This treacherous act was highly unpopular among the party rank and file." What is more, the four "fatal diseases" account for why the party had remained passive throughout the 1953 coup. These maladies continued after the 1953 coup. In 1953–54, the Tudeh had "shown signs of weakness." "Some leaders even collaborated with the regime." In 1953–55, it had assassinated four police informers. In 1954, its military branch had been uncovered with disastrous

consequences. "This, in effect, terminated party activities within the country." In 1963–64, it had done little to oppose the White Revolution. "Instead of forthright opposition, we said yes to reform, no to dictatorship." "This was another proof of treason as it is now clear that the sole purpose of the White Revolution was to turn Iran into a

― 183 ―

large market for American goods." During the 1978–79 mass protests, it had made no significant contribution to the revolution. "Our party membership inside Iran was no more than a handful." This was yet another proof of treason. Kianuri was embellishing errors and

shortcomings into wrongdoings and misdemeanors—then wrongdoings and misdemeanors into treason and high crimes.

After the revolution, Kianuri continued, the Tudeh "ungratefully" exploited freedom to undermine the Islamic Republic. It pretended to support the war effort, even sending volunteers to the front, but in reality favored the UN peace offer. "We committed treason because we did not sincerely believe in the slogan 'War, War Until Victory.'" It also pledged support for the Islamic Republic but, at the same time, looked toward a post-Khomeini era when it would seek more influence—even power. "We hoped to exploit the future, especially if Iran experienced a major socioeconomic crisis."

Kianuri described some "shameful deeds" for which he, as party leader, took "full

responsibility." After the revolution, he instructed some party members to keep their pistols. "This was especially serious since our frontline troops were in dire need of weapons." He obtained from the Soviets one thousand tons of paper—"a scarce and lucrative commodity at the time." He recruited military personnel in clear violation of the Imam's decree ordering all political parties to stay clear of the armed forces. He encouraged party members to work hard and obtain promotions in the ministries and universities. He tried to escape from the country when it became clear that the party could no longer function. He also gave the Soviet

Embassy handwritten reports on the national and international situation. "Others members of the central committee may have had their own lines of communication with the Soviets. But the investigators would know more than me about this."

Kianuri went out of his way to emphasize that his appearance was voluntary and that Islam was superior to Marxism. He ridiculed rumors "spread by foreign officials" that he had been subjected to drugs and chemicals. "I would like to thank

― 184 ―

the authorities for their humane treatment." He also emphasized that his intensive research into history had shown him that Marxism was divorced from reality whereas Islam, especially the true version espoused by the progressive clergy, had always enjoyed strong roots among the Iranian masses—from the time of the Tobacco Crisis and the Constitutional Revolution, through the Mossadeq-Kashani era, into the Islamic Revolution. And, finally, he said,

I would like to conclude by telling the youth, especially the party youth, that the mother of all our deviation and treason has been our links with foreign ways of thought. I beseech you to study Iranian society and history. . . . If you study diligently you will see that imperialism poses a serious threat to Iran. At present the threat comes in the form of the Iraqi aggression, but in future years it could come in the shape of plots and conspiracies hatched by the imperial powers. This is why it is the duty of all Iranians—even nonreligious ones—to rally behind the Revolution.

Although Kianuri and Behazin avoided the subject of espionage, government newspapers gave these recantations such sensational headlines as "Tudeh Confessions of Spying for the Soviet Union and Plotting to Overthrow the Islamic Republic"; "Kianuri Exposes Half- Century of Treachery by the Soviets, the Marxists, and the Tudeh Party"; "Two Tudeh Leaders Make Sensational Confessions of Spying and Plotting to Overthrow."[12] _Thoughout

their television appearances, the two kept their hands hidden under the table. Kianuri's hand had been broken during his stage preparations. Behazin's had been injured in World War II. In her protest letter, Mrs. Behazin complained that the authorities were trying to force her

husband to "commit ideological suicide" as well as to smear himself as a "traitor" even though he had sacrificed his hand for his country.[13]

Immediately after Behazin and Kianuri's appearance, the government outlawed the Tudeh on the grounds it had "spied

― 185 ―

for foreigners," "infiltrated the ministries and the armed forces," "incited factory strikes," "stored arms to overthrow the Islamic Republic," and "established contact with groups warring against God"—this probably referred to the Mojahedin or the Hashemi group.[14] _The

regime ordered party members to turn themselves in. Some one thousand party members were apprehended.[15] _{The same was soon done to the Majority Fedayi on the grounds that it was}

closely identified with the Tudeh. The same was also done to a small anti-Tudeh Trotskyist group.

In an evenhanded denunciation, Khomeini pronounced both the Bahais and the Tudeh to be "foreign spies" and declared that the Tudeh leaders themselves had "come forward to expose their own pasts": "These gentlemen are in prison not because of their views but because of their espionage activities."[16] _{In a long series of editorials entitled "Confession," Ettela'at}

declared these disclosures to be "unprecedented in world history" and to be "living proof of Islam's strength":

No one else has been able to obtain confessions revealing such a large spy network—not even the Shah with all his foreign experts, surveillance equipment, modern police tactics, and up- to-date interrogation methods. Under the Shah, such criminals would spend years in prison without confessing their crimes. But under the Islamic Republic, they are willing to make full disclosures after a few brief months. What better proof of Islam's moral superiority.[17]

The chief prosecutor claimed that the confessions showed the Tudeh had "declared war on God" and was so despicable that it had "betrayed" even the Soviet Union as well as the Islamic Republic. He added that according to the sharia the eventual punishment for those who had declared war on God could be lightened if they came forward willingly and repented before their trials began. "Late repentance will not lessen the retribution. The sharia has strict rules against those who war against God."[18] _{Ayatollah Janati, the Imam Jom'eh of Qom,}

declared that the arrests were more important than the takeover of the "U.S. spy den" on the grounds that the Tudeh had been

― 186 ―

trying to "steal our youth" and spread "corruption" (fasad ) and "unrest" (fetnah ) throughout the land.[19] _{Ayatollah Taheri, the Imam Jom'eh of Isfahan, congratulated the government for}

saving youth from such a "filthy and corrupt organization."[20]

Hojjat al-Islam Hojjati-Kermani, a former Bani-Sadr supporter, was even more laudatory. Without any sense of irony, he "congratulated the Imam and the community for their great ideological victory," arguing that the confessions buried once and for all the corpse of "historical materialism" and showed to all the towering superiority of Islam. "The leaders of the Fedayan-e Islam—unlike these atheists—died rather than give up their ideals. No doubt, some communists will try to escape the proscribed fate for apostates by claiming to have been born Jewish."[21] _{Hojjati-Kermani considers himself to be a modern-thinking cleric.}

Equally revealing were the comments that poured forth from émigré intellectuals, exiled newspapers, and rival political parties. Like the Moscow trials, the confessions generated much heat but little analysis. Few linked them to torture and prison brutality. Most cited them