There are a number of writers who do not fall squarely into either the ‘social media supporters’ or ‘social media opponents’ groups. For example, Barassi and Trere (2012) focus primarily on analysing the actual usage of social media, and also call for a re-assessment of the theories that are being applied. They explain their position viz:
31
‘Our aim has been on the one hand to urge scholars to take a step back and question the appropriateness of their theoretical models and on the other hand to stimulate the need to investigate users’ media practices as a way to inform the development of these models’ (Barassi and Trere, 2012, p.13).
In their study of activism among Italian students, Barassi and Trere (2012) found that their utilisation of social media was not straightforward. Rather, whilst social media and the Internet were being used by activists as tools for communicating, organising and planning their political activities, their general everyday use of social media and the Internet was weak. This suggests that activists prefer to use social media as an organisational tool and not as a public sphere for the exchange of political information. As the authors write:
‘Although Italian student activists develop their communication strategies on the basis of models of Web 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 and benefit from technological advances (e.g. they open websites, social media accounts, blogs, etc.) their everyday usage of these platforms do not (sic) reflect the communication processes (cognition, participation, co-operation) that are usually associated with Web developments’ (Barassi and Trere, 2012, p.13).
Mattoni (2012) draws attention to ‘precarious workers’ whom he defines as those employees without access to institutions that protect their human rights, such as trade unions. He claims that, since these workers do not have this protective facility, they are far more likely to rely upon social media and other new communication technologies as facilitators of mobilisation. Therefore, Mattoni (2012) implies that ordinary workers (as well as highly-educated activists and students) will increasingly utilise social media as a tool for their movements. However, whilst these claims of
32
Mattoni (2012) may apply to the US and the West, it is uncertain they can be applied to the Arab uprisings of late 2010/early 2011. The digital divide in Tunisia and Egypt at that time may suggest that the number of social media users were too low to make this a widely effective communication tool for mobilising the general workforce. On the other hand, however, it could be argued that a relatively small group of users could exert greater influence over the others if they used social media in addition to a range of other complementary tools.
Furthermore, there are writers such as Gerbaudo (2012) who suggest our understanding of social media’s role during the uprisings should be based on a middle way. He describes his own approach as having been developed:
‘….in opposition not only to the unbounded techno-optimism of social media theorists such as Clay Shirky, but also to the techno-pessimism of commentators like Evgeniy Morozov and Malcom Gladwell. I argue that both positions are characterised by an essentialist vision of social media as being automatically either suitable or unsuitable as a means of mobilisation. These approaches tend to look at social media in the abstract, without due attention to their intervention in specific local geographies of action or to their embeddedness in the culture of the social movements adopting them’ (Gerbaudo, 2012, p.5).
Hence, Gerbaudo (2012) is seeking a balance between the views of social media optimists on the one hand and social media pessimists on the other hand, the implication being there may be an element of truth in both of these extremes. Importantly, Gerbaudo (ibid) also makes the valid point that our understanding should take into consideration the different geographical locations around the world
33
and different cultures. This is because people from different parts of the world and people with different cultures will have various social, economic, political, and historical factors influencing their adoption of social media as a tool for activism. Finally, it is interesting to note that Gerbaudo (ibid) echoes the claims of Dajani (2011) and Juris (2012) that face-to-face communication still plays a critical role in mobilising masses of protesters onto the streets. Again, the suggestion is that communicating face-to-face and communicating by social media are complementary to one another, perhaps with one being more important than the other depending upon various other factors, such as the stage of a revolution.
‘Once the movement hit the streets, these (social) media became less important than face-to-face communication. Tahrir square, with the bodily density it attracted, came to constitute a physical beacon for the coordination of the movement, which was why the communication blackout imposed by the Mubarak regime had only a limited effect’ (Gerbaudo, 2012, pp.15-16). Dellicastelli (2011) outlines a number of communication technologies that are said to have benefitted successful uprisings of the past. The printed press, audio cassettes and photocopier machines are all described as helping various social movements. However, on the other hand, she also believes that none of these technologies was the trigger that actually caused these uprisings to begin. Interestingly, Dellicastelli uses similar reasoning to argue that the technology of social media was not the trigger that caused the uprisings to break out in Tunisia and Egypt. Rather, she believes that other factors were the cause of these Arab uprisings, and these factors included poverty, widespread corruption, high prices, and high levels of unemployment. Importantly, she says the trigger that turned these factors into the
34
physical action of street protests was not social media, but the death of Mohammad Bouazizi (Dellicastelli, 2011). Dellicastelli proposes that the positive role of social media lay in its use as a communication tool, enabling activists to rapidly spread information, plans and ideas.
1.1.5 Social Media as public sphere during the Tunisian and Egyptian Uprisings