IMPACTO EN LA MEJORA DEL CAPITAL SOCIAL DE LAS MYPES

Just as a Reliabilist might reject the demand for an account of which process-types determine reliability, and claim that conversational context determines which process types are relevant to a given reliability ascription (Heller, 1995), an Intellectualist might reject the demand to give a general account of relevant methods by claiming that conversational context determines which ways of acting are relevant to a given knowledge-how

ascription.

This kind of response naturally goes together with a Contextualist account of the meaning of interrogatives, which claims that which question an interrogative expresses depends on conversational context.103 _{There is a decent amount of linguistic evidence for}

the context-sensitivity of interrogatives. For example, the interrogative sentence: (1) What caused the Second World War?

plausibly expresses different questions when it is asked in everyday conversation, and when it is asked in a history exam. We can see this by noting that in an everyday context, this question can be answered by a somewhat general proposition, whereas in a history exam a detailed and specific proposition is called for. A natural way to accommodate this data is to posit the influence of context on the semantic value of interrogative phrases.104

This contextualist thesis bears on the debate about knowledge-wh, since contextualism about interrogative phrases means that which answers an agent needs to know to count as ‘knowing Wh-F?’ will depend in part on features of the conversational context. This kind of contextualism about knowledge-wh is to be distinguished from well-known versions of contextualism about knowledge-that (Cohen, 1986; Lewis, 1996; DeRose, 2009). Whereas the established debate focuses on the context-sensitivity of the relation expressed by ‘knows’, contextualism about interrogatives yields a kind of contextualism about interrogatives, or about what is known.

103 _{(Braun, 2006; Parent, 2014).}

104 _{Alternatively, one could appeal to warranted assertibility to explain this phenomenon. See}

A Contextualist about knowledge-how might respond to the Generality Problem by contending that there is no need for a general account of which way-types figure in

knowledge-how, since various contextual mechanisms will select which way-types are relevant in a given context. Here’s a toy example of how this contextual restriction on question-meanings can lead to a restriction in relevant ways of acting. Suppose that I utter the sentence:

(2)Józefa knows how to get to London

in a context in which we are deciding who should drive us there. By the Contextualist’s lights there will be some kind of restriction on the meaning of the

embedded interrogative in this sentence, such that the question which it expresses is really something like how can one drive to London?. If this is the case, then the answers which will be relevant to the knowledge ascription will be restricted to those which concern ways of getting to London by driving, meaning that (2) will come out false if Józefa only knows a way to get to London by train. The restriction on the meaning of the interrogative leads to a corresponding restriction in which way-propositions can figure in the knowledge-how ascriptions.

I think that the case for contextualism about Interrogatives is pretty compelling. However, in order to show that context can provide a fix to the Generality problem, the Intellectualist needs to offer an account of the contextual mechanisms at work in ‘knows how’ ascriptions. One option is to appeal to general contextual mechanisms at work in interrogatives. Here are two salient options:

i. Interrogatives are associated with a domain restriction to a contextually salient set of objects, meaning that an interrogative expresses a set of answers

concerning only contextually salient objects (Stanley, 2011b, pp. 56–8, 118). ii. The meaning of an interrogative phrase is affected by the interests and purposes

of conversational participants, meaning that an interrogative only expresses a set of answers which are relevant to the speaker or hearer’s interests and purposes (Boër & Lycan, 1986).105

These are plausible as accounts of the mechanisms of context-sensitivity in ‘knows- wh’, but they won’t help solve the Generality problem. Both mechanisms place general restrictions on what counts as an answer to a how-question in a given conversational context, which will lead to a restriction on which ways of acting can figure in knowing how. However, this account runs into trouble due to the fact that we are able to make know-how ascriptions at different levels of generality in the same conversational context. Consider the following sentence said about Jim from Hornsby’s touch-typing example:

(3) Jim knows how to touch-type ‘Afghanistan’, but he doesn’t know how to touch-type.

This sentence is true of Jim in Hornsby’s example. In order for the first half of the sentence to come out true, there better be some contextual mechanism which means that only relevant ways of touch-typing ‘Afghanistan’ figure as answers to the question how can Jim touch-type ‘Afghanistan’? (ruling out answers like ‘by using his fingers’). The problem is that once a relevant way of touch-typing ‘Afghanistan’ is available in the context, it will also figure in an answer to the question how can Jim touch-type?, (assuming that context does not shift between the two halves of the sentence). This entails result that the second half of the sentence comes out false, since Jim knows a contextually relevant way to touch-type. The lesson is that we seem to be able to switch between narrow and general know-how ascriptions without triggering a corresponding change of context, which suggests that general mechanisms of contextual sensitivity cannot resolve the Generality Problem.

In response to this problem, the Contextualist might switch focus to more specific mechanisms of context dependence in the meaning of ‘how to’ questions. There are three accounts of this kind in the literature:

i. That the modal ‘can’ involved in knowledge-how ascriptions takes a

contextually supplied set of worlds as its modal base (Stanley, 2011b, pp. 126– 7);

ii. That knowledge-how ascriptions are associated by an unpronounced task variable, which is filled out by context (Hawley, 2003, pp. 21–2);

iii. That infinitival knows-wh ascriptions involve context-sensitive goal-oriented bouletic modality, where goals are supplied by context (Bhatt, 2006, pp. 117– 58).

We’ll consider Stanley’s account of context-sensitivity in (3.5), so let’s focus here on the kinds of context-sensitivity suggested by Hawley and Bhatt.

Hawley suggests that knowledge-how ascriptions are associated with an unpronounced task variable which gets filled out by context, where tasks can pick out both engaging in an activity in a certain kind of environment, or more specific kinds of V- ing (Hawley, 2003, pp. 21–2; Cath, 2015, n. 14). A task like driving can be contextually altered to concern driving in snow, or driving an automatic car. This view gives the following account of knowledge-how:

ANSS&W+DAV2: S knows how to V iff for all of a contextually salient set of sub-tasks

of V-ing {t1, t2, …} S knows that that some method M is a way in which she can perform task tn.

This view can explain our pattern of judgements in the touch-typing case. Suppose that context provides us with a salient set of tasks associated with touch-typing ‘Afghanistan’, and another rather larger set of tasks associated with touch-typing. Jim’s limited knowledge might provide him with knowledge of how to perform the tasks associated with one

activity, but not the tasks associated with the other. This view can also explain the possibility of truthfully uttering sentences like (3), since it can posit two different task- variables in this sentence, which will get filled out by tasks associated with the two different activities.

Although this seems a plausible account of knowledge-how, the question is whether context will provide the right kinds of material to make the appropriate knowledge-how ascriptions come out true. In order to take the sting out of the Generality Problem, it needs to be the case that for every knowledge-how ascription, contextual mechanisms winnow down the possible answers to the question ‘how to V’ to yield a set of answers such that knowledge of them (individually or jointly) is sufficient for the possession of knowledge-

how ascriptions, it would surely be a coincidence if contextual mechanisms restricted the meaning of interrogatives in just the way that Intellectualists need to save their theory (Conee & Feldman, 1998, pp. 20–4).

On Bhatt’s view, knowledge-how ascriptions are associated with a complex bouletic modal, which can take two readings: expressing either a circumstantial can (V is possible given the way the world is), or a bouletic should (V is a/the way to satisfy one’s goals). Bhatt suggests that the ‘can’ reading is the default for knowledge-how ascriptions (Bhatt, 2006, p. 125) and on this reading, his account yields a semantic value close to ANSS&W+DAV.

However, he notes that in cases where there is a contextually salient goal, a ‘should’ reading is available (Bhatt, 2006, p. 125). To see this reading, consider sentence 4) in a context where the goal is to solve the problem but without violating any social norms:

(4)Magnus knows how to solve this problem.

Intuitively, in such a case, the correct paraphrase of 4) is deontic, expressing knowledge of a way that avoids norm-violation:

(5)Magnus knows how he should solve this problem (in order to avoid violating any social norms).

According to Bhatt’s account we should understand sentence 4) as saying (roughly) that Magnus knows i) that some way w is a way in which he can solve the problem, and ii) that employing this way will satisfy his goal of not violating any social norms.

Bhatt’s notion of contextually supplied goals can restrict the level of generality of answers, offering a potential way to address the generality problem. For example, if Jim’s goal is to touch-type a manuscript accurately at a speed of at least 60 words per minute, then in order to know how to touch type, he better know a way of touch-typing which satisfies the goal of typing at least 60 words per minute, whereas if his goal is just to touch- type, then any way of touch-typing will do. This means that in a context with goals are contextually salient, Bhatt can say that Jim doesn’t know how to touch-type because his way of touch-typing does not allow him to satisfy his goals. Generalising, we might suggest

that according to Bhatt’s account the relevant ways of acting are just those that lead to the fulfilment of contextually supplied goals.

Appealing to goals can fix the level of generality ascriptions where there are rich goals available in the context, but does not solve the Generality Problem. On Bhatt’s account, rich contextual goals only play a role on the ‘should’ reading. In order to get a ‘can’ reading out of the underlying bouletic modal, he relies on the idea that in some conversations the salient goals are trivial in the sense that acting automatically entails achieving the goal (Bhatt, 2006, pp. 129–31). If I say that I know how to swim, my salient goal might just be swimming, meaning that all I need to know is that some way is a way in which I can swim (since all such ways of swimming will lead to success in the goal of swimming, meaning that clause ii) in the account will be trivially satisfied). Since Bhatt’s account only appeals to (non-trivial) goals in cases where the ‘should’ reading is salient, this account cannot solve the generality problem for ascriptions with a ‘can’ reading, which Bhatt claims is the majority of knowledge-how ascriptions. Even for ascriptions with a ‘should’ reading, it is a substantial empirical claim that conversational context will provide salient goals that are sufficiently rich to do the explanatory work of selecting a way of acting of the appropriate level of generality. This issue mirrors the problem for Hawley’s account: it would be a coincidence if conversational context happened to always provide salient goals which fixed the level of generality of ways of acting to the appropriate level.

I take it that both Hawley’s and Bhatt’s accounts are plausible accounts of kinds of context-sensitivity at work in knowledge-how ascriptions. What I take issue with is the move of pushing the explanation of the generality of methods into the conversational context, on the grounds that without an argument that context always possesses relevant generality-fixing features, we shouldn’t rely on it to do this explanatory work.