Impactos en la comuna Engabao con el impulso del turismo

While a perception of control is necessary for responding adaptively to the crisis

(Vardaman, et al. 2012), the disruptive nature of change (Sharma, 2006:9) is expected to produce, rather contradictorily, an initial sense of uncontrollability that needs to be accepted for change to occur (consistent with Walinga, 2008). Specifically, the chaotic in essence (Bütz, 1995) and continuously in flux (Heraclitus in Osborne, 2003:99)

reality can constitute any system incapable (breakdown in Farazmand, 2003:339 & 362) of exerting everlasting control without questioning, as well as changing, when necessary, its practices (quantum paradigm in Fris & Lazaridou, 2006). For a company, the very same challenge arises once a crisis is faced, since the call for transformation in such cases (Gopinath, 2005) is underlain by the notion that the existing paradigm is unable to control and cope with the chaotic (Gersick, 1991; Murphy, 1996) crisis at hand (Faulkner, 2001; Reilly, 1987). From the individuals’ perspective the experienced uncontrollability (sadness) and uncertainty (fear), as these derive from the crisis (Liu, Perrewé, 2005; sec. 7.1), create a motivational impulse to restore the diminished levels of order and structure (Whitson, Galinsky & Kay, 2015) by formulating a more accurate mental model about how the world operates (schema change: see ch.3). If procrastination does not arise, this impulse will be expressed as a set of goal and implementation intentions (Gollwitzer; 1999) that indicate the need to take action and respond to the crisis “now” (Kotter, 1996).

Once the need for change is developed, appraisals of coping potential get involved in order to determine, along with the already (sec. 7.3) attributed causal responsibility

(Scherer, 2001), the most adaptive way to face the issue at hand (secondary appraisals: Lazarus, 1991). In particular, the highly problematic and uncertain characteristics of the crisis (Gersick, 1991; Murphy, 1996) necessitate an emotional response of hope

exact mode of this hope and, hence, the distinct cognitive and behavioral features of the action to be taken (Eaves, et al. 2014; Webb, 2007) will be, depends on how its element of agency will be realized (Snyder, 2002). By extension, then, the mode of hope, and consequently the nature of the response, is defined based on the way the already formulated (urgency check: sec. 7.2) intentions for action, which are reflected in agency (Rand & Cheavens, 2009), are shaped by the appraisals of coping potential

(Efficacy & agency: Bandura, 1989). That is, the appraised outcomes will trigger a specific mode of hope (Eaves, et al. 2014; Webb, 2007) that will entail a respective motivational approach towards the imaginary conception, or non-conception, of alternative courses of action (Snyder, 2002; et al. 1991). Note that the course of action is not an actual one, but the very first outcome of individuals’ mental capability to temporally extend their agency in the future (Bratman, 2000) and, thus, plan and write the script of their life (Kennett & Matthews, 2009:329)11.

In broad terms the potential modes of hope can be either adaptive or maladaptive

(Lazarus, 1999b), depending on whether uncontrollability will be realized as a benign reality that vindicates the need to change or as a threat to the self (Walinga, 2008). In its basis, innate uncontrollability is stressful for the leader (Keown-McMullan, 1997), as it poses a threat to the established order and the ego attached to it (Leary, Terry, Allen & Tate, 2009). If this emotionality is not adaptively regulated, leaders will aim to control the experienced threat (Walinga, 2008), mainly by defending against its source; the chaotic nature of the crisis (defences are analysed below). In such cases, hope is invoked in order to enhance irrational beliefs in status quo’s viability and facilitate, or else justify, leaders’ reluctance to let go (necessary for change: Mavrinac,

11 _{According to Snyder (2002) hope requires agency thinking and the existence of workable} pathways for achieving the desired goals. Here Bandura’s (1989) logic is followed and more emphasis is given to agency. That is, an initial experience of hope can be triggered on the basis that when there is agency (will) there is, potentially, an imaginary alternative pathway (Snyder, et al. 1991; emphasis added) to achieve the goal of changing. Whether or not a precise pathway actually exists, so that hope can be sustained (hope is part of an emotional process: Folkman

& Lazarus, 1985), will be determined after the instigation of change, which is a step that lies

outside the scope of this work (fig.2). On the other hand, when capacity to achieve change is appraised as low, individuals can still construct illusionary pathways with the “hope” that they will lead to the covetable outcome (defences analysed below).

2006) of any old commitments (Lazarus, 1991a:283). Hence, this kind of hope prevents leaders from seeing the benefits of a potential alternative course of action (Lazarus, 1999b), and, ultimately, drives a decision against the instigation of the change process. On the contrary, if innate uncontrollability is accepted as a benign reality, the inadequacy of the status quo to respond adaptively will be acknowledged (see above)

and, ergo, change will occur (Walinga, 2008). In these cases, hope has nothing to vindicate and, thus, can only serve as a yearning for the better that escorts the uncertainty about the future (Lazarus, 1991a; 1999b) which is inherent to any decision

(Walker, et al. 2003).

Before proceeding to further analysis, it is essential to discuss the implications of causal responsibility attribution, as it highly interacts with coping potential (Scherer, 2001), on the mode of the hope to be triggered. Specifically, a misattribution of causal responsibility, apart from maintaining self-value (motivational impulse for the defence: sec. 7.3.2) by externalizing the blame to an agent, is also expected to decrease the experienced chaotic disorder and the concomitant uncontrollability, that characterizes the faced crisis (idea derives from Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan & Keefer, 2012). This is because, leaders perceive the issue at hand not as an outcome of inaccurate mental models (self-conscious emotions shame-guilt: Lazarus, 1991a:240-271; Tracy & Robins, 2004) that need to be reconsidered and restructured (schema change: ch.3), but as an offence (anger: Lazarus, 1991a:222) from an external agent to an otherwise workable and in order status quo (sec. 7.3). As a result, coping potential concerns the capacity of launching a counter-attack (Lazarus, 1991a) so that the self and the company can be protected from the external threat, while the logic of responding to a chaotic crisis becomes applicable only to internally attributed cases. Ultimately, hope in externally attributed cases will not be an outcome of defensive responses to crisis’s chaotic disorder (refer to sec. 8.3.3). On this basis, the following sections discuss how the ego-driven mind treats uncontrollability, what defences could be triggered, as well as how hope is experienced and expressed.