Indicadores de rentabilidad

Industrial social policy was another key component of the regime's neutralizing policy toward the working population. A key date here is 1971, when after vicious internal struggles bet-ween opposite camps, Walter Ulbricht was removed from office and replaced by Erich Ho-necker as SED First Secretary.¹⁸⁶ This episode, which marked the realignment of the GDR leadership with the USSR, had the development of social policy at its core. The end of the 1960s had seen workers becoming restless in many Eastern Bloc countries, as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland two years later. Without questioning the leading role of the state parties in the popular democracies, the Soviet leaders showed themselves nonetheless favorable to some changes in government policy in the form of an increased standard of living in those countries. In the GDR, this new approach in social policy was termed “unity of the economic and the social policy” and was introduced by 1972.¹⁸⁷

In addition to the more traditional components of social security, such as health, pensions, family support and education, the East German leadership targeted housing and consumption as fields of industrial social policy requiring rapid improvements. Between 1971 and 1989, the continuous rise of the standards of living was identified as the mechanism for the "pro-gression of socialism" and linked to social policy.

185 Ibid., p. 370, underlined in original.

186 This section is mainly based around: Hertle 1992, Frerich/Frey 1993, Hockerts 1994, Schneider 1996, Schmidt 1999, Boyer/Skyba 1999, Boyer 2001, Skyba 2002.

187 Boyer/Skyba 1999, pp. 582-84.

Between 1971 and 1985, almost two million apartments were built or renovated. By 1989, the GDR had 426 apartments for 1,000 inhabitants, a relatively high rate by international stan-dards but nevertheless insufficient: 781,000 applications for new apartments had been registe-red, the majority on grounds that they lacked modern conveniences.¹⁸⁸ The production of consumer goods also grew significantly during this period. In 1989, 99% of East German fa-milies possessed a refrigerator (1970: 56%), 88% a television (1970: 69%) and 99% a was-hing machine (1970: 53%).¹⁸⁹ If the production of motorized vehicles had increased to its peak of 217,931 units in 1986, it is a known fact that true demand was never met.¹⁹⁰ The state also subsidized rents, electricity, water, heating, goods of basic consumption and the cost of public transportation.

2.2.2.2.1 An Industrial Type of Social Policy

Most administrative tasks accomplished, services delivered and counseling provided in the enterprises qualifies East German social policy as industrial (betriebliche Sozialpolitik). A quick overview demonstrates its importance.

In 1988, East German enterprises operated 122 polyclinics, 306 infirmaries (Betriebsambula-torien), 1,683 medical stations (Arztsanitätsstellen) and 1,327 nurse stations (Schwesternsani-tätsstellen), as well as outpatient facilities for smaller enterprises. The company-based heal-thcare system (Betriebsgesundheitswesen) cared for 75% of the GDR’s workforce and employed about 18,000 persons. Company doctors were responsible for an average of 3,100 persons. (This includes persons at large, not only workers, because company healthcare facili-ties, especially in larger plants, also cared for those living near the enterprise.¹⁹¹) The services delivered in company healthcare facilities went well beyond labor-related medical care and treatment.

Enterprises had day-care centers for workers’ children. They shared this responsibility with districts, cities and towns. This vast network of highly subsidized day-care centers was among the most significant East German family policy measures. It was designed to support a rising birth rate and to reduce the tension between family and work, even though campaigns to bring women to work were scaled back in the 1980s.¹⁹² In the same spirit, and also to foster the

188 Frerich/Frey 1993, pp. 426, 439, 450-54.

189 Schneider 1996, p. 125 and Weber 1999, p. 289.

190 In 1989, 52% of East German families owned a motor vehicle; the waiting period for delivery was about 10 years. Schneider 1996, pp. 125-28.

191 Frerich/Frey 1993, p. 250; Hockerts 1994, pp. 526-27.

192 Frerich/Frey 1993, p. 422.

development of a strong bond to labor at an early age, enterprises were compelled to design cultural and sport programs for school-aged children.

The trade unions were used to assign apartments intended for worker families; yet as the bulk of apartments were reserved for worker families, this task was of great importance. BGL hou-sing commissions helped workers to complete the request form and counsel district offices in the actual decision-making process.¹⁹³ Furthermore, many enterprises had taken over the practice, typical of German entrepreneurs since the Wilhelmine period, of providing a certain number of apartments to workers. These “company apartments” (Werkswohnungen) were seen as a way to secure enough workers, always a problem at such enterprises. BGL were jointly responsible for the distribution of these apartments.¹⁹⁴

The FDGB possessed a large number of holiday resorts, reserved for FDGB members, a fact that might shed some light on high membership levels. The number of reservations available in FDGB holiday resorts remained stable at about one million throughout the 1960s, but grew significantly in the following decades to 1,446,853 in 1975 and 1,863,900 in 1986. This would however fall in the second half of the 1980s: 1,833,300 reservations available in 1989.¹⁹⁵ The allocation of available slots in these resorts was assigned to a specific unit wi-thin BGL and the FDGB: the Holiday Service (FDGB-Feriendienst). Since 1979, the FDGB Holiday Service also managed the allocation of the more than three million slots in company sanatoriums and health resorts. These company homes and resorts were not only intended for use by overworked eomployees; they also served to increase the number of holiday options. In the second half of the 1980s, the FDGB Holiday Service managed the allocation of about 7.5 million holidays (about 1,400,000 in the form of camping), and employed 18,000.¹⁹⁶

Despite these figures, the availability of slots, especially during the summertime, was consi-dered insufficient by many workers. At the end of the 1980s, an average member of the FDGB was granted summer vacation at a facility once every seven years. In 1987, FDGB president Tisch thought a good way to solve the problem was to spread holidays throughout the year.

193 Ibid, p. 427.

194 Ibid., pp. 440-42.

195 Vollmer 1999, p. 327.

196 Frerich/Frey 1993, pp. 168-69; Vollmer 1999, p. 327; Weinert / Gilles 1999, p. 24.

Und es ist eine Illusion zu glauben, dass man sich nur im Juni, Juli oder August an der Ostsee erholen könnte. Diese Ostsee hat eine Küste, wo man sich das ganze Jahr, be-sonders auch im Frühjahr, gut erholen kann.¹⁹⁷

In the same vein, many food products, such as bananas, were sometimes supplied to enterpri-ses and distributed among workers. In addition, most consultation on social policy issues took place at the enterprise level. Beside the 18,000 staff responsible for Holiday Services, about 400,000 BGL members took part to the managing of social policy in the GDR, of which 280,000 were elected officials responsible for social issues.¹⁹⁸ These main elements of social policy all converged to make the enterprise the main administrator and provider of social ser-vices in the GDR.

2.2.2.2.2 The Costs of the Social Policy in the 1980s

In the second half of the 1980s, not only did financing for social policy suffer from a weak economy. It had in turn become a burden for the entire economy, which recorded an annual deficit of 8 billion and an exterior debt of 20 billion marks in 1988. Hospital service deteriora-ted, materials for housing were of a poor quality, slots in holiday resorts fell in number, va-rious everyday products were unavailable. These problems are familiar as detailed in the FDGB and Stasi reports previously analyzed.

Among the Politburo members, this situation manifested itself in an important controversy between Günter Mittag, in charge of the economy, and Gerhard Schürer, president of the State Plan Commission. Faced with a growing budget deficit, the latter proposed radical economic reforms: a reduction of subsidies for rent/energy and in the supply of consumer goods, toge-ther with a sharp increase of trade with capitalist countries.¹⁹⁹ For Gerhard Schürer and other Politburo members like Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, the only way out of the crisis was join in a confederation with the Federal Republic of Germany and have this country assume its debt. This offer reached chancellor Kohl’s ears and was even discussed between the USA and the USSR at the end of 1989.²⁰⁰ Such a confederation would have been based on the res-tructuring of the East German economic and social policy, as well as a drastic reduction in the level of social benefits offered to the East German population and a severe fall in the standard

197 Protokoll des 11. FDGB-Kongresses vom 22. bis 25 April 1987 in Berlin (Berlin-Ost, 1987, p. 31), quoted in Weinert / Gilles 1999, p. 26.

198 Hockerts 1994, p. 523 and Weinert / Gilles 1999, p. 24.

199 Together with other measures. “Überlegungen zur weiteren Arbeit am Volkswirtschaftsplan 1989 und darüber hinaus”, Berlin, April 26, 1988, quoted in: Hertle 1992, pp. 128-29.

200 Hertle 1992, p. 131.

of living. For them, too, at that time, “there was no alternative.” Margaret Thatcher’s course for western economies was their plan to guarantee the future of ‘socialism’ in Germany.

Mittag rejected this proposition altogether and Schürer’s attempts to convince Honecker were fruitless. Although he was considering models to lower wages, Honecker did not want to risk such a direct confrontation with the population.²⁰¹ On the contrary: facing growing dissatis-faction, the Politburo and the FDGB worked to increase retirement pensions, a measure de-manded by the population.²⁰² The economy and social policy were crumbling, but the resort to new social improvements, never to be implemented, was the response of Honecker, Mittag and Tisch.²⁰³ As head of the FDGB, and as such, responsible for social policy, Harry Tisch still had reservations about Schürer’s 1988 proposition, even years later:

Dass man nun sagt, er [Schürer] mahnte und mahnte, so ist das ja nun nicht. Wenn er das heute sagt, dann sagt er auch zuviel über sich. So viel hat Schürer nicht gemahnt.

Und wenn er sich beruft auf sein Papier, das er 1988 eingereicht hat: Das war ein schwaches Papier, das hätte die Lösung auch nicht gebracht. Darum wurde das Papier auch zurückgewiesen, es enthielt nur eine Umschichtung, daraus war doch keine Strate-gie zu entnehmen.²⁰⁴

Yet failures of the social policy, the scale of the regime’s success, often produced popular discontent. The outcome was that measures announced to appease workers may well have produced greater antagonism if they were not implemented. For instance, a Stasi report from June 1989, noted that a wage increase, announced to quell worker discontent in one division of the VEB Düngemittelwerk, could not be paid due to a lack of financial resources. The result was greater anger of the workforce here.²⁰⁵

For our purposes, the importance of this debate, often described as a crucial ideological confrontation between reformers (Schürer, Schalck-Golodkowski) and conservatives (Honec-ker, Mittag, Tisch), should not be overestimated. With respect to the relationships between regime leadership and the working population, both the "reformist" and the "conservative"

camps announced major decreases in the standards of living. If the "conservative" camp main-tained the social policy, it was unable to finance these provisions. Instead of an ideological controversy, we may rather be confronted with different strategies to increase productivity

201 Ibid, p. 131.

202 It was announced on November 29, 1988. Weinert/Gilles 1999, pp. 36-37.

203 Except that months later, Mittag made several propositions for economic reforms that resembled some of Schürer’s paper. Hertle 1992, p. 130.

204 “Wir waren überzeugt, dass unser System richtig ist. Gespräch mit Harry Tisch, Berlin, 9.12.1993”, in: Pirker et al., 1990, pp. 121-142, pp. 130-31.

205 MfS BV Rostock, “Information über beabsichtigte Austritte aus dem FDGB”, Rostock, June 14, 1989, AKG Nr. 276, p. 2. Similar comments in: Lepsius 1994, p. 24; Hockerts 1994, pp. 535-37; Schmidt, pp. 298-99.

and decrease state expenditures – a combination that resulted in a decrease in the workers' standard of living – without prompting unrest among the population.