INFLAMACION DE LAS ANGINAS Para desbloquear a pacientes y

One of the most prominent practitioner-theologists of the twenty-first century is naturally Osama bin Laden. Whilst remembered as an organiser, planner, and figurehead of the group Al Qaeda,108 _{he evidences a distinct approach to justifying}

violent action that is rhetorically more rooted in the institutions of the classical Islamic era, or at least, his personal understanding of how Islamic law and jihad interacted in

103 _{Bassam Tibi, Islamism and Islam (Yale University Press 2012) 31–32.}

104 _{For instance, it is possible to discuss the similarity between the two thinkers’ desire to return to a}

“golden age” though the form of this golden age is coloured by contact with contemporary ideologies and state systems. See R. Scott Appleby, ‘History in the Fundamentalist Imagination’ (2002) 89 The Journal of American History 498, 506.

105 _{Riaz Hassan, ‘Religion, Society, and the State in Pakistan: Pirs and Politics’ (1987) 27 Asian Survey}

552, 564–565.

106 _Ibid.

107 _{Appleby (n 104) 498.}

108 _{Dane Thorleifson, Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda's Operational Design (Naval War College 2003)}

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this period.109 _{Bin Laden’s theology exists within the same framework established by}

earlier theorists, though with some key variations on the central themes, the most notable of which is an inclination towards classical modes of organisation. First, he is more respectful towards incumbent Islamic institutions than many subsequent thinkers. Referring to the persistent ulema, he notes “[t]hey kept from it the distortion of the stupid, the plagiarism of the liars, the interpretation of the ignorant and the dilution of the profligate tyrants”.110 _{In acknowledging this, however, he is dismissive}

of the modern ulema, suggesting that they have become corrupt, and have permitted distortions to occur. In relation to a particular scholar, he mentions specifically how this individual permitted usury, failed to condemn a Muslim leader for wearing a cross, criticised the issuing of fatwahs that permitted western involvement in the first Gulf War, and issued a fatwah encouraging peace with “the Jewish enemy”. These, to name but a few infractions, were indicative to bin Laden of corruption, and collusion with tyrants and the enemies of God.111 _{His willingness to salvage these institutions rather}

than place them forever outside the fold of Islam represents a pragmatism not present in the thought of many subsequent thinkers, and even the jihadist organisations with which his name has become intertwined.112

Bin Laden persists in the essential understanding of the present condition, and the influence of the west upon Islam as established by the earlier theorists of the Egyptian school. Rhetorically, Bin Laden makes a critical contribution, however, in his vision of how to restore Islam to its rightful place. Unlike al-Banna, Qutb, or Faraj, bin Laden seeks to co-opt for himself Islamic authority within the bounds of classical Islamic institutions. This has led to a recognition that whilst appearing irrational and absurd to western audiences, his ideology has a visceral appeal to some Islamic audiences, especially those feeling dislocated or dispossessed by modernity.113

109 _{Michael G. Knapp, ‘The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam’ (2003) Parameters 82, 84–85.} 110 _{Osama Bin Laden, ‘Open Letter to Shaykh Bin Baz on the Invalidity of his Fatwa on Peace with the}

Jews’ (Wikisource 1994)

<https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Open_Letter_to_Shaykh_Bin_Baz_on_the_Invalidity_of_his_Fatwa_ on_Peace_with_the_Jews#cite_note-2> accessed 20 July 2018.

111 _Ibid.

112 _{Roberts (n 102).}

113 _{See generally Fareed Zakaria, ‘Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism’ (2004) 119}

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Bin Laden emphasised the importance of organisation.114 _{Consistent with his}

position as a globally recognisable figurehead, bin Laden adopted for himself the title of Emir.115 _{There is evidence in his writings that, to him, this denoted far more than}

the mere sobriquet that western intelligence services frequently assumed it to be. Emir is a title bin Laden utilised to denote a “true” leader of the Islamic world, in contrast to those he saw as connected to the west.116 _{This commitment, whilst arguably}

superficial, differentiates his organisation from Islamic leaders with more secular titles.

By accepting the role of Emir in the modern Islamic community, Bin Laden was accepting not only an accolade, but also a role in Islamic governance. The title of Emir was a critical aspect of how he understood the duty of jihad and his personal capacity to wage one against the “west”. As well as being rooted in classical Islamic empires and communities, thus gaining resonance with his audience, under specific circumstance an emir is afforded the privilege of invoking jihad in the reasoning. Accordingly, bin Laden sought to present the incumbent Islamic institutions as inadequate or corrupted. For instance, he indicates that today’s Muslim governments are in fact, not Muslim, due to their loyalty to the “invader” and further, the scholars of Islam have become little more than the “donkeys that carry the book”,117 _{failing to}

reflect an accurate interpretation of Islam, devoid of western influence. This contrasts with his own asceticism, dedication to jihad, and practical commitments – details emphasized in his public image.

Bin Laden was conversant in the specifics as to why Islam had become subordinate to the west, particularly in military matters. He mainly explains the relative position of the Muslim culture as a consequence of enslavement by “Zionists” and “crusaders”..118 _{This indication of oppression by external forces is, however,}

114 _{In the publication ‘Structures and Bylaws’, it becomes clear that Al Qaeda sought to draw upon}

modern western management and organisational techniques, whilst veiling these innovations in Islamic language, with chairmen and committees existing alongside Shura councils and emirs. This effort is deeper than mere terminology, however, with Al Qaeda seeking to mimic a range of western examples. See generally CTC, ‘Al-Qa`ida’s Structure and Bylaws’ (2002) <https://ctc.usma.edu/harmony- program/al-qaidas-structure-and-bylaws-original-language-2/> accessed 20 April 2017.

115 _{Ibid 5.}

116 _{Osama Bin Laden, ‘Unknown 27 Dec 2004’ in IntelCenter (ed), IntelCenter Words of Osama Bin}

Laden vol 1 (Tempest Publishing 2008) 90–91.

117 _{Osama Bin Laden, ‘Letter to all Muslim brothers in the world’ (2018)}

<https://dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2017/english/Letter%20to%20all%20Muslim%20brothers%20in %20the%20world.pdf> accessed 20 July 2018, 3.

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compounded by internal elements, mainly infighting, and the emergence of sects he sees as heterodox.119 _{He accordingly stresses a practical, more pragmatic approach to}

jihad that is more grounded in classical Islamic law and theory. Bin Laden’s depiction of both the west and Islam is better grounded in history than many approaches that come later; bin Laden’s assessment of western material and organisational superiority at this juncture serves to modulate what is possible, as well as extend the timeline for the realisation of an Islamic state. In his own lifetime, he was against, for instance, attempting to install an Islamic state in the Muslim world.120 _{Bin Laden’s radical}

acceptance of the physical limitations of his organisation and the Islamic world in general within the framework of the persistent understanding of Islam and the west sets him apart from the subsequent discussion of jihad found in the writings of more recent neo-jihadists. By grounding his understanding in history, he is forced to relegate the realisation of the actual “Islamic state” to some point in the future.

In summary, bin Laden is far more conversant with the systems and forms of the classical era than many later scholars. He is deliberate in identifying himself as a modern-day emir, or battle leader. This permits him to direct jihad for the purpose of restoring Islamic governance, whilst he predicates the authority to act in this manner upon the degeneration of the ulema and the lack of any “true” Islamic leaders above him. He concurrently recognises the need to co-opt existing institutions and state systems; this indicates his pragmatism in earthly matters. In bin Laden’s thought, the west, and its influence over the Islamic world, require inducement to remove; the west does not by its ideal nature contain features that will bring about its own inevitable destruction, nor does he emphasise the destruction of the west as God’s prerogative. This pragmatism and innovation stand in sharp contrast to many later theorists.