2.4 LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN Y LOS VALORES
2.4.2 La influencia de la televisión sobre el desarrollo socio moral en
Rapu : Tax Assignment and Revenue Shaflng in Nigeria 35
partly, modifications
of
assigned taxes and introductionof
other more reliable taxes as follows:The
introduction of
state excise taxeson
alcoholic beverages and tobacco products is a good examplefor
new tax assignmentto
the state goverrrments.This form
of
tax would be politically acceptable as a meansof
financing state governments' expenditures on health care services. The newtax
system is expected to be a residence-based tax and does not eliminate excise tax by the Federal Government (such as practicedin
Mexico)i .In particular, personal income taxes form a major component of tax assignment
to
the state governments. Evidence over the years has shown thatflelds
from the personal income have been low. Consequently,in
viewof
the performance of VAT comparedwith
the former sales tax, there are new suggestions that the Federal Government should be encouragedto
takeover the administration of personal incometax.
However, we differ with this suggestion, rather we profferthat the powers to set rates, in addition to the existing administrative
responsibilities should be transferred to the state governments. Thiswill
enable themto
adjust rates, depending on their economic circumstances and revenue needs.The
constitution
has recognizedthat property rate is intrinsically local in
character and assignsit to
the local governments. However, concernedwith
the stagnation in yields from the tax, we suggest a reformin
this regard on the grounds of cost efficiency and higher compliance rate. Thus, the administrationof
property tax should be placed under the puwiewof
the state governments while the proceeds should be givento
the local councils,with
a surchargeof not more than
10.0 percentto
coveradministrative
costs. Thus, besides increasing revenue,it will
also reducetax
evasion and avoidance. Another areain which the councils could
increasetheir tax
revenueis through
5 S€e Walsh C., 1996 pg ll5
36
Central BanI of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review March 2006IV.3.2 Inclusion
of
the Education Tax and VATin
the Federation Account Onething that
has emerged clearwith the
cominginto force of the
1999 Constitutionis that
the fateof
the Education Trust Fund cannot be differentfrom that of
the Petroleum (special)Trust
Fund. By extension education tax revenueis
nowpart of
the Federation Account Revenue and should be paidinto that
account. The VAT Pool Account should be abolished and mergedwith the
Federation Accountfor simplicity
and transparency aswell
asin
conformitywith
the constitutional provisions.IV.3.3 Review
of
the VerticalDistribution
FormulaTo further boost statutory transfers to the
sub-national governments, the revenue-sharingformula
should be reviewed.A
notable featureof
Nigeria's federalfiscal
arrangementsis the multiple
channelsof
transfersfrom
the Federal Governmentto the
sub-national governments. Some are statutory transfers such as the Federation Account and VAT revenues while others areplan
transfersin
theform of
grants-in-aid. Plan transfers include transfersfrom
education tax revenue and transfersin
respectof
Universal BasicEduca-tion
(UBE), Basic Primary Healthcare and others. Therefore, considering the needsof the
states andlocal
councilsto
meettheir different
expenditure outlays,this
paper considers a consolidated revenue transfersthat is
based on a tax-by-tax sharing system. However, the percentage allocationto
each tierof
government can be determined by proper bargaining, depending largely on the expenditure needsof
eachtier of
government on social services, internal security and defense. We, therefore, suggest a sharing formula below:entertainment ta,x on birthdays and burial ceremonies, taxes on advertisement
in their
localities, and cost recovery charges, such astolls for
useof
local roads and other user charges. Again, more substantial t:xes on fairs and marketsor
alocal
business licensetax
(as practicedin
Germany) basedon
actualturnover
could be pursuedby the local
councilsto
enhancetheir
internal revenue base.37
Table
l0:
Suggested Vertical Distribution of Revenue in the Nigerian Federation(in percent)
State I-aal Corncils Totd
Oil Tarcs
&
Revenue 52.5 15.0 n.o 100.0Corpany Incone Tax 50.0 100.0
Orstonr & Ercise 50.5 30.0 19.5 5.0 100.0
Value -Added Tax 30.0 210.0 30.0 20.0 100.0
Elucation Tax 30.0 ru.0
Average 44.5 12.9
The suggested
vertical distribution in
Table 10is
basedon the following
assumptions:that the funding
of
primary education should revertto
the states whilethe
federal andlocal
councilsparticipations
are restrictedto
design and implementation, respectively. Basically,from
experience over the years, the local councils ]ack the capacities to have this function assignedto
them not onlyin
termsof
funding,but
also administration;that the
state governments' expenditureon
social infrastructureswill
continue to rise and remain higher than that of the Federal Government;
derivation should apply on a tax-by-tax basis and directly on the out-standing receipts before distribution. In view
of
this, derivation becomes afirst
chargeon all
revenueitems
exceptfor
education tax.This
is mainlyto
serve as an incentiveto
state governments;this
formula assumes the exclusionof
special funds;the inclusion of education tax and VAT revenues in the federation account and the abolition
of
the individual taxes disbursement mechanisms;Rapu : Tax Assignment and Revenue Sharing in Nigeria
Fedral Derirdion
32.5
50.0 5.0
100.0
42.6 100.0
38
Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review March 2006education
tax
shouldstrictly
be earmarkedfor the
purpose exceptif
abolished under the new tax reforms; and
The new options allocates
to the
Federal Government (42.6%), state govern-ments (44.5 %), and local governments (12.9%)of total
federally-collectible revenue. The objective hereis to
increasestatutory
transfers and decrease grants.This
generallywiII
removethe
political-influencefactors
associatedwith
federal grantsin
the inter-governmental transfers. Thus,the
consolida-tion of all transfers
asstatutory
revenue-sharing makes these transfers explicit and predictable.IV.3.4
Reviewof
the Horizontal Revenue-Sharing FormulaRevenue-sharing across the sub-national governments can be shared on a tax-by-tax basis, applyrng different weights and principles. The table below attempts to play down on most
of
the objections facilitating agitationsin
the horizontal revenue-sharing system. The suggested distributionprofile did not
recognize the principleof
tax efforts whileit
de-emphasized the principleof
geographicarea (landmass/terrain). For instance, emphasis on equality principle is to help those disadvantaged sub-national governments
with low per
capita income comparedwith
the national standardto
have morefund for
infrastructural development, thereby, encouragingprivate
investmentto boost
economic activitiesin
their respective states and local councils.If
the emphasis placedon
the principlesof
equityis
adoptedit will
achieve the equalization effect across the sub-national governments and reduce considerably the unintended advantagesto
the well-established states and local councilsin the
currentdistribution
system.that
the state governments should adjust regularly, the amountof
state allocationto
the councils.Rapu : Tax Assignment and Revenue Sharing in Nigeria 39
Under the principle
of
social development factors, thereis
a recognitionof
the inverseof all
the sub-factors and considerable weight givento
them.It
isbelieved that the implementation of this will
encouragean
even social development acrossthe
sub-national governments. These principles and the associated percentages are also, recommendedfor
revenuedistribution
to local governments. However, the use of the number of local governments underequality of states should be
abrogatedsince the power to
create local governments has been revertedto
the state governments.Table 11: Suggested Horizontal Distribution of Revenue in Nigeria
Rewnue Sorraes Population I-andnass / Terrain
Equality Smial Faclor
Inlrrse of Sodal factor
'Iotal
C)il Taxes & Revenue 20 5 60 5.5 9.5 100
Company Income Tax l0 10 60 l0 l0 100
Customs & E\cise t0 0 60 ) 5 100
Value Added Tax 25 0 60 7.5 1.5 r00
Education Tax 0 0 40 30 30 r00
IV.3.5
Compelling the State Govenrments to Allocate the Mandatory lO % ot their Internal Revenue to the Local CouncilsThe Federal Government should establish a standard format to enable
it
monitorthis
aspectof the constitution
andstiff
penaltystipulated in the
law. For instance,it
could be recommended that failure to comply, the fiscal commission should deduct the outstanding amountsfrom individual
state government's shareof
the Federation Account. Thus, the States Houseof
Assembly should endeavorto monitor
compliancewith
the law.In
addition, the state finance commission should be properly constituted. Rather than allow the officials of the state's ministryof
financeto
dominate the committee,it
should be made an independent bodylike the
RMFAC. The objectiveof
these reformsis
to makethe transfer
systempredictable,
measurableand transparent.
The proportionfor distribution
should be automatically adjustableto
inflation.40
Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review March 2006Although the
criteria for distribution
among the local councils needto
varyfrom
stateto
state becauseof
differencesin
local situations,this
should not be an impediment to the earlier achievementof
decentralization in the country.Consequently, we suggest
this
framework belowfor
adoption according to IocaI conditions.Table 12: Framework for Revenue-Sharing to LGs.
Criteria WeiBhts
Derivation tOTc
Popu lation 3O7o
fruality 30Eo
Own revenue efforts
Geographic Arca: toca
Rural Area 4%
Urban Arca 6Ca
Social Factors toEc
D irect 57c
Invene -5qo
The principles underlying
this
framework,is that
apartfrom
the sizeof
local governments representedby
the population and geographical area (which aremajor
determinantsof the
financial needsof the
councils), revenue-sharing should be complemented by a setof
criteria, which measure efficiency by the revenue-generatingefforts of
local councils, and equityby
the levelof
local income per capita. Thus, the equity principle favors the fiscally-disadvantaged councils while the former is an encouragement to those high revenue-generating councilsfor their
efforts.t0%
Rapu : Tax Assignment and Revenue Sharing in Nigeria 4t
IV.3.6
Constitutional Amendment on the Distribution of Proceeds from the Federation AccountThe Federal Government should pursue
vigorously the
amendmentof
the constitutionin
the areaof
the powerof
the state legislaruresto
create local councils. Thus, the National Assembly can be given the confirmation authority based on the available resources. The main implication of the excessive creationof
councilsis
that, the available fundswill
be spent on mere administration rather than on economic and social infrastructures. Thus, thereis
the need to amendthe chapter of the constitution
dealingwith the creation of
localcouncils
for
a proper decentralizationin
Nigeria.The Federal Government
through the
RMFAC should establish a good and acceptable statistical basefor
the purposeof
revenue-sharing across the sub-national governments. This is in terms of derivation, population, and geographic area. This should also, be reviewed at regular intervals through independent surveys.V
Summary and ConclusionThe paper described the basis
of tax
assignment and revenue sharingin
afederal system. The evolution of tax assignment and
revenue-sharing arrangements in Nigeria were also discussed. The resultof
the review indicatesthat in the earlier periods of the
Federation,fiscal decentralization
was encouragedby
granting high revenue-yielding taxesto
the regions. However, the coming of military ruIein
1966 marked the beginningof
the erosionof
thetaxing
powersof the
sub-national governmentsand the
concentrationof national financial resources in the hands of the Federal
Government.Consequently,
from
1967/68 fiscal year, a notable feature has been the growing vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalancesin
the Federationin
termsof
fiscal capacitiesof
the various levelsof
government and across the federating units.These have generated debates threatening