Instrumentos

During Japan’s post-war industrial boom, opinion on Japanese foreign policy was relegated to ‘essentially a means of removing obstacles, or defusing possible mine- fields, in the path of Japan's economic interests.’4 The assumption was that Japan had an ‘economic strategy’ rooted in the work of the bureaucracy.5 Analysis by Chalmers Johnson with the concept of the ‘developmental state’ dominated scholarship on where power was concentrated.6 Through tracing the origins and cause of Japan’s twentieth- century ‘economic miracle’, Johnson identified the bureaucracy, particularly MITI (now METI) as being at the helm of policymaking.7 For Johnson, ‘Japan is a system of bureaucratic rule’ where the primary function of politicians is to act as a ‘safety valve’ for officials. Johnson later retracted some elements of his original argument as political parties like the LDP grew in influence in the late 1970s but continued to maintain that the ‘most important policies still originate within a ministry or agency, not within the political or private sectors’.8

3

Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation, (New York; Vintage Books, 1987, 1992), p. 7

4

Bill Emmott, ‘The Economic Sources of Japan’s Foreign Policy,’ Survival, The IISS Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (1992), p. 52

5

For further works on the subject of bureaucracy-ruling party dynamics see Scalapino, The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (1977), Gertis, Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War (1993), Robert J. Art ‘Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique’ Policy Sciences 4, No. 4 (Dec 1973) and Stephen D Krasner ‘Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)’ Foreign Policy, no. 7 (Summer 1972)

6

Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle The growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975,

(Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1982)

7

Johnson appreciated that bureaucracies often faced internal disagreements and pressure from other parties but considered their influence to ‘exert the greatest positive influence’.

8

Chalmers Johnson, D’A Tyson and J. Zysman eds., Politics and Productivity: How Japan’s Development Strategy Work, (New York; Ballinger, 1989), p. 182

This bottom-up approach was long-considered the most suitable model. Aurelia George Mulgan described Japan as the ‘Un-Westminster’ system,9 where in contrast to the UK; Japanese bureaucrats play a central role whilst politicians merely negotiate the terms. For Mulgan, Japan’s bureaucracy has ‘formidable control over the function of policy advice, initiation, formulation and implementation’.

A subsequent generation of scholars have challenged Johnson and Mulgan’s assumptions. Haley for example believes that ‘the dominance of the Japanese bureaucracy in the political process has been grossly exaggerated. Not only has bureaucratic influence rarely been as significant as generally perceived, but also what powers the bureaucracy has exercised have declined steadily’.10 Other scholars claim that policy is directed solely by the LDP. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth adopt a ‘rational choice’ approach, viewing politicians and bureaucrats as principals and agents who balance against one another.11 Officials who are aware of the influence politicians hold over their career futures, provide policies simply which they believe politicians will implement.

i. ‘Kantei diplomacy’

A recent addition to the debate has been made by Shinoda.12 Despite the title ‘Koizumi Diplomacy,’ his volume chronicles the extension of the Prime Minister’s Official

9

Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Japan’s Un-Westminster’ System: Impediments to Reform in a Crisis Economy’ Government and Opposition 38, no. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 73-91

10

Maurice Wright, ‘Who Governs Japan? Politicians and Bureaucrats in the Policy-Making Processes’,

Political Studies, XLVII(1999) p. 945

11

JM Ramseyer and FM Rosenbluth, Japan’s Political Marketplace, (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1993) in Wright, ‘Who Governs Japan? Politicians and Bureaucrats in the Policy- Making Processes’, p. 949

12

Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs,

Residence (Kantei) as the ‘core executive’ on security policy-making under Nakasone and Hashimoto through to Koizumi’s premiership.13 Shinoda shows how with limited power within their party and weak links with the bureaucracy, they strengthened the office of the Prime Minister to the extent that ‘the Kantei has supplanted MOFA in formulating legislation’.14 Shinoda praises this change, deeming it not only democratic since the Prime Minister is elected but also efficient since he can act as mediator between ministries and interests. Shinoda believes that the Kantei is also politically- conscious and therefore better able to ‘pursue national interests compared to MOFA, which may put a higher priority on friendly relations with foreign countries.’15

Despite these positives, Shinoda’s analysis does not necessarily equate to the reality of current policy formulation. Shinoda’s approach goes a step too far by claiming that the Kantei has taken over from other sectors to dominate policymaking. Consensus-building within the LDP, bureaucracy and other interested parties was still required to pass Koizumi’s landmark legislation. Furthermore as Mulgan notes, Shinoda overlooks structure and the fact that Koizumi was cushioned by strong domestic political support. Without such a backdrop it is unlikely such radical policies would have been accepted.

Whilst valuable for its in-depth critique of the working of the Kantei, as a model for understanding the formation of policy Shinoda’s thesis is flawed. A more balanced perspective has come from academics that broaden their explanations to include additional actors. Officials retain dominance in policymaking but Japan is not quite as

13

The Kantei is defined by Shinoda in its ‘narrowest’ terms as the Prime Minister, chief cabinet secretary (CCS) and three deputy CCSs and in the ‘broader definition’ employed in his study as also including the Cabinet Secretariat p. 8

14

Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, p. 14

15

‘statist’ as once thought. Muramatsu’s ‘patterned pluralism’ model has been particularly influential.

ii. Patterned Pluralism

The model of political pluralism relates to a system where several relatively autonomous groups vie for power rather than one where a select number of actors direct policy. In contrast to ‘classical pluralism’, however, in Muramatsu’s model the state is not weak and competition between groups is not open-ended.16 The modifier ‘patterned’ is therefore added to indicate that since the state is ‘penetrated’ by predictable interest groups and political parties. It remains strong within the framework of LDP-dominance. The bureaucracy continues to act as the ‘pivot’ for policymaking alliances. 17 Nevertheless there has been a tangible shift in the location of initiative ‘where prime ministerial, parliamentarian and interest group power has grown resulting in the bureaucracy being forced to ‘share the stage with a number of other influential actors’.18

The 1980s brought two significant drivers of change: increased strain on government resources and economic friction with the US.19 Muramatsu argues that each of these factors, one domestic and the other external, made the bureaucracy more ‘defensive’ thereby boosting the power of the prime minister and ‘enhancing patterned pluralism’.

16

M. Muramatsu and Krauss, ‘The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism’, in K Yamamura and Y Yasuba, eds, The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 1: The Domestic Transformation (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1987) p. 538

17

Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security, p. 542

18

Ibid. p. 540

19

MOF autonomy for example, once severely protected, was reduced when demands from the US forced Japan to liberalise interest rates in 1983. The Ministry of Finance had also suffered threats to its

independence in the 1970s due to domestic pressure of Japan’s rising zoku and other political pressures ultimately led to MOF failure to uphold a balanced budget. Muramatsu, ‘Patterned Pluralism under Challenge: The Policies of the 1980s’ in Political Dynamics of Contemporary Japan, (Ithace NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.60

Whilst the DPJ government establishes its approach to policy, Muramatsu’s model of pluralism continues to provide the most viable method of analysis. Furthermore, the ‘patterned pluralism’ recognises that the evolution of various groups occurs as a result of structural/environmental changes, therefore adhering to NCR.