The move to unite the original provinces and states into a single unit, West Pakistan, was motivated by the desire to prevent regionalist movements from becoming a threat to the unity of the newly independent nation, as Michel points out.600 NWFP, Balochistan and the tribal areas (FATA, Northern Areas) were by and large left out due their highly specific, community-based systems of water management which were not part of the Indus Basin development yet, as Wescoat et al. note.601
A new institution to oversee and steer this process in the water sector was established: The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), founded in 1958, would mark a centralized approach to water management in Pakistan.602 Originally named the West Pakistan Water and Power Authority, it represented the most significant departure from the provincial prerogative in water management as established by the Canal and Drainage Act. Being directly answerable to the federal government, WAPDA is in charge of planning and executing schemes for a province or any part thereof in the following areas:
- irrigation, water supply and drainage,
- the generation, transmission and distribution of power, - flood control,
- the prevention of water-logging and reclamation of waterlogged and salted lands and
- inland navigation.
This wide range of authorities (Art. 8) makes WAPDA the predominant institution in the water sector. According to the WAPDA Act, the Authority has control over all water sources and an almost unlimited authority to initiate and implement water development schemes. Following the conclusion of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960, WAPDA has since overseen the expansion of the colonial irrigation system to a network of unseen dimensions, with Punjab at the centre of development. Being the sole executing agency in the water and power sectors and thus in charge of implementing the projects envisaged in the IWT and the accompanying Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement, WAPDA’s role has inevitably been strengthened.
600 This need was felt on both sides of the new border, in Pakistan as well as in India; cf. Michel: Indus
Rivers, op. cit., p. 345.
601 James Wescoat, S. Halvorson & D. Mustafa: Water management in the Indus Basin of Pakistan: a
half-century perspective; Water Resources Development, vol. 16, no. 3, 2000, p. 394.
602 WAPDA was established through the Water and Power Development Authority Act (XXXI, 1958).
The Act was published in the Gazette of West Pakistan, 24 April 1958. I am grateful to Chaudhry Mazhar Ali, advisor to the Irrigation and Power Dept. of the Punjab, for providing me a copy of the Act. Cf. Hermann Kreutzmann: Wasser aus Hochasien (Water from the Himalaya-Hindu Kush-Karakoram); in German); Geographische Rundschau, vol. 50, no. 7 – 8, 1998, p. 407 – 409.
WAPDA, with a workforce of over 130,000 employed in its Water and Power wings making it the country’s biggest employer after the military, WAPDA operates the water reservoirs and power plants and maintains the irrigation network.603 It is responsible for water releases and power supply. Led mostly by active and retired officers, WAPDA to date represents the military’s hold on power, the nation’s hydraulic mission, an attempt to overcome inter-provincial disputes by centralized decision-making, and a determination to raise the country’s stature through economic development. Headquartered in Lahore, near the governor’s mansion, WAPDA has also become another symbol of Punjab’s political and economic dominance.
Following the end of the One Unit system in 1971, the governments of the reinstituted provinces regained their authority over water management. In a step that marked the beginning of a gradual decentralization of water management, the provincial governments obtained some of the responsibilities they had before the One Unit came into being. The newly created provincial Irrigation and Power departments (IPD) – one per province – assumed responsibility of irrigation services, including operating and maintaining the canal network, and intra-provincial water allocation.604 Later their authority was extended to groundwater; in the Punjab this was realized by way of integrating the Punjab Soil Reclamation Board into the IPD (1973).605 Groundwater management, however, lacked precise regulations (for licensing and registration etc.), as Jehangir and Horinkova point out, and did not cover the whole range of groundwater pumps, limiting the effectiveness of the Soil Reclamation Act which regulated groundwater utilization.606
The expansion of the irrigation system multiplied existing problems like water-logging, the silting of barrages and dams and water allocation.607 Systematic drainage was introduced in 1963 – under the aegis of WAPDA – with the Salinity Control and Reclamation Project (SCARP).608 Under SCARP, executed in three phases between
1960 and 1999 according to the Soil Reclamation Act, nearly 20,000 deep tubewells were installed. Draining the used water in a way that will not affect soil fertility or fresh water inflows is vital to preserve the system’s productivity. The problem of water-logging and insufficient drainage is found throughout the Indus Basin, yet with marked differences according to the type of irrigation in operation and the gradient of
603 WAPDA Annual Report 2002 – 2003, p. 11. Details of the Treaty and the settlement plan will be
discussed in the water sharing section.
604 Power generation, in spite of the name, would by and large remain within the authority of WAPDA. 605 The Board was exclusively charged with groundwater management, as envisaged in the Punjab
Soil Reclamation Act (XXI, 1952). Cf. Jehangir & Horinkova: Institutional constraints, op. cit., p. 9. Document text: Chauhan: Manual, op. cit.
606 Ibidem, p. 10.
607 For an overview and assessment of drainage measures cf. Sam H. Johnson, III: Large-scale
irrigation and drainage schemes in Pakistan; in: Gerald T. O’Mara, ed.: Efficiency in irrigation. The conjunctive use of surface and groundwater resources. A World Bank symposium; Washington, D.C.: WB, 1988, p. 69 – 72. For an overview of SCARP cf. Shahid Amjad Chaudhry: Pakistan: Indus Basin water strategy – past, present and future; Lahore Journal of Economics, vol. 15, Sept. 2010, p. 190. Cf. Fred Scholz: Bewässerung in Pakistan (Irrigation in Pakistan; in German); Erdkunde, no. 38, 1984, p. 221. Sophisticated monitoring enables researchers to pinpoint waterlogged and saline spots, thanks to research done at IWMI; cf. Salman Asif & Mubeen-ul-Din Ahmad: Using state-of-the-art RS and GIS for monitoring waterlogging and salinity; Proceedings of the Roundtable Meeting of the International Programme for Technology and Research in Irrigation and Drainage, Lahore, 10 – 11 November 2000; www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y3690E/y3690e0a.htm (Aug. 2007). For a geographical overview of SCARP see: Government of Pakistan: Atlas of Pakistan; Rawalpindi: Survey of Pakistan, 1986, p. 85.
608 M. Akhbar Bhatti & J. Kijne: Irrigation allocation problems at tertiary level in Pakistan; Water
the terrain. According to Azad, Sindh’s lands are particularly affected as nearly 50 per cent of all irrigated fields lack drainage and are therefore particularly prone to water-logging which in turn translates into falling productivity.609 Azad notes that this problem tends to be underestimated as one can see from inadequate budget allocations which are commonly based on arbitrary estimates rather than scientific assessments.610
But again this aspect of water management is more complex, as McCready points out.611 Drainage, just like water allocation, has a marked provincial dimension. Drainage in Sindh, identified as a challenge as early as 1932, at the time of the construction of the Sukkur Barrage, faced particular obstacles due to the low water table and the disposal of flood water in summer. After a series of studies, the Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) was started in 1974, then the largest project, to improve irrigation in the eastern part of Sindh, downstream of Sukkur.612 The LBOD is generally considered a costly, yet successful project that enabled farmers to reclaim vast tracts of already abandoned land.
In a move that signalled greater provincial authority, water management was extended to the farm level in the late 1970s and 1980s. Launched in the Punjab in 1976, the On-Farm Water Management (OFWM) Directorate, under the supervision of the provincial Agriculture Department, initiated farm-level water works like land levelling and watercourse lining in cooperation with farmers.613 The On-Farm Water Management concept is credited with raising the productivity of water and contributing to greater equality in water allocation.614 This step, in principle, was important for the over-all performance of the irrigation system because, as World Bank researchers have found, the largest percentage losses in the irrigation system occur below the level of canals on watercourses and fields.615 From an engineering perspective, the hardening and lining of canals in order to increase flow velocity have succeeded in raising the water availability at the farm gate while decreasing salinity
609 A. Azad: Sindh water resources management – issues and options; FAO Investment Centre
Occasional Paper series, no. 15, 2003; Rome: FAO, 2003, p. 11; http://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/af1050/af1050e00.pdf (March 2011). Cf. Kaiser Bengali: Water management under constraints: the need for a paradigm shift; in: Michael Kugelman & R. Hathaway, eds.: Running on empty. Pakistan’s water crisis; Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009, p. 55; www.wilsoncenter.org (March 2011).
610 Ibidem, p. 13. Cf. also Khalid Hussain: Poverty alleviation through protection of water resources –
integrated approaches. A case study of the IMT process in the IBIS; paper presented at the international conference Water for Life, Coimbatore, India, 19 – 21 Sept. 2001), p. 6; www.kkstiftung.de/Entwicklungszusammenarbeit/dokucontent.htm (April 2003).
611 W. McCready: Left bank outfall drain in Pakistan; Water Resources Journal (FAO), March 1988, p.
68 – 70.
612 Ibidem, p. 69; Asian Development Bank: Project completion report on the Left Bank Outfall Drain
project (Stage I); Manila: ADB, 2000; www.adb.org/Documents/PCRs/PAK/pcr_pak17055.pdf (August 2002).
613 The On-Farm Water Management and Water Users’ Associations Ordinance (V, 1981) defines the
scope of OFWM and the role of WUA; document text: Chauhan: Manual, op. cit., p. 504 ff. Cf. Jehangir & Horinkova: Institutional constraints, op. cit., p. 15; Henning Fahlbusch, B. Schultz & C. D. Thatte: The Indus Basin – history of irrigation, drainage and flood management; New Delhi: ICID, 2004, p. 318. The cost of water works were shared between farmers and the Directorate. The other provinces have enacted similar ordinances; cf. Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Cooperatives: Co- operatives and Water Users’ Associations; Islamabad: GoP, 1987, p. 5 – 10.
614 Ibidem, p. 82 – 85, 94.
615 Masood Ahmad & G. Kutcher: Irrigation planning with environmental considerations. A study of
levels and water losses through seepage.616 From a rational choice perspective, the reason of effective maintenance of water works and better allocation of water to tail- enders is the active involvement of the stakeholders (farmers).617
In a further step, again under the auspices of the Irrigation and Power Department (IPD) of the Punjab, farmers were encouraged to form Water User Associations (WUA) to jointly operate farm level water works. This move, expected to lead to a shift of responsibilities from the IPD to the farmers, failed because of institutional obstacles built in the respective ordinance. In effect, the government’s determination to preserve the control over irrigation works down to the farm level blocked WUAs from taking over legal responsibility of canal operation and water management.618 The Asian Development Bank (ADB), a major supporting agency in Pakistan’s water sector, concluded that there is limited scope for broadening the activities of WUAs.619 One reason, according to ADB, is the provincial government’s focus on infrastructure, rather than on water supplies. Another reason is the status-orientation of the personnel. Performance-oriented incentives – positive and negative – are not employed, furthering a tendency to ignore farmers’ concerns.620
The National Drainage Programme (NDP), initiated in 1997, was designed as a more comprehensive approach to drainage than the Left Bank Outfall Drain. Based on World Bank recommendations, the NDP was formalized by Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority Acts that would replace the Irrigation and Power Departments, in an effort to further decentralize water management and enhance private sector participation in management and financing.621 The PIDAs’ purpose is water allocation at the canal level, to operate tubewells, to execute drainage and to formulate water management policies.622 Area Water Boards (AWB), canal level organizations initiated and overseen by PIDA, link the Authority with Farmer Organizations (FO), groups of farmers that are responsible for the distribution of water allocated to them by the PIDA. In theory, AWB and FO would be linked through agreements on the services to be provided by PIDA, ensuring a degree on transparency and allowing for active cooperation between AWB officials and farmers.
616 Asian Development Bank: Second On-Farm Water Management Project. Project performance audit
report; Manila: ADB, March 2000, p. 11. The report cites the motivation of the farmers to maintain their watercourses as a major factor in OFWM’s success.
617 Ibidem. This assessment applies to the second OFWM stage. The World Bank finds that
privatization of SCARPs in Punjab by replacing government owned and operated large tube wells with community owned and operated small capacity shallow tube wells was perhaps the most successful and path breaking investment supported by the Bank; cf. World Bank: Pakistan country water resources assistance strategy. Water economy – running dry; report no. 34081-PK; Washington, D.C.: WB, 2005, p. 99.
618 World Bank: Punjab private sector groundwater development project. Staff appraisal report, no.
15207-PAK; Washington, D.C.: WB, 1996, paragraph 30 (no page numbers).
619 ADB: Second OFWM, op. cit., p. 11.
620 Ibidem. Cf. Waheed Chaudhry: Water Users’ Associations in Pakistan: institutional, organizational
and participatory aspects; PhD dissertation, Institute of Rural Development, University of Göttingen, 1997; http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/diss/1997/chaudh/thesis.pdf (July 2011), p. 90 – 94. Chaudhry traces this orientation back to the colonial administration.
621 Waltina Scheumann & Yameen Memon: Reforming governance systems for drainage in Pakistan.
Toward an interdisciplinary and integrated approach to agricultural drainage in Pakistan; Agriculture and Rural Development Working Paper no. 11, 2004 (World Bank), p. 48 – 49. Cf. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development & International Development Association: Management report and recommendation in response to the inspection panel investigation report: Pakistan National Drainage Program Project; Washington, D.C.: IBRD/IDA (World Bank), 2006, p. 13.
The implementation of the programme, however, faced a number of obstacles, as a World Bank review found: The existing Irrigation and Power Departments (IPD) proved unwilling to hand over control over provincial water resources, as stated in the PIDA Act (Art. 8 of Punjab’s PIDA Act).623 A look at today’s provincial water management in fact finds PIDA and IPD existing side by side – a symptom of incomplete reform, as even the government partly admits.624 Jehangir and Horinkova observe that legal fragmentation, i.e. the existence of parallel, partly overlapping laws, hinders the implementation of the reform as much as one-sided regulations favouring the provincial authority and the AWB, at the expense of the farmers which are, in a sense, answerable to the AWB (and thus the government), but in a position of uncertainty regarding the water services they are entitled to.625 The Farmer Organizations are limited to landowners, adding an economic hurdle to participation that effectively excludes tenants.626
Behind this deficient institutional change is the vague wording of the PIDA Act which does not mention the existing IPDs which are the starting point of the reform, nor any procedure of transferring responsibilities. The reference to the Canal and Drainage Act (Art. 5) is noteworthy in this context, as the CDA, valid since 1873, only asserts the provincial government’s prerogative.627 Understandably, at least from an institutional and rational choice perspective, the expected loss of influence of IPDs was not welcomed by IPD staff, nor by the provincial governments which would face smaller budgets as a result of the reform. Correspondingly, at the canal level, the farmers identified a lack of qualified information and professional interest on the part of the officials as a major hindrance.628 Recently, Sindh and Punjab have issued regulations detailing the implementation of the programme. The original PIDA Act of Sindh, a fairly brief law lacking – like the other PIDA Acts – provisions on the implementation of PIDAs, was revoked in 2002 and replaced by the much more comprehensive Sindh Water Management Ordinance (XL, 2002).629 This Ordinance
is significant because of its detailed provisions regarding the authority of PIDA, AWB and FO, a modus operandi for the transition period (Art. 96, 97) and even a dispute settlement mechanism (Art. 83). Punjab has upheld its original PIDA Act and added official rules for its implementation, like the Pilot Area Water Board Rules (2005).630
623 World Bank: Pakistan country water assistance, op. cit., p. 99. Cf. Muhammad Junaid Usman
Akhtar: Institutional reforms in irrigation. Review of National Drainage Programme (NDP) in Pakistan; proceedings of the 1st South Asia Water Forum, Kathmandu, 26 – 28 February 2002; Islamabad: Pakistan Water Partnership (PWP), 2002, p. 111.
624 Ministry of Water and Power, Office of the Chief Engineering Advisor and Chairman of the Federal
Flood Commission: Pakistan water sector strategy. Detailed strategy formulation, vol. 4; Islamabad: GoP, Oct. 2002, p. 20, 166, 182, 231; http://cms.waterinfo.net.pk/?q=wss (July 2011). As of July 2011, the PIDA of Punjab is in the process of implementing wide ranging reforms under its economic vision and water strategy in order to provide adequate equitable and reliable Irrigation supplies to the culturable lands of Punjab, aiming of enhanced agricultural productivity; Punjab’s PIDA has held over 40 meetings, and five AWBs are operating; http://pida.punjab.gov.pk. Within the responsibility of Sindh’s PIDA five AWBs are in place; www.sida.org.pk.
625 Waqar Jehangir & V. Horinkova: Institutional constraints, op. cit., p. 18. 626 Ibidem.
627 This CDA reference applies to the PIDA Act of the Punjab. All four Acts, differing mainly in structure
and sequence of provisions, contain the same article.
628 For the findings of an IWMI farm survey cf. Ralf Starkloff & Waheed-uz-Zaman: Farmers’
participation and empowerment in Pakistan’s institutional reform of the irrigation sector: the farmers’ view of the process; paper presented at Deutscher Tropentag 1999, Berlin, 14 – 15 Oct. 1999, p. 5; http://ftp.gwdg.de/pub/tropentag/proceedings/1999/referate/IOR2.pdf (April 2010).
629 Document text: www.sida.org.pk/ordinace/default.asp (7/2011).
The general institutional weakness in the overall reform process, according to the World Bank, is poor governance, especially the lack of accountability and transparency in water management organizations.631 The result is a lack of trust of farmers in the government and a failure to meet set targets. Taken together, the institutional deficits and the self-interests of the major institutions (i.e. the IPD/PIDA staff), at last the provincial governments themselves, are the most significant reasons why the NDP has not been a greater success. Drainage in some parts has been improved, taking advantage of additional international funding and technological- scientific support. But inefficient operations, delays and poor planning have hampered progress and undermined the NDP’s financial viability.632
It is not surprising that an inter-provincial drainage accord, or national drainage accord, as envisioned by the World Bank, has not materialized yet. Though from the perspective of integrated water resources management (IWRM) that focuses on the river, such an agreement that binds all stakeholders of the basin together would undoubtedly make sense, it is the political concerns that stand in its way.633 Further decentralization and partial privatization of irrigation services mean a gradual withdrawal of the state, translating into loss of status, loss of budget, loss of influence. Stalling the reform process, in other words, is a matter of survival for the public sector – even at the price of exacerbating the water crisis.