There is a form o f incommensurability that is not directly associated with the ontology o f money, but with the epistemology o f money — and other things besides. The reason this is worth mentioning is because slippage between ontology and epistemology (the epistemic fallacy and the relativism this generates) which is a continual Post-structuralist threat, can cause ontological confusion and, in this case, about the ontology o f money. We might, because o f this, end up confusing money and our theories o f money.
The form o f incommensurability I have in mind here is that which can take place between competing theories.22 Tomass (2001), for example, observes the possibility o f incommensurability between rival monetary theories by Mises and Marx. He postulates three elements, which may constitute economic paradigms and thereby incommensurability between the rival monetary theories: different starting points, different methodological procedures and different conceptual schemes. Tomass starts by assuming that incommensurability exists between those rival monetary theories. Contrary to his own starting assumption, however, Tomass concludes that rival monetary theories are commensurable on the grounds o f their logical compatibility, that is that they can stand in relations o f logical consistency or inconsistency.
Understanding this (theoretical) incommensurability and, thereby, avoiding the epistemic fallacy, requires that we break relativism into two different kinds — epistemic and judgemental relativism.
Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism
Epistemic relativism is the view that the world can only be known in terms o f available descriptions or discourses. The way we conceptualise the world, reflects our epistemic standpoint(s). There is no independent access to the world. We have no choice but to confront the world via our conceptual apparatus. This means, o f course, that all accounts, theories, models, descriptions, explanations and so on, are theory laden, or as Fleetwood (2005) calls them, conceptually mediated. And accounts o f money are no different. To say that an account o f money is conceptually mediated, or to say that we can only know money in terms o f some account or other, is not to say that money is simply an epiphenomena o f this theory or these accounts. There are many ways o f saying this, so allow me to say it in several ways to avoid any confusion. Whilst an account o f money is a social construct it is not a mere social construct. Whilst an account o f money is conceptually mediated, it is not simply an epiphenomenon o f our concepts, it is irreducible to our concepts. That is, some entity, some referent remains as money and now, alongside it as it were, the fact that we have
22 Incommensurability between theories may arise from other facts (Richardson, 1994, p. 260): (a) a
priori nature o f knowledge: much o f what is learned is seemingly a priori or definitional. W hat is a
priori or definitional may serve as a criterion o f correctness for the elaboration o f other parts o f one’s view, (b) Different cognitive ends: Values that go into defining what is taken as theoretical success,
a concept with which to deal conceptually with it. Fleetwood (2005) would say money is an example o f a ‘socially real’ entity — i.e. it is not materially, artefactually, nor conceptually real. It is possible to say different theories o f money are incommensurable, because they are epistemically relative. But let us be clear, the charge o f (theoretical) incommensurability goes further than this. Let us see how far, and whether or not we need to go this far. There might be incommensurability between different accounts o f money in the sense that all accounts o f money (or whatever) are conceptually mediated. Although money can only be known in terms o f some accounts o f money, this does not mean money is simply an epiphenomenon o f these accounts, a mere social construct. Money remains as a common referent. Epistemic relativism simply makes the claim that what we see is coloured by our standpoint. It makes no claims about judging.
Incommensurability and Judgmental Relativism
Judgmental Relativism is the view that, because o f epistemic relativism, one cannot judge between different accounts and decide whether or not some accounts are better than the others. And accounts o f money are no different. But here we see the ontological slippage at work. Underlying judgmental relativism is an ontological commitment. When advocates o f judgemental relativism say an account o f money is conceptually mediated, or say that we can only know money in terms o f some account or other, the clear implication here is that money is simply an epiphenomena o f this theory or these accounts. Money is a mere social construct; it is reducible to our concepts. That is, there is no entity, no referent that remains as money. All we have are competing accounts o f money. In this case, we cannot compare our account o f money to money itself, because the account socially constructs money. With no referent against which to compare pour account, all we can do is compare accounts to one another. Clearly, from this ontological position, judgmental relativism is unavoidable. It is possible to say different accounts o f money are incommensurable, because they are judgementally relative. But here is the snag. Judgemental relativism is avoidable because the ontology upon which it rests is avoidable. Judgemental relativism is avoidable provided we are willing to keep a distinction between our account o f the world, and the world itself; between our account o f money, and money
itself. To deny this distinction is to accept some form o f subjective idealism, to accept that our thinking, theorising, talking or whatever, about the world makes the world. I suggest that almost no-one does hold this position, not even Post-structuralists. The reason many Post-structuralists end up ensnared by judgemental relativism is because they are ontologically ambiguous.
In sum, then, Critical Realists accept epistemic relativism without having to go the extra step and accepting judgemental reason. That said, there is nothing in my claim that suggests judging between competing accounts or theories is easy. To be sure, it is often exceptionally difficult: but it is not an impossible task. Thus, this thesis accepts epistemic relativism, but does not accept judgmental relativism: it accepts incommensurability between theoretical discourses only in respect o f epistemic relativism.23
There is incommensurability between different theoretical discourses on money (e.g. neo-classical, Keynesian, Monetarist, Marxist, Austrian) in a sense that money is conceptually mediated: money can only be known in terms o f some accounts o f money, whilst there is money as a common referent. (Crude) idealists or subjectivists in the Post-structuralist camp, however, claim that there is no such thing as money as a common referent, but our different accounts, stories and theories o f money. From this viewpoint, discourse is always everywhere as our creative force, with whomever it is involved, theorists or money users. It should not be forgotten, however, that incommensurability between values and ‘constitutive incommensurability’, argued above, could neither be derived from nor reduced to incommensurability between (theoretical) discourses.24 The former forms o f incommensurability are not a result o f our different accounts, stories and theories o f money and incommensurability: it is not
fruitfulness in engendering hypothesis, and explanatory value.
23 There is an interesting twist in my standpoint. I take a ‘commensurabilist’ standpoint for theoretical discourses. From a viewpoint o f epistemic relativism without accepting judgm ental relativism, I defends the logical compatibility o f different theories on money: rival monetary theories are
commensurable on the grounds o f their logical compatibility. In contrast, however, I take an ‘incom m ensurabilist’ standpoint for certain social relations and value commitments. I believe in the existence o f constitutively incommensurable items and options, which are constituted by a refusal to put a price on them. See 3.2 for further arguments on constitutive incommensurability.
This argument is related to discourse, which will be argued later on. This thesis argues against
reductionism between two dimensions o f discourse: incommensurability as discourse (i.e. intransitive
dimension) can neither be derived from nor reduced into discourse about incommensurability (i.e.
the case that there is money and incommensurability because they are regarded as