As previously discussed, a pervasive development in armed conflict has been the deployment of children and adolescents, often in large numbers as active child soldiers in combat (Singer 2006: 4-5, Wessells 2006: 3). During the armed conflict, between 30,000 – 50,000 child soldiers or “Kadagos” (little ones), have been active in DRC (Bell 2006: 4, Singer 2006: 21, Wessells 2006: 13). Although the figure of active child soldiers in DRC has been reduced somewhat the last few years, there are still at least 7-8000 child soldiers remaining, mainly within the northeastern parts of the country (Pauletto and Patel 2010: 36). Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers estimates that nearly 40,000 child soldiers have been released from armed groups in recent years (2011: 10). Quantifiable statistics are however scarce in this region and these figures are perhaps more the result of educated guesses than accurate science. Yet judging from the number of child soldiers who have passed through intervention programmes10, the higher estimates are probably more authentic. All
armed groups both national and foreign, have recruited child soldiers in various degrees. In some armed groups, underage soldiers amount for as much as one-third of the total number of soldiers according to the UN (Achvarina 2008: 2). Girls are believed to make up
10At the start of 2007, 54,000 children had according to Thakur passed through official intervention programmes, several thousand had been repatriated to neighbouring countries, and an estimated 15-20,000 were still awaiting formal assistance (2007: 54). At least 11.000 had self-demobilized according to UNICEF (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008: 4). However, it is imperative to consider that both under- and over- reporting may implicate these figures.
32 approximately 40% of the total number of child soldiers in DRC, serving a wide arrange of roles just like their male counterpart (Bell 2006: 4). Still, girls represent only a minority of the total number of child soldiers who had passed through intervention programmes (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008: 4). Findings by Tonheim suggest that female child soldiers experience significant levels of stigmatization upon reintegration, potentially “hampering” this process (2011).
Most child soldiers are recruited in their teens between the ages of twelve and eighteen, and both forced and voluntary recruitment has been present (Bayer et al. 2007: 557, ILO 2003: 37). The lack of verifiable knowledge impedes any attempt to conclude which approach has been the dominant one. Although some research suggests that the majority of child soldiers had some initiative in their own recruitment, many respondents cited lack of security, food and widespread fear as important reasons for joining armed groups (ILO 2003: 29). Recruitment factors for many child soldiers may therefore be a mixture between voluntary and indirect coercive. Abduction-led recruitment has also been frequently used. Re- recruitment figures are speculated to as high as 60% in eastern parts of the country (ILO 2003: 37). Child soldiers in DRC generally express a high level of both witnessing and participating in severe violent acts (Bayer et al. 2007: 558, ILO 2003: 43).
The considerable need for child soldiers in DRC corresponds closely with the almost uninterrupted violent conflict that has characterized the country since the mid-1990s. This warfare has every trademark of contemporary protracted social conflict including prolonged fighting, relative little direct combat between belligerents, large flows of displaced population and direct targeting of civilians (Gates and Reich 2010: 8). The armed groups’ demand for cost-effective combatants combined with child labour traditions are likely considerable factors in explaining the vast use of underage soldiers. People aged fifteen and younger constitute about half the population in DRC, reinforcing the great availability for potential child soldiers (Britannica 2012). Availability alone should however not be viewed as a causal explanation for why child soldiering is so widespread here.
Formalized child soldier intervention in DRC dates back to the period between the two Congolese Wars, and numerous international NGOs and national CBOs conduct work of this kind throughout the country (DAI 2007: 30). In addition, DRC has also collaborated in a multi-country demobilization and reintegration program (MDRP) with neighboring countries. Still, perhaps as little as 50% of returning child soldiers have had access to “reintegration support” (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2011: 2). There is also notable difference between child soldier intervention work in DRC, and comparable work in Angola,
33 Liberia and Sierra Leone. DRC is to some extent still characterized by armed conflict, as opposed to the other African countries, where intervention work occurred mainly in post- conflict environments. Therefore, child soldier intervention efforts as traditionally defined may not be entirely appropriate in DRC according to Pauletto and Patel (2010: 48).
International pressure and increased focus on the illegality of using underage soldiers was an important step into reducing the amount of child soldiers in DRC. Following the attempt to unify several armed groups into a national Congolese army in 2002, the criminalization of recruiting child soldiers became increasingly more important. This had some profound effects. Thousands of child soldiers were released from their respective armed groups, many sent to join formalized intervention programmes, others to self-demobilize. Armed groups reluctant to comply with the army unification adopted approaches to become even more covert in their child soldier usage and recruitment, sometimes even abandoning child soldiers to care for themselves. Some groups have disregarded all developments made while continuously recruited underage accomplices (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008: 2). In March 2006, the Congolese Major Jean-Pierre Biyoyo became the first person to be convicted for recruiting child soldiers, a case which established an important precedent in international law (Chikuhwa 2010: 48). Another case from DRC, rebel commander Thomas Lubanga was the first militia leader brought to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for child soldier recruitment (Beber and Blattman 2011: 1). At the time of writing, the international criminal court has delivered the “first verdict in its 10-year history”, finding Thomas Lubanga guilty of recruiting child soldiers (The Guardian 2012).