La inclusión en los servicios financieros

Before giving my account of why group membership matters for self-respect I want to consider the prima facie similar accounts given by Kymlicka and Raz. I want to treat their accounts together for two reasons. First, both thinkers focus primarily on cultural groups, and give a ‘conceptual’ account of the importance of membership in such groups to self-respect. In claiming that their accounts are ‘conceptual’ I mean to highlight how they both insist that membership of a cultural group is necessary for an individual to be able to conceive of her options in a meaningful way, over and above the practical benefits that membership of a group brings.

The second reason for bracketing Kymlicka and Raz together is that they are both declared ‘multiculturalists’. What marks out an approach as multiculturalist are the special measures it recommends for coping with problems of identity and difference.^ Raz gives a threefold classification of responses to cultural difference which helps in understanding the nature of multiculturalism. Each category should be thought of as transcending its predecessor.

’ Arising, for Kymlicka, either from ‘incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a larger state’, (Multicultural Citizenship, p. 10),or from group or individual immigration.

Toleration: An attitude and policies of toleration revolve around ‘letting minorities conduct themselves as they wish without being criminalised, so long as they do not interfere with the culture of the majority, and with the ability of members of the majority to enjoy the lifestyle of their culture*/ An attitude and policies of toleration are justified by the Harm Principle— that coercion of those whose actions do not cause harm to others is unjustified—or by reference to reasons of social stability and peace, as evinced in the emergence of pleas for toleration after the wars of religion in the 17 th century/

Non-Discrimination Rights: Non-discrimination rights are individual rights not to be discriminated against. These rights often interfere with policies barring the access of particular individuals to important social institutions—schools, workplace, political office— on the grounds of their membership of a group. Policies of non-discrimination transcend Toleration because Toleration alone merely prevents certain forms of coercive interference with groups; it does not recommend granting access to important social institutions to members of tolerated groups.’"

* J, Raz, ‘Multiculturalism’, Ethics in the Public Domain (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), p. 157.

’ The classic text here is, of course, John Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration.

Multiculturalism: ‘While incorporating policies of non-discrimination, liberal multiculturalism transcends the individualistic approach which they tend to incorporate, and recognises the importance of unimpeded membership in a respected and flourishing cultural group for individual well-being.’" Only multiculturalism can yield policies, thinks Raz, which give wholehearted protection to cultural groups, given the importance of membership in these groups.'^

It is a truism that liberal multicultural approaches require a workable distinction between cultural and non-cultural groups to be convincing. I will argue in this section that Kymlicka’s and Raz’s conceptual accounts of the importance of cultural membership do not support a workable distinction between cultural and non-cultural groups. In the next section I offer a practical account of the importance of group membership for self-respect which suggests a workable distinction between cultural and non-cultural groups.

" J. Raz, ‘Multiculturalism’, Ethics in the Public Domain, p. 174.

Examples of such policies given by Raz are: education in one’s own culture and about the cultures of others; respect in public and private companies— within the limits of toleration— for the cultural practices of employees; economic policies to remove the link between certain cultural groups and poverty; public support for ‘autonomous cultural institutions’; a fair division of public space. ‘Multiculturalism’, Ethics in the Public Domain, pp. 174-175.

Kymlicka

... cultural membership is not a means used in the pursuit of one’s ends. It is rather the context within which we choose our ends, and come to see their value, and this is a precondition of self-respect, of the sense that one’s ends are worth pursuing. And it affects our very sense of personal identity and capacity. When we take cultural identity seriously, we’ll understand that asking someone to trade off her cultural identity for some amount of money is like expecting someone to trade off her self-respect for some amount of money. Having money for the pursuit of one’s ends is of little help if the price involves giving up the context within which those ends are worth pursuing.'^

Kymlicka’s claim is that cultural membership is a special sort of primary good in virtue of its relationship to self-respect. Unlike, for example, the relationship between self-respect and income and wealth (about which I will have more to say in chapters 6 and 7), the relationship between self-respect and cultural membership is not a practical, means-ends one. Rather, cultural membership is conceptually necessary for self-respect: cultural membership

provides the context without which we could not make choices supportive of self-respect/'* In Multicultural Citizenship Kymlicka claims that:

Whether or not a course of action has any significance for us depends on whether, and how, our language renders vivid to us the point of that activity. And the way in which language renders vivid these activities is shaped by our history, our ‘traditions and conventions’. Understanding these cultural narratives is a precondition of making intelligent judgements about how to lead our lives.**

When one deliberates about courses of action and how they will affect one’s self-respect one reflects—however inchoately— on one’s self­ conception; one thinks about the kind of person one is and wants to be, and makes decisions on the basis of these beliefs and desires. Relating this conception of self-respect to Kymlicka’s claim: one’s understanding of who

J. Tomasi expresses this idea well in his ‘Kymlicka, Liberalism and Respect for Cultural