La relación entre espacio y desarrollo sostenible

Although Peirce’s account of scientific progress through successive corrective steps is justified, in my opinion, there is a problem in his account of convergence on the truth, because it presupposes that true theories from all particular sciences can be systemized in a single theoretical framework or in one single theory through the unification of sciences. But, in order this account to be true, one has to examine:

1. Whether the complexity of nature, which consists of the infinite multiplicity of particulars, can be comprehended by progressively better theories of each particular science, which are concerned with general regularities (universals) that represent adequately the natural phenomena.

2. Whether the different scientific theories from the different layers of reality, which arise from particular disciplines, allow that or they have limits due to the fragmentary view of each discipline and the different irreducible levels (layers) of the world.

3. Whether can be solved the problem of different languages that each particular discipline uses, since the ideal single theory that could describe completely the ‘real’ must be expressed by a universal language.

4. Whether there is such a guarantee that the world can be explained by a single theory that is true in all possible worlds, taking into account the limits of our language and the finitude of minds of scientific community, compared with the increase of diversity of nature and the inexhaustibility of the laws as infinite potentialities in macrocosm, microcosm and other space-time dimensions. Moreover, granted fallibilism, the definition of the ‘real’ is inexhaustible, therefore it should be without definite limits.

Peirce provided a sufficient account for the first question with his notion of the reality of

Thirdness, in a sense of both real regularities (habits) and universal qualities (‘would be’s’:

dispositions to behave in a certain way under certain conditions), which allows us to systemize the particulars in general laws. He showed that scientific inquiry is self- corrective for single disciplines; therefore it can gradually approach the approximate representation of these real laws of nature as an ideal limit. He showed, first, that the three

forms of scientific inference (abduction, deduction and induction) are irreducible, second, that each one involves a distinct leading principle that contributes to the self-correction, and third, that the whole unity forms a dialectical process that in the long run of application could lead to the cessation of doubt and the settlement of fixed beliefs, which represent approximately the real external world.

His view of abduction (only the premises not the conclusions must be directly observable) provided a sufficient tool for inquiries into unobservable entities in the twentieth Century. He developed the probabilistic account of induction, which has been applied to current statistical theory and has shown the direction in which (theory of probable inference with long-run probabilities) can be found a solution to Hume’s problem and Carnap’s226 requirement of total evidence. In this sense Peirce’s proposed method provided a solution to overcome both the weakness of induction and the weakness of the traditional Hypothetico- Deductive method (HD).

His notion of continuity (synechism) and his weak fallibilism provided a sufficient account for the predictability of scientific method, the knowability of universal laws, and it is distinguished from strong fallibilism that can lead to skepticism or agnosticism, because it can contribute to the establishing true beliefs open to further modification.

But Peirce’s historicism and metaphysical notion of cognitive evolution failed to give an account of the convergence upon truth, so to say, science will finally reach asymptotically to the true representation of reality by a single theoretical framework. Because Peirce did not explore the question nr.2, since although there are signs of unification of theories or disciplines, it is questionable whether e.g. biological or social phenomena that entail intentionality and teleological features can be represented by the same universal laws of physics and chemistry; therefore this notion is subject to further inquiry.

As for the question nr.3, Peirce tried with his theory of signs to find a solution to this problem, but he did not complete this work. Certainly, this notion gave rise to further inquiry in that direction by philosophers in the twentieth century (language as representation or correspondence), since representation does not involve only our language

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Carnap Rudolf in (1950), Logical Foundations of Probability, p. 211, holds: ‘In the application of inductive logic to a given knowledge situation, the total evidence available must be taken as basis for determining the degree of confirmation’.

but also symbols, models, mathematical and diagrammatic representations. Finally, concerning question nr. 4, which is the most questionable and unexplored from all until today, he only drew an analogy from one particular discipline to all disciplines.

Peirce’s ideal view of scientific community, did not take into consideration that scientific communities, like all other communities, are governed by some ethical norms or values; it consists of individual scientists, therefore emotional motivation of each investigator has been very significant factor for the advancement of inquiry. These considerations gave rise to the introduction of sociology of science and contributed to the development of social sciences in that direction227. From this point of view, Peirce’s notion of scientific community was not developed enough, so as to explore the necessary conditions and institutional characteristics, which can secure its independent, autonomous, democratic and inquiring role, against the influence of prevalent notions (paradigma) of the ‘normal science’, as Thomas Kuhn (1970) argues.

Peirce provided an account for the justification of abduction through his notion of

Thirdness (Thirdness is given in perception), as a causal principle between two entities

under certain conditions, which can justify the consequent-antecedent relation in abduction and allows us to infer from consequent to the unknown antecedent and to make predictions. Furthermore, his notion of universal qualities as dispositions of all things of the same class to behave in a certain way under certain conditions, though conditional and relative to our actions (Peircean ‘would be’s’), it justifies the classification of particular events to one of the general classes. But this ability to recognize universal qualities or classes, as I have argued, we have acquired by generalization and after having perceived many members of the class, that is, by inductive generalizations; therefore abduction is based partly upon crude induction. This aspect Peirce did not take into consideration. However, this does not underestimate the important function of abduction, which can lead us to inferring about causal relation and classification of entities; therefore abduction is the only kind of inferences that can introduce new ideas into our body of beliefs.

As Laudan pointed out, Peirce did not develop the account of the self-corrective character of abduction enough and especially the technique to find better alternative hypotheses. But, as I argued, Peirce with his view ‘induction corrects its premises’ implied a way of

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modifying the hypotheses by correcting the premises of abductive inference. This in association with his proposed ‘economy of research’ (criteria of admissibility of the hypotheses) and the development of scientific skill through scientific community provided a technique for drawing better hypotheses.

But sometimes modern inquiry deals with problems such as confounding factors that produce similar data; therefore it is not clear whether the inductive verification concerns the hypothesis in question or its background assumptions, as there is no clear distinction between them. Furthermore, modern inquiry deals with unobservable phenomena, underdetermination, theory-laden devices, lack of detecting devices at all etc. All these problems may require more careful planning and predesignation of experimental verification, so as to diminish these factors. It might also require suspension of judgment until new evidential data favors one of the rival hypotheses or the background assumptions (auxiliary hypotheses), or some more criteria of admissibility of hypotheses, or even an algorithmic way of connecting all these criteria with appropriate weights. For all the above mentioned reasons it is apparent that the abductive phase of scientific research is subject to further inquiry. Therefore in the second part of the study I am going to appeal to the scientific methodology that Lavoisier followed in the Chemical Revolution for the construction of the oxygen theory, so as to evaluate the different aspects of Peirce’s SCT (scientists’ skill, self-corrective sorts of inference, criteria of admissibility of the hypotheses, fallibilism, scientific community etc.), and in case of discovering any weaknesses of Peirce’s SCT to introduce some new aspects.